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Every society clings to a myth by which it lives. Ours 
is the myth of economic growth. For the last five 
decades the pursuit of growth has been the single 
most important policy goal across the world. The 
global economy is almost five times the size it was 
half a century ago. If it continues to grow at the 
same rate the economy will be 80 times that size 
by the year 2100. 
This extraordinary ramping up of global economic 
activity has no historical precedent. It’s totally at 
odds with our scientific knowledge of the finite 
resource base and the fragile ecology on which 
we depend for survival. And it has already been 
accompanied by the degradation of an estimated 
60% of the world’s ecosystems. 
For the most part, we avoid the stark reality 
of these numbers. The default assumption is that 
– financial crises aside – growth will continue 
indefinitely. Not just for the poorest countries, where 
a better quality of life is undeniably needed, but 
even for the richest nations where the cornucopia 
of material wealth adds little to happiness and 
is beginning to threaten the foundations of our 
wellbeing. 
The reasons for this collective blindness are easy 
enough to find. The modern economy is structurally 
reliant on economic growth for its stability. When 
growth falters – as it has done recently – politicians 
panic. Businesses struggle to survive. People lose 
their jobs and sometimes their homes. A spiral of 
recession looms. Questioning growth is deemed to 
be the act of lunatics, idealists and revolutionaries. 
But question it we must. The myth of growth 
has failed us. It has failed the two billion people 
who still live on less than $2 a day. It has failed 
the fragile ecological systems on which we depend 
for survival. It has failed, spectacularly, in its own 
terms, to provide economic stability and secure 
people’s livelihoods.
Today we find ourselves faced with the imminent 
end of the era of cheap oil, the prospect (beyond the 
recent bubble) of steadily rising commodity prices, 
the degradation of forests, lakes and soils, conflicts 
over land use, water quality, fishing rights and the 
momentous challenge of stabilising concentrations 
of carbon in the global atmosphere. And we face 
these tasks with an economy that is fundamentally 
broken, in desperate need of renewal. 
In these circumstances, a return to business 
as usual is not an option. Prosperity for the few 
founded on ecological destruction and persistent 
social injustice is no foundation for a civilised society. 
Economic recovery is vital. Protecting people’s jobs – 
and creating new ones – is absolutely essential. But 
we also stand in urgent need of a renewed sense 
of shared prosperity. A commitment to fairness and 
flourishing in a finite world. 
Delivering these goals may seem an unfamiliar 
or even incongruous task to policy in the modern 
age. The role of government has been framed so 
narrowly by material aims, and hollowed out by a 
misguided vision of unbounded consumer freedoms. 
The concept of governance itself stands in urgent 
need of renewal. 
But the current economic crisis presents us with 
a unique opportunity to invest in change. To sweep 
away the short-term thinking that has plagued 
society for decades. To replace it with considered 
policy capable of addressing the enormous challenge 
of delivering a lasting prosperity. 
For at the end of the day, prosperity goes beyond 
material pleasures. It transcends material concerns. 
It resides in the quality of our lives and in the health 
and happiness of our families. It is present in the 
strength of our relationships and our trust in the 
community. It is evidenced by our satisfaction at 
work and our sense of shared meaning and purpose. 
It hangs on our potential to participate fully in the 
life of society. 
Prosperity consists in our ability to flourish 
as human beings – within the ecological limits of 
a finite planet. The challenge for our society is to 
create the conditions under which this is possible. It 
is the most urgent task of our times. 
Tim Jackson 
Economics Commissioner
Sustainable Development Commission,   March 2009
Foreword
Growth has delivered its benefits, at best, unequally. 
A fifth of the world’s population earns just 2% of 
global income. Inequality is higher in the OECD 
nations than it was 20 years ago. And while the 
rich got richer, middle-class incomes in Western 
countries were stagnant in real terms long before 
the recession. Far from raising the living standard 
for those who most needed it, growth let much of 
the world’s population down. Wealth trickled up to 
the lucky few.
Fairness (or the lack of it) is just one of several 
reasons to question the conventional formula for 
achieving prosperity. As the economy expands, so do 
the resource implications associated with it. These 
impacts are already unsustainable. In the last quarter 
of a century the global economy has doubled, while 
an estimated 60% of the world’s ecosystems have 
been degraded. Global carbon emissions have risen 
by 40% since 1990 (the Kyoto Protocol ‘base year’). 
Significant scarcity in key resources – such as oil – may 
be less than a decade away. 
A world in which things simply go on as usual 
is already inconceivable. But what about a world 
in which nine billion people all aspire to the level 
of affluence achieved in the OECD nations? Such an 
economy would need to be 15 times the size of 
this one by 2050 and 40 times bigger by the end of 
the century. What does such an economy look like? 
What does it run on? Does it really offer a credible 
vision for a shared and lasting prosperity? 
These are some of the questions that prompted 
this report. They belong in a long tradition of serious 
reflection on the nature of progress. But they also 
reflect real and immediate concerns. Climate 
change, fuel security, collapsing biodiversity and 
global inequality have moved inexorably to the 
forefront of the international policy agenda over 
the last decade. These are issues that can no longer 
be relegated to the next generation or the next 
electoral cycle. They demand attention now. 
Accordingly, this report sets out a critical 
examination of the relationship between 
prosperity and growth. It acknowledges 
at the outset that poorer nations stand in 
urgent need of economic development. 
But it also questions whether ever-rising incomes for 
the already-rich are an appropriate goal for policy in 
a world constrained by ecological limits. 
Its aim is not just to analyse the dynamics of 
an emerging ecological crisis that is likely to dwarf 
the existing economic crisis. But also to put forward 
coherent policy proposals (Box 1) that will facilitate 
the transition to a sustainable economy. 
In short, this report challenges the assumption 
of continued economic expansion in rich countries 
and asks: is it possible to achieve prosperity without 
growth? 
The Age of Irresponsibility 
Recession throws this question into sharp relief. 
The banking crisis of 2008 led the world to the 
brink of financial disaster and shook the dominant 
economic model to its foundations. It redefined the 
boundaries between market and state and forced 
us to confront our inability to manage the financial 
sustainability – let alone the ecological sustainability 
– of the global economy. 
This may seem an inopportune moment to 
question growth. It is not. On the contrary, this crisis 
offers the potential to engage in serious reflection. 
It is a unique opportunity to address financial and 
ecological sustainability together. And as this report 
argues, the two things are intimately related. 
Chapter 2 argues that the current turmoil is not 
the result of isolated malpractice or simple failures 
of vigilance. The market was not undone by rogue 
individuals or the turning of a blind eye by incompetent 
regulators. It was undone by growth itself. 
The growth imperative has shaped the 
architecture of the modern economy. It motivated 
the freedoms granted to the financial sector. It 
stood at least partly responsible for the loosening 
of regulations and the proliferation of unstable 
financial derivatives. Continued expansion of credit 
was deliberately courted as an essential mechanism 
to stimulate consumption growth. 
Economic growth is supposed to deliver prosperity. Higher incomes should mean better 
choices, richer lives, an improved quality of life for us all. That at least is the conventional 
wisdom. But things haven’t always turned out that way.
Summary
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This model was always unstable ecologically. It 
has now proven itself unstable economically. The 
age of irresponsibility is not about casual oversight 
or individual greed. If there was irresponsibility it 
was systematic, sanctioned widely and with one 
clear aim in mind: the continuation and protection 
of economic growth. 
The failure of this strategy is disastrous in all sorts 
of ways. Not least for the impacts that it is having 
across the world, in particular in poorer communities. 
But the idea that growth can deliver us from the 
crisis is also deeply problematic. Responses which 
aim to restore the status quo, even if they succeed 
in the short term, simply return us to a condition of 
financial and ecological unsustainability. 
Redefining Prosperity 
A more appropriate response is to question the 
underlying vision of a prosperity built on continual 
growth. And to search for alternative visions – in 
which humans can still flourish and yet reduce their 
material impact on the environment. In fact, as 
Chapter 3 makes clear, the voluminous literature on 
human wellbeing is replete with insights here. 
Prosperity has undeniable material dimensions. 
It’s perverse to talk about things going well where 
there is inadequate food and shelter (as is the case 
for billions in the developing world). But it is also 
plain to see that the simple equation of quantity with 
quality, of more with better, is false in general. 
When you’ve had no food for months and the 
harvest has failed again, any food at all is a blessing. 
When the American-style fridge freezer is already 
stuffed with overwhelming choice, even a little 
extra might be considered a burden, particularly if 
you’re tempted to eat it. 
An even stronger finding is that the requirements 
of prosperity go way beyond material sustenance. 
Prosperity has vital social and psychological 
dimensions. To do well is in part about the ability 
to give and receive love, to enjoy the respect of 
your peers, to contribute useful work, and to have 
a sense of belonging and trust in the community. 
In short, an important component of prosperity is 
the ability to participate meaningfully in the life 
of society.
This view of prosperity has much in common 
with Amartya Sen’s vision of development as 
‘capabilities for flourishing’. But that vision needs to 
be interpreted carefully: not as a set of disembodied 
freedoms, but as a range of ‘bounded capabilities’ 
to live well – within certain clearly defined limits. 
A fair and lasting prosperity cannot be isolated 
from these material conditions. Capabilities are 
bounded on the one hand by the scale of the global 
population and on the other by the finite ecology 
of the planet. To ignore these natural bounds to 
flourishing is to condemn our descendents – and our 
fellow creatures – to an impoverished planet. 
Conversely, the possibility that humans can 
flourish and at the same time consume less is an 
intriguing one. It would be foolish to think that it 
is easy to achieve. But it should not be given up 
lightly. It offers the best prospect we have for a 
lasting prosperity. 
The Dilemma of Growth
Having this vision to hand doesn’t ensure that 
prosperity without growth is possible. Though 
formally distinct from rising prosperity, there 
remains the possibility that continued economic 
growth is a necessary condition for a lasting 
prosperity. And that, without growth, our ability to 
flourish diminishes substantially. 
Chapter 4 explores three related propositions in 
defence of economic growth. The first is that material 
opulence is (after all) necessary for flourishing. 
The second is that economic growth is closely 
correlated with certain basic ‘entitlements’ – for 
health or education, perhaps – that are essential to 
prosperity. The third is that growth is functional in 
maintaining economic and social stability.
There is evidence in support of each of these 
propositions. Material possessions do play an 
important symbolic role in our lives, allowing us 
to participate in the life of society. There is some 
statistical correlation between economic growth and 
key human development indicators. And economic 
resilience – the ability to protect jobs and livelihoods 
and avoid collapse in the face of external shocks – 
really does matter. Basic capabilities are threatened 
when economies collapse. 
Growth has been (until now) the default 
mechanism for preventing collapse. In particular, 
market economies have placed a high emphasis 
on labour productivity. Continuous improvements in 
technology mean that more output can be produced 
for any given input of labour. But crucially this also 
means that fewer people are needed to produce the 
same goods from one year to the next. 
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As long as the economy expands fast enough to 
offset labour productivity there isn’t a problem. But 
if the economy doesn’t grow, there is a downward 
pressure on employment. People lose their jobs. 
With less money in the economy, output falls, public 
spending is curtailed and the ability to service 
public debt is diminished. A spiral of recession 
looms. Growth is necessary within this system just 
to prevent collapse. 
This evidence leads to an uncomfortable and 
deep-seated dilemma: growth may be unsustainable, 
but ‘de-growth’1 appears to be unstable. At first this 
looks like an impossibility theorem for a lasting 
prosperity. But ignoring the implications won’t make 
them go away. The failure to take the dilemma of 
growth seriously may be the single biggest threat to 
sustainability that we face. 
The Myth of Decoupling 
The conventional response to the dilemma of growth 
is to call for ‘decoupling’: continued economic growth 
with continually declining material throughput. 
Since efficiency is one of the things that modern 
capitalist economies are supposed to be good at, 
decoupling has a familiar logic and a clear appeal as 
a solution to the dilemma of growth. 
As Chapter 5 points out, it’s vital to distinguish 
between ‘relative’ and ‘absolute’ decoupling. 
Relative decoupling refers to a situation where 
resource impacts decline relative to the GDP. Impacts 
may still rise, but they do so more slowly than the 
GDP. The situation in which resource impacts decline 
in absolute terms is called ‘absolute decoupling’. 
Needless to say, this latter situation is essential if 
economic activity is to remain within ecological 
limits.
Evidence for declining resource intensities 
(relative decoupling) is relatively easy to identify. 
The energy required to produce a unit of economic 
output declined by a third in the last thirty years, for 
instance. Global carbon intensity fell from around 
one kilo per dollar of economic activity to just under 
770 grams per dollar. 
Evidence for overall reductions in resource 
throughput (absolute decoupling) is much harder 
to find. The improvements in energy (and carbon) 
intensity noted above were offset by increases 
in the scale of economic activity over the same 
period. Global carbon emissions from energy use 
have increased by 40% since only 1990 (the Kyoto 
base year). 
There are rising global trends in a number of other 
resources – a range of different metals and several 
non-metallic minerals for example. Worryingly, 
in some cases, even relative decoupling isn’t 
happening. Resource productivity in the use of some 
structural materials (iron ore, bauxite, cement) has 
been declining globally since 2000, as the emerging 
economies build up physical infrastructures, leading 
to accelerating resource throughput. 
The scale of improvement required is daunting. 
In a world of nine billion people, all aspiring to a 
level of income commensurate with 2% growth on 
the average EU income today, carbon intensities 
(for example) would have to fall on average by 
over 11% per year to stabilise the climate, 16 times 
faster than it has done since 1990. By 2050, the 
global carbon intensity would need to be only six 
grams per dollar of output, almost 130 times lower 
than it is today. 
Substantial economic investment will be needed 
to achieve anything close to these improvements. 
Lord Stern has argued that stabilising atmospheric 
carbon at 500 parts per million (ppm) would mean 
investing 2% of GDP each year in carbon emission 
reductions. Achieving 450 ppm stabilisation would 
require even higher levels of investment. Factor 
in the wider capital needs for resource efficiency, 
material and process substitution and ecological 
protection and the sheer scale of investment 
becomes an issue. The macro-economic implications 
of this are addressed in Chapter 8. 
More to the point, there is little attempt in existing 
scenarios to achieve an equitable distribution of 
incomes across nations. Unless growth in the richer 
nations is curtailed, the ecological implications of a 
truly shared prosperity become even more daunting 
to contemplate.
The truth is that there is as yet no credible, 
socially just, ecologically sustainable scenario of 
continually growing incomes for a world of nine 
billion people.
In this context, simplistic assumptions that 
capitalism’s propensity for efficiency will allow us 
to stabilise the climate and protect against resource 
scarcity are nothing short of delusional. Those who 
promote decoupling as an escape route from the 
dilemma of growth need to take a closer look at 
the historical evidence – and at the basic arithmetic 
of growth.
1 De-growth (décroissance in the French) is an emerging term for (planned) reductions in economic output. 
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The ‘Iron Cage’ of Consumerism 
In the face of the evidence, it is fanciful to suppose 
that ‘deep’ resource and emission cuts can be 
achieved without confronting the nature and 
structure of market economies. Chapter 6 exposes 
two interrelated features of modern economic 
life that together drive the growth dynamic: the 
production and consumption of novelty. 
The profit motive stimulates a continual search 
by producers for newer, better or cheaper products 
and services. This process of ‘creative destruction’, 
according to the economist Joseph Schumpeter, is 
what drives economic growth forwards. 
For the individual firm, the ability to adapt and 
to innovate – to design, produce and market not just 
cheaper products but newer and more exciting ones 
– is vital. Firms who fail in this process risk their own 
survival. 
But the continual production of novelty would be 
of little value to firms if there were no market for the 
consumption of novelty in households. Recognising 
the existence, and understanding the nature, of this 
demand is essential. 
It is intimately linked to the symbolic role that 
material goods play in our lives. The ‘language of 
goods’ allows us to communicate with each other 
– most obviously about social status, but also about 
identity, social affiliation, and even – through giving 
and receiving gifts for example – about our feelings 
for each other. 
Novelty plays an absolutely central role here 
for a variety of reasons. In particular, novelty has 
always carried important information about status. 
But it also allows us to explore our aspirations for 
ourselves and our family, and our dreams of the 
good life. 
Perhaps the most telling point of all is the 
almost perfect fit between the continual production 
of novelty by firms and the continuous consumption 
of novelty in households. The restless desire of the 
consumer is the perfect complement for the restless 
innovation of the entrepreneur. Taken together 
these two self-reinforcing processes are exactly 
what is needed to drive growth forwards. 
Despite this fit, or perhaps because of it, the 
relentless pursuit of novelty creates an anxiety that 
can undermine social wellbeing. Individuals are at 
the mercy of social comparison. Firms must innovate 
or die. Institutions are skewed towards the pursuit 
of a materialistic consumerism. The economy itself 
is dependent on consumption growth for its very 
survival. The ‘iron cage of consumerism’ is a system 
in which no one is free.
It’s an anxious, and ultimately a pathological 
system. But at one level it works. The system 
remains economically viable as long as liquidity is 
preserved and consumption rises. It collapses when 
either of these stalls. 
Keynesianism and the Green New Deal 
Policy responses to the economic crisis are more or 
less unanimous that recovery means re-invigorating 
consumer spending so as to kick-start economic 
growth. Differences of opinion are mainly confined 
to how this should be achieved. The predominant 
(Keynesian) response is to use a mixture of public 
spending and tax cuts to stimulate consumer 
demand. 
Chapter 7 summarises some of the more 
interesting variations on this theme. It highlights 
in particular the emerging international consensus 
around a very simple idea. Economic recovery 
demands investment. Targeting that investment 
carefully towards energy security, low-carbon 
infrastructures and ecological protection offers 
multiple benefits. These benefits include: 
•	 freeing up resources for household spending 
and productive investment by reducing 
energy and material costs
•	 reducing our reliance on imports and our 
exposure to the fragile geopolitics of  
energy supply
•	 providing a much-needed boost to 
employment in the expanding ‘environmental 
industries’ sector
•	 making progress towards demanding global 
carbon reduction targets
•	 protecting valuable ecological assets 
and improving the quality of our living 
environment for generations to come.
In short, a ‘green stimulus’ is an eminently 
sensible response to the economic crisis. It offers 
jobs and economic recovery in the short term, 
energy security and technological innovation in 
the medium term, and a sustainable future for our 
children in the long term. 
Nonetheless, the default assumption of even 
the ‘greenest’ Keynesian stimulus is to return the 
economy to a condition of continuing consumption 
growth. Since this condition is unsustainable, it is 
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difficult to escape the conclusion that in the longer 
term something more is needed. A different kind 
of macro-economic structure is essential for an 
ecologically-constrained world. 
Macroeconomics for Sustainability
There is something odd about the modern refusal to 
countenance anything but growth at all costs. Early 
economists such as John Stuart Mill (and indeed 
Keynes himself) foresaw a time in which growth 
would have to stop. 
Herman Daly’s pioneering work defined the 
ecological conditions of a steady-state economy in 
terms of a constant stock of physical capital, capable 
of being maintained by a low rate of material 
throughput that lies within the regenerative and 
assimilative capacities of the ecosystem.
What we still miss from this is a viable macro-
economic model in which these conditions can be 
achieved. There is no clear model for achieving 
economic stability without consumption growth. Nor 
do any of the existing models account fully for the 
dependency of the macro-economy on ecological 
variables such as resources and emissions. In short 
there is no macro-economics for sustainability and 
there is an urgent need for one. 
Chapter 8 explores the dimensions of this 
call in more detail. It presents results from two 
specific attempts to develop a macro-economics 
of sustainability. One of these suggests that it is 
possible, under certain assumptions, to stabilise 
economic output, even within a fairly conventional 
macro-economy. A crucial role is played by work-
time policies in this model, to prevent rising 
unemployment. 
The second model addresses the macro-
economic implications of a shift away from fossil 
fuels. It shows that there may only be a narrow 
‘sustainability window’ through which the economy 
can pass if it is to make this transition successfully. 
But crucially, this window is widened if more of 
the national income is allocated to savings and 
investment. 
These exercises reveal that a new macro-
economics for sustainability is not only essential, 
but possible. The starting point must be to identify 
clearly the conditions that define a sustainable 
economy. 
These conditions will still include a strong 
requirement for economic stability as the basis for 
protecting both people’s jobs and their capabilities 
for flourishing. But this condition will need to 
be supplemented by conditions that ensure 
distributional equity, establish sustainable levels of 
resource throughput and emissions, and provide for 
the protection of critical natural capital. 
In operational terms, there will be important 
differences in the way that the conventional 
variables play out in this new macro-economy. 
The balance between consumption and investment, 
the split between the public and the private sector 
spending, the nature of productivity improvements, 
the conditions of profitability: all of these will have 
to be re-negotiated. 
The role of investment is particularly crucial. 
Sustainability will need enhanced investment in 
public infrastructures, sustainable technologies 
and ecological maintenance and protection. 
These investments will operate differently from 
conventional capital spending (Appendix 2) and will 
have to be judged and managed accordingly. 
Above all, a new macro-economics for 
sustainability must abandon the presumption of 
growth in material consumption as the basis for 
economic stability. It will have to be ecologically 
and socially literate, ending the folly of separating 
economy from society and environment.
Flourishing – within Limits 
Fixing the economy is only part of the problem. 
Addressing the social logic of consumerism is also 
vital. This task is far from simple – mainly because 
of the way in which material goods are so deeply 
implicated in the fabric of our lives. 
But change is essential. And some mandate for 
that change already exists. A nascent disaffection 
with consumerism and rising concern over the 
‘social recession’ have prompted a number of 
initiatives aimed at improving wellbeing and 
pursuing an ‘alternative hedonism’ – sources of 
identity, creativity and meaning that lie outside the 
realm of the market. 
Against the surge of consumerism there are 
already those who have resisted the exhortation to 
‘go out shopping’, preferring instead to devote their 
time to less materialistic pursuits, to their family, or 
to the care of others. 
Small scale ‘intentional’ communities (like the 
Findhorn community in Scotland or Plum Village in 
France) are exploring the art of the possible. Larger 
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social movements (such as the ‘transition town’ 
movement) are mobilising people’s desire to live 
more sustainably. These initiatives don’t appeal 
to everyone. But they do provide an invaluable 
learning ground, giving us clues about the potential 
for more mainstream social change. 
Chapter 9 discusses their strengths and limitations. 
It explores why people may turn out both to be 
happier and to live more sustainably when they 
favour intrinsic goals that embed them in family 
and community rather than extrinsic ones which 
tie them into display and social status. Flourishing 
within limits is a real possibility, according to this 
evidence. 
On the other hand, those at the forefront of social 
change are often haunted by the conflict of trying to 
live, quite literally, in opposition to the structures 
and values that dominate society. These structures 
represent a culture of consumption that sends all 
the wrong signals, penalising ‘good’ environmental 
choices and making it all but impossible, even for 
highly-motivated people, to live sustainably without 
personal sacrifice. 
In this context, simplistic exhortations for people 
to resist consumerism are destined to failure. 
Urging people to insulate their homes, turn down 
the thermostat, put on a jumper, drive a little less, 
walk a little more, holiday at home, buy locally 
produced food (and so on) will either go unheard 
or be rejected as manipulation for as long as all the 
messages about high street consumption point in 
the other direction. 
For this reason, structural change must lie at the 
heart of any strategy to address the social logic of 
consumerism. And it must consist in two main avenues. 
The first is to dismantle the perverse incentives for 
unproductive status competition. The second must be 
to establish new structures that provide capabilities 
for people to flourish – and in particular to participate 
meaningfully and creatively in the life of society – in 
less materialistic ways.
The advantages in terms of prosperity are likely 
to be substantial. A less materialistic society will 
enhance life satisfaction. A more equal society 
will lower the importance of status goods. A less 
growth-driven economy will improve people’s 
work-life balance. Enhanced investment in 
public goods will provide lasting returns to the 
nation’s prosperity. 
Governance for Prosperity 
Achieving these goals inevitably raises the question 
of governance – in the broadest sense of the word. 
How is a shared prosperity to be achieved in a 
pluralistic society? How are the interests of the 
individual to be balanced against the common 
good? What are the mechanisms for achieving this 
balance? 
Particular questions arise about the role of 
government itself. Chapter 10 identifies an almost 
undisputed role for the state in maintaining macro-
economic stability. For better or worse, government 
also ‘co-creates’ the culture of consumption, shaping 
the structures and signals that influence people’s 
behaviour. At the same time, of course, government 
has an essential role to play in protecting the 
‘commitment devices’ that prevent myopic choice 
and support long-term social goals. 
History suggests a cultural drift within government 
towards supporting and encouraging a materialistic 
and individualistic consumerism. This drift is not 
entirely uniform across all countries. For example, 
different ‘varieties of capitalism’ place more or less 
emphasis on de-regulation and competition. But all 
varieties have a structural requirement for growth, 
and rely directly or indirectly (eg in export markets) 
on consumerism to achieve this. 
Government itself is conflicted here. On the one 
hand, it has a role in ‘securing the future’ – protecting 
long-term social and ecological goods; on the other 
it holds a key responsibility for macro-economic 
stability. For as long as macro-economic stability 
depends on economic growth, government will 
have an incentive to support social structures that 
undermine commitment and reinforce materialistic, 
novelty-seeking individualism. Particularly where 
that’s needed to boost high street sales. 
Conversely, freeing the macro-economy from a 
structural requirement for growth will simultaneously 
free government to play its proper role in delivering 
social and ecological goals and protecting long-term 
interests. 
The narrow pursuit of growth represents a 
horrible distortion of the common good and of 
underlying human values. It also undermines the 
legitimate role of government itself. At the end of 
the day, the state is society’s commitment device, 
par excellence, and the principal agent in protecting 
our shared prosperity. A new vision of governance 
that embraces this role is urgently needed. 
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The Transition to a Sustainable Economy 
The policy demands of this analysis are significant. 
Chapter 11 presents a series of steps that governments 
could take now to effect the transition to a sustainable 
economy. Box 1 summarises these steps. They fall 
into three main categories: 
•	 building a sustainable macro-economy
•	 protecting capabilities for flourishing
•	 respecting ecological limits. 
The specific proposals flow directly from the 
analysis in this report. But many of them sit within 
longer and deeper debates about sustainability, 
wellbeing and economic growth. And at least some 
of them connect closely with existing concerns of 
government – for example over resource scarcity, 
climate change targets, ecological taxation and 
social wellbeing. 
A part of the aim of this report is to provide a 
coherent foundation for these policies and help 
strengthen the hand of government in taking them 
forward. For at the moment, in spite of its best 
efforts, progress towards sustainability remains 
painfully slow. And it tends to stall endlessly on 
the over-arching commitment to economic growth. 
A step change in political will – and a renewed vision 
of governance – is essential. 
But there is now a unique opportunity for 
government – by pursuing these steps – to 
demonstrate economic leadership and at the 
same time to champion international action on 
sustainability. This process must start by developing 
financial and ecological prudence at home. It must 
also begin to redress the perverse incentives and 
damaging social logic that lock us into unproductive 
status competition. 
Above all, there is an urgent need to develop 
a resilient and sustainable macro-economy that is 
no longer predicated on relentless consumption 
growth. The clearest message from the financial 
crisis of 2008 is that our current model of economic 
success is fundamentally flawed. For the advanced 
economies of the Western world, prosperity without 
growth is no longer a utopian dream. It is a financial 
and ecological necessity.
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Box 1: 12 Steps To a Sustainable Economy
Building a Sustainable Macro-Economy 
Debt-driven materialistic consumption is deeply unsatisfactory as the basis for our macro-economy. The time is 
now ripe to develop a new macro-economics for sustainability that does not rely for its stability on relentless 
growth and expanding material throughput. Four specific policy areas are identified to achieve this:
1. Developing macro-economic capability 
2. Investing in public assets and infrastructures 
3. Increasing financial and fiscal prudence 
4. Reforming macro-economic accounting 
Protecting Capabilities for Flourishing 
The social logic that locks people into materialistic consumerism is extremely powerful, but detrimental ecologically 
and psychologically. A lasting prosperity can only be achieved by freeing people from this damaging dynamic and 
providing creative opportunities for people to flourish – within the ecological limits of the planet. Five policy areas 
address this challenge.
5. Sharing the available work and improving the work-life balance 
6. Tackling systemic inequality 
7. Measuring capabilities and flourishing 
8. Strengthening human and social capital 
9. Reversing the culture of consumerism
Respecting Ecological Limits 
The material profligacy of consumer society is depleting natural resources and placing unsustainable burdens on 
the planet’s ecosystems. There is an urgent need to establish clear resource and environmental limits on economic 
activity and develop policies to achieve them. Three policy suggestions contribute to that task.
10. Imposing clearly defined resource/emissions caps 
11. Implementing fiscal reform for sustainability 
12. Promoting technology transfer and international ecosystem protection.
For further details see pages 103-107
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Introduction
1
“ I think all of us here today would acknowledge 
that we’ve lost that sense of shared prosperity.”
Barack Obama
March 20081
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There is also a sense in which individual prosperity 
is curtailed in the presence of social calamity. 
That things are going well for us personally is of 
little consolation if our family, our friends and our 
community are in dire straits. In both these senses 
– of caring about the future and of caring about 
others – prosperity has something in common with 
the concept of sustainability. The broad aim of this 
report is to explore that relationship – between 
prosperity and sustainability – in more detail. 
At the heart of this exploration is a simple question: 
what can prosperity possibly mean in a finite world 
with a rising population that is expected to exceed 
nine billion people within decades?1 
One response – perhaps the most familiar one 
– is to cast prosperity in economic terms and to 
recommend a continual rise in national (and global) 
economic output, with a corresponding increase in 
people’s incomes. This response has an appealing 
logic for the world’s poorest nations, where 20% of 
the population earn just 2% of the world’s income. 
A meaningful approach to prosperity must certainly 
address the plight of the one billion people across 
the world who are living on less than $1 a day – half 
the price of a small cappuccino in Starbucks.2 
But prosperity is not synonymous with income or 
wealth. Rising prosperity is not the same thing as 
economic growth. Until quite recently, prosperity 
was not cast specifically in terms of money at all; it 
was simply the opposite of adversity or affliction.3 
The concept of economic prosperity – and the elision 
of rising prosperity with economic growth – is a 
modern construction. It is a construction that has 
come under considerable criticism. 
Economic growth, claim its critics, doesn’t always 
increase our prosperity. On the contrary, it can detract 
from it in various ways. Perhaps most relevant here, 
the material implications of economic growth lead to 
the depletion of natural resources and the degradation 
of the environment, impoverishing both present and 
future generations. Climate change, depletion of oil 
resources, water scarcity, the collapse of fish stocks 
and the chronic loss of biodiversity are a few of these 
material concerns.4 
Particular urgency pertains to the twin challenges 
of climate change and ‘peak oil’.i In the first case, 
we can probably keep the economy going for a 
while even as we head towards the cliff. But as Sir 
Nicholas Stern has argued, costs will be punishingly 
high when the crunch comes. Early investment in 
the transition to a low carbon society is vital to 
avoid economic collapse later on.5
In the second case, oil price hikes have already 
shown they have the potential to destabilise the 
global economy and threaten basic securities. Fears 
peaked in July 2008 when oil prices reached $147 
a barrel. Though prices fell sharply in the following 
months, the threat of peak oil hasn’t gone away. 
The International Energy Agency estimates that 
the ‘peak’ could arrive as early as 2020. Other 
commentators believe it could be even sooner.6 
Beyond these ecological concerns lie social ones. 
There is disturbing evidence that both the benefits 
and the costs of economic growth are unevenly 
distributed. The continuing disparities between 
rich and poorer nations are unacceptable from a 
humanitarian point of view and generate rising social 
tensions: real hardships in the most disadvantaged 
communities have a spill-over effect on society as 
a whole.7 
Finally, the continued pursuit of economic growth 
(beyond a certain point at least) does not appear to 
advance and may even impede human happiness. 
Talk of a growing ‘social recession’ in advanced 
economies has accompanied the relative economic 
success of the last decade.8
Prosperity is about things going well for us – in accordance with (pro- in the Latin) our 
hopes and expectations (speres). Wanting things to go well is a common human concern. 
It’s understood that this sense of things going well includes some notion of continuity. 
We are not inclined to think that life is going well, if we confidently expect things to fall apart 
tomorrow. There is a natural tendency to be at least partly concerned about the future. 
i  Peak oil is the term used to describe the point at which global oil output reaches a peak, before entering a terminal decline. 
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These three related arguments – ecological, social 
and psychological – are now well-rehearsed in the 
literature on sustainability (and on happiness). It is 
not the aim of this study to dwell on them in detail. 
Rather the intention is to turn the relationship 
between rising prosperity and economic growth on 
its head. If economic growth and rising prosperity 
are not the same thing, and since growth can 
damage both people and planet, should we not 
perhaps think about doing without growth, at least 
in the richer nations? 
Clearly such a prospect is problematic in the 
poorest countries. But the conditions of living in 
cosmopolitan Europe or the USA are a far cry from 
the abject poverty of rural Africa and parts of South 
Asia and Latin America. 
In a world of finite resources, constrained by strict 
environmental limits, still characterised by ‘islands 
of prosperity’ within ‘oceans of poverty’,9 are 
ever-increasing incomes for the already-rich really 
a legitimate focus for our continued hopes and 
expectations? Is there some other path towards 
a more sustainable, a more equitable form of 
prosperity? 
In short, this report challenges the assumption of 
continued economic expansion in rich countries and 
asks: is it possible to achieve prosperity without 
growth? 
Some would say it’s ironic to be asking such 
questions when economic stability is itself 
under threat and the world struggles with global 
recession. Raising deep, structural questions about 
the nature of prosperity in this climate might seem 
inopportune if not insensitive. ‘That is not what 
people are interested in when financial markets are 
in turmoil,’ admits George Soros of his own attempt 
to dig deeper into the global credit crisis.10 But there 
are several reasons not to postpone this inquiry until 
the economy looks brighter. 
The first is that the cumulative impacts of economic 
growth – climate change, resource depletion, social 
recession, for example – are unlikely to go away, 
just because growth slows down in the advanced 
economies. Some may get better, temporarily. But 
some of them may even get worse. 
The second is that the current state of the economy 
and the concerns of this report are not unrelated. 
On the contrary, as we see in Chapter 2, it is impossible 
to ignore the influence of financial markets and 
commodity prices in the relationship between 
growth and prosperity. This interrelatedness has not 
gone unnoticed amongst world leaders. Speaking on 
the opening day of the 2008 G8 Summit in Hokkaido, 
UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon referred to the 
problems of climate change, soaring food prices and 
development as ‘deeply interconnected’ crises that 
need to be addressed simultaneously.11 
The economist Peter Victor, one of the contributors to 
the SDC’s Redefining Prosperity project, has argued 
that our overriding challenge is to build economies 
which are ‘slower by design, not by disaster’.12 
But if the current economic crisis really does indicate 
(as some predict) the end of an era of easy growth, 
then the concerns of this report are doubly relevant. 
Prosperity without growth is a very useful trick to 
have up your sleeve when the economy is going 
down the pan. 
Perhaps most telling of all is the clear window of 
opportunity – and overwhelming imperative – that 
now exists for change. In the face of economic 
collapse, governments have an undisputed duty 
to intervene. Public investment is essential. 
Restructuring is inevitable. Targeting these 
interventions towards sustainability makes obvious 
sense. 
In short, there is no better time to make progress 
towards a more sustainable society. To invest in 
renewable technologies that will reduce both carbon 
emissions and our dependence on finite resources. 
To renew our financial and social institutions and 
create a fairer world. To invest in the jobs and skills 
that these tasks demand. To initiate the transition to 
a sustainable economy.  
Whatever the state of the economy, the central 
question addressed in this report is undiminished. 
It has haunted debates on sustainable development 
for several decades. And in a very real sense, now 
may be the best possible time to make some clear 
progress in answering it. That at any rate is the 
intention of the following pages. 
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“ This has been an age of global prosperity.  
It has also been an era of global turbulence. 
And where there has been irresponsibility,  
we must now clearly say: the age of 
irresponsibility must be ended.”
2
The Age of 
Irresponsibility
Gordon Brown
September 20081
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This question was thrown into sharp relief during 
the course of writing the report. The banking crisis 
of 2008 led the world to the brink of financial 
disaster and shook the dominant economic model 
to its foundations. It redefined the boundaries 
between market and state and forced us to confront 
our inability to manage the financial – let alone 
social or environmental – sustainability of the global 
economy. 
Consumer confidence has been shattered. 
Investment has stalled and unemployment is rising 
sharply. Advanced economies (and some developing 
countries) are faced with the prospect of a deep and 
long-lasting recession. Public sector finances will be 
stretched for a decade or more. Trust in financial 
markets will suffer for some considerable time to 
come. Not to stand back now and question what 
happened would be to compound failure with failure: 
failure of vision with failure of responsibility.
In search of villains
The causes of the crisis were complex. The most 
prominent villain was taken to be subprime lending 
in the US housing market. Some highlighted the 
unmanageability of the ‘credit default swaps’ used 
to parcel up ‘toxic debts’ and hide them from the 
balance sheet. Others pointed the finger of blame at 
greedy speculators and unscrupulous investors intent 
on making a killing at the expense of vulnerable 
institutions. 
A dramatic rise in basic commodity prices during 
2007 and early 2008 (Figure 1) certainly contributed 
to economic slowdown by squeezing company 
margins and reducing discretionary spending. 
At one point in mid-2008, advanced economies 
were facing the prospect of ‘stagflation’ – a 
simultaneous slow-down in growth with a rise in 
inflation – for the first time in thirty years. Oil prices 
doubled in the year to July 2008, while food prices 
rose by 66%, sparking civil unrest in some poorer 
nations.2 
All of these can be counted as contributory factors. 
None on their own offers an adequate explanation 
for how financial markets managed to destabilise 
entire economies. Why loans were offered to people 
who couldn’t afford to pay them off. Why regulators 
failed to curb individual financial practices that could 
bring down monolithic institutions. Why unsecured 
debt had become so dominant a force in the 
economy. And why Governments had consistently 
turned a blind eye or actively encouraged this ‘age 
of irresponsibility’. 
Political response to the crisis provides us with some 
clues. By the end of October 2008, governments 
across the world had committed a staggering $7 
trillion of public money – over three times the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) of the UK – to securitise 
risky assets, underwrite threatened savings and 
recapitalise failing banks.3 No one pretended that 
this was anything other than a short-term and deeply 
regressive solution. A temporary fix that rewarded 
those responsible for the crisis at the expense of the 
taxpayer. It was excused on the grounds that the 
alternative was simply unthinkable. 
Collapse of the financial markets would have 
led to a massive and completely unpredictable 
global recession. Entire nations would have been 
bankrupted. Commerce would have failed en 
masse. Livelihoods would have been destroyed. 
Homes would have been lost. The humanitarian 
cost of failing to save the banking system would 
have been enormous. Those who resisted the US’s 
Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) on its first 
reading through Congress appeared oblivious to 
these consequences, inflamed as they were with 
The conventional formula for achieving prosperity relies on the pursuit of economic growth. 
Higher incomes will increase wellbeing and lead to prosperity for all, in this view. 
This report challenges that formula. It questions whether economic growth is still 
a legitimate goal for rich countries like the UK, in the context of the huge disparities in 
income and wellbeing that persist across the globe and the constraints of living within finite 
environmental limits. It explores whether the benefits of continued economic growth still 
outweigh the costs and scrutinises the assumption that growth is essential for prosperity. 
In short, it asks: is it possible to have prosperity without growth?
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understandable indignation over the unjustness of 
the solution. 
But the harsh reality was that politicians had no 
choice but to intervene in the protection of the 
banking sector. In the language of the media, Wall 
Street is the lifeblood of Main Street. The health of 
the modern economy hangs on the health of the 
financial sector. Anything less than total commitment 
to its survival would have been unthinkable. The 
appropriate goal of policy at that point in time was 
incontestably to stabilise the system: to reassure 
savers, to encourage investors, to assist debtors, 
to restore confidence in the market. Very much as 
governments around the world tried to do. 
They were only partially successful – halting an 
immediate slide into chaos but failing to avert the 
prospect of a deep recession across the world. This 
prompted a further round of economic recovery 
packages early in 2009 which aimed to ‘kick-start’ 
consumer spending, protect jobs, and stimulate 
economic growth again. In Chapter 7 we explore 
some of these ‘stimulus packages’ in more detail. 
It was abundantly clear, by the time the World 
Economic Forum met in Davos in February 2009, 
that a little reflection was in order. Political leaders, 
economists and even financiers accept the point. 
The suspension of practices like short-selling; 
increased regulation of financial derivatives; 
better scrutiny of the conditions of lending: all of 
these became widely accepted as inevitable and 
necessary responses to the crisis. There was even 
a grudging acceptance of the need to cap executive 
remuneration in the financial sector. 
Admittedly, this was born more of political necessity 
in the face of huge public outcry over the bonus 
culture than through recognition of a point of 
principle. In fact, huge executive bonuses were still 
being paid. Goldman Sachs paid out $2.6 billion in 
end of year (2008) bonuses in spite of its $6 billion 
dollar bailout by the US government, justifying 
these on the basis that they helped to ‘attract and 
motivate’ the best people.5 
But even these responses were seen as short-term 
interventions, designed to facilitate the restoration 
of business as usual. Short-selling was suspended 
for six months, rather than banned. The part-
nationalisation of financial institutions was justified 
on the basis that shares would be sold back to 
the private sector as soon as reasonably possible. 
The capping of executive remuneration was 
‘performance related’. 
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Figure 1 Global Commodity Prices: Jan 2003 – Feb 20094
Extraordinary though some of these interventions 
were, they were largely regarded as temporary 
measures. Necessary evils in the restoration of a 
free market economy. Their declared aim was clear. 
By pumping equity into the banks and restoring 
confidence to lenders, the world’s leaders hope to 
re-invigorate demand and halt the recession. 
Their ultimate goal was to protect the pursuit of 
economic growth. Throughout the crisis, this has 
been the one non-negotiable: that growth must 
continue at all costs. Renewed growth was the 
end that justified interventions unthought of only a 
few months previously. No politician seriously 
questions it.
Yet question it we must. Allegiance to growth was 
the single most dominant feature of an economic 
and political system that led the world to the brink 
of disaster. The growth imperative has shaped the 
architecture of the modern economy. It motivated 
the freedoms granted to the financial sector. 
It stood at least partly responsible for the loosening 
of regulations, the over-extension of credit and 
the proliferation of unmanageable (and unstable) 
financial derivatives. 
The labyrinth of debt 
In fact, it is generally agreed that the unprecedented 
consumption growth between 1990 and 2007 
was fuelled by a massive expansion of credit and 
increasing levels of debt (Box 2). One aspect of this 
was the rise and rise of consumer indebtedness. 
Over the course of more than a decade consumer 
debt served as a deliberate mechanism for freeing 
personal spending from wage income and allowing 
consumption to drive the dynamics of growth. 
Not all economies were equally susceptible to this 
dynamic. Indeed it’s a feature of the system of debt 
that for one part of the global economy to be highly 
indebted, another part must be saving hard. During 
the first decade of the 21st Century, the savers were 
largely in the emerging economies. The savings rate 
in China during 2008 was around 25% of disposable 
income, while in India it was even higher at 37%.
There were also clear differences between the so-
called ‘liberal’ and ‘coordinated’ market economies’, 
with the former typically showing higher levels of 
consumer indebtedness than the latter.6 The UK and 
the US were particularly vulnerable to the problem. 
Personal debt in the UK more than doubled in less 
than a decade. Even during 2008, as recession 
loomed, it was growing at the rate of £1m every 11 
minutes. Though the rate of growth slowed down – 
as it tends to do in a recession – by the end of 2008, 
the cumulative personal debt still stood at almost 
£1.5 trillion, higher than the GDP for the second 
year running.7 Savings, on the other hand, had 
plummeted. During the first quarter of 2008, the 
household savings ratio in the UK fell below zero for 
the first time in four decades (Figure 2). 
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Box 2: Debt in Perspective
Lending and borrowing money is (in normal times at least) a fundamental feature of the modern economy (see 
Chapter 6). Households, companies and governments all participate both in lending (e.g. through savings and 
investments) and in borrowing (e.g. through loans, credit accounts and mortgages). Financial debts (sometimes 
called liabilities) are the accumulated money owed at any one point in time by a person, a firm, a government or 
indeed the nation as a whole. 
A fundamental principle of capitalism is that these accumulated liabilities attract interest charges over time. 
Debt rises in two ways: firstly by borrowing more money (e.g. for increased public spending); and secondly 
through interest accumulated on the debt. For any given interest rate, a higher level of debt places a greater 
demand on people’s income to pay off the interest and stop the debt accumulating. 
Some of this requirement could be met from revenues generated by people’s own financial ‘assets’ or savings. 
By participating in the economy both as savers and as borrowers, people can try and balance their financial 
liabilities (money borrowed) against their financial assets (money lent). The extent to which it ‘matters’ how 
much debt we hold depends (in part) on this balance between assets and liabilities. And as the current crisis has 
shown, on the financial reliability of the assets. 
Three aspects of debt have attracted media and policy attention over the last decade: personal debt, the 
national debt and the gross external debt. Though all are concerned with money owed, these debts are quite 
different and have different policy implications. The following paragraphs set out the key elements of each and 
their relevance for economic sustainability. 
Personal Debt
Personal (or consumer) debt is the amount of money owed by private citizens. It includes home loans, credit card 
debt and other forms of consumer borrowing. Personal debt in the UK is currently dominated by home loans, 
which at the end of 2008 comprised 84% of total. For as long as the value of homes continued to rise people’s 
financial liabilities (home loans) were offset by the value of their physical assets (homes). Problems arise when 
house values collapse. Liabilities are no longer balanced by assets. When this is compounded (as in a recession) 
by falling incomes, debt – and the financial viability of households – becomes highly unstable. Like much of the 
growth economy (Chapters 4 and 6), financial stability turns out to be dependent in an unsustainable way on 
growth – in this case growth in the housing market. 
National Debt
The national (or public sector) debt is the money that government owes to the private sector.9 When a government 
continually runs a deficit (i.e. spends more than it receives in revenues) the national debt rises. Just as for 
households, reducing the debt is only possible when the public sector runs a surplus (i.e. it spends less than it 
receives). Increased debt is a common feature of public finances during recession. But servicing this debt – without 
compromising public services – depends heavily on future government revenues increasing. This can happen in 
only three ways. First, by achieving the desired aim of growth. Second, by increasing the tax rate. And third, by 
using the debt to invest in productive assets with positive returns to the public purse. A continually rising public 
debt in a shrinking economy is a recipe for disaster. 
External debt 
The total debt held outside the country by government, business and households is called the external debt. 
The sustainability of this debt depends on a complex mix of factors, including the extent to which it is balanced 
by external ‘assets’, the form of both assets and liabilities (including the currency in which they are held) and the 
relative strength of domestic currency on the international market. Particular pressure is placed on an economy 
when its economy is shrinking and its currency is losing value. In extreme circumstances, a country may find itself 
unable to attract investors willing to support its spending and unable to liquidate its assets to compensate for this. 
At this point the level of external debt relative to the GDP becomes critical. Calling in debts worth almost five times 
the national income (as in the UK) would be catastrophic. 
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People are encouraged into debt by a complex 
mix of factors including (Chapter 6) the desire for 
social status and the drive to boost high street 
sales. But when this strategy becomes unstable – 
as it did during 2008 – it places large sections of 
the population at risk of lasting financial hardship. 
Inevitably, that risk falls mainly on those who are 
most vulnerable already – the lower income groups 
who profited less from the last two decades of 
growth.10 Far from delivering prosperity, the culture 
of ‘borrow and spend’ ends up detracting from it.
The same vulnerability can afflict the nation as a 
whole. There are different kinds of indebtedness at 
the national level (Box 2). One of the key measures 
is the national – or public sector – debt which 
measures how much government owes to the 
private sector. This can vary widely across nations. 
France, Germany, Canada and the US all have public 
sector debts above 60% of GDP. Italy and Japan hold 
public sector debts that are higher than their GDP. 
Norway by contrast holds no public debt at all and 
on the contrary has enormous financial assets.  
In the UK, public sector debt rose sharply through 
the financial crisis (Figure 3). This was in part a 
result of the increased borrowing needed to protect 
the banks and fund economic recovery. By the 
end of 2008, the national debt was already higher 
than at any time since the early 1980s, well above 
the Treasury’s self-imposed ceiling of 40% of the 
GDP and rising fast. The UK Government’s own 
calculations had public sector borrowing rising 
from 2.6% of GDP in 2008 to 8% within a year or 
so. And the Government accepted that this would 
push national debt to almost 60% of GDP by 2010. 
Crucially, this figure excluded the costs of purchasing 
equity in the part-nationalised banks.11 
Public sector debt is not in itself a bad thing. It simply 
reflects the amount of money that government owes 
to the private sector. This includes money saved by 
its own citizens. And the idea that citizens hold a 
financial interest in the public sector has some clear 
advantages. It can be thought of as part of the ‘social 
contract’ between citizen and state. But when the 
household savings rate collapses (Figure 2) and the 
national debt rises (Figure 3), further borrowing 
increases what is called the external debt (Box 1) – 
the money a country borrows from outside its own 
boundaries. This inevitably exposes the nation to 
the volatility of international markets. 
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Some countries may be better placed than others 
to weather this volatility. External debt varied 
widely across nations (Figure 4) during 2007/8, 
from as little as 5% of GDP (in China and India for 
example) to over 900% of GDP (in Ireland). In the 
UK, the gross external debt increased seven and a 
half times in the space of just two decades. By the 
end of 2008, it was equivalent to almost five times 
the GDP and ranked as the second highest absolute 
level of external debt in the world after the US. 
These external liabilities were set off – at least 
in part – by a higher than usual level of external 
assets. But in an unstable market this placed the UK 
in a vulnerable financial position. More to the point, 
as the International Monetary Fund points out, this 
position was deliberately courted by the UK in its 
role as an international centre of finance. 
The architecture of financial recovery in the wake 
of the 2008 crisis – and in particular the role of the 
public sector as an equity-holder in the banks – owed 
much to the UK Prime Minister, Gordon Brown. In 
this respect, the UK Government attracted deserving 
praise for its response to the crisis. Part-nationalising 
the banks may have been suboptimal from a 
free market perspective but it was considerably 
more progressive than simply pumping in cash or 
guarantees to ensure liquidity. At least it allowed 
for the possibility of a financial return to the public 
purse. 
At the same time, what became clear through the 
crisis was the extent to which economic policy over 
two decades had positioned the UK slap bang across 
an emerging fault line in the financial sector. High 
levels of consumer debt and the second highest level 
of external debt in the world were not just accidental 
features of economic life, but the result of specific 
policies to increase liquidity and boost spending. The 
one area of fiscal prudence in the UK – a relatively 
low level of public sector debt – became the first 
casualty of the collapse. 
This is not to suggest that the UK is alone in facing 
the severity of the current crisis. On the contrary, 
in an increasingly globalised world, it was difficult 
for any country to escape this recession. Even those 
economies – like Germany, Japan and China – which 
retained strong manufacturing sectors, largely 
avoided consumer debt and delivered strong public 
sector surpluses – suffered. During the last quarter 
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of 2008, Germany’s economy sank faster than any 
other European nation, contracting by 2.1%.14
Ironically, these economies built their stability not on 
domestic consumption growth but on consumption 
growth abroad. Unable to persuade their own 
consumers to spend rather than save, they achieved 
growth by exporting to countries like the US and 
the UK where consumers were still prepared to 
spend rather than save. When credit collapsed and 
consumer spending slowed everywhere, there were 
knock-on impacts for everyone. 
So the sense that economic policy consciously flirted 
with financial risk goes much wider than the UK’s 
dalliance in the banking sector. In fact, the roots of 
the crisis lie at least in part in a concerted effort 
to free up credit for economic expansion across the 
world. 
In The New Paradigm for Financial Markets, George 
Soros traces the emergence of what he calls a 
‘super-bubble’ in global financial markets to a series 
of economic policies to increase liquidity as a way 
of stimulating demand. Loosening restraints on the 
US Federal Reserve, de-regulating financial markets 
and promoting the securitisation of debts through 
complex financial derivatives were also deliberate 
interventions. Their overriding aim was to promote 
economic growth.15 
In other words, the market was not undone by 
isolated practices carried out by rogue individuals. 
Or even through the turning of a blind eye by 
less than vigilant regulators. It was undone by 
growth itself. 
The enemy within
Securitisation of mortgage debts (for example) was 
championed at the highest level, spearheaded by 
Alan Greenspan, former chairman of the Federal 
Reserve. In The Age of Turbulence, Greenspan 
defends the practice explicitly, arguing that 
‘transferring risk away from… highly leveraged loan 
originators can be critical for economic stability, 
especially in a global environment.’16 
In testimony to US Congress in late October 2008, 
Greenspan admitted to being ‘shocked’ that 
markets hadn’t worked as expected.17 But this only 
underlines the point that these interventions were 
deliberate. All along the way, decisions to increase 
liquidity were made with a view to expanding the 
economy. ‘Amid the crisis of 2008’, remarked an 
Economist leader article, ‘it is easy to forget that 
liberalisation had good consequences as well: by 
making it easier for households and businesses to 
get credit, deregulation contributed to economic 
growth.’18 
For over two decades, deregulation of financial 
markets was championed under monetarism as 
the best way to stimulate demand. The monetarists 
may have been reacting against the levels of public 
debt incurred by Keynesian spending programmes in 
the 1970s.19 But a strategy that ended up replacing 
public debt with private debt was always a risky one. 
‘When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things 
will be complicated,’ the CEO of Citibank reportedly 
remarked, just before the bubble burst. ‘But as long 
as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and 
dance. We’re still dancing.’20 
By the end of 2008, Citibank was no longer dancing. 
No bank was. The music had clearly stopped – and things 
were definitely complicated.21 Just how complicated 
was indicated by the sheer size of the international 
bail-out. And the fact that even an estimated $7 trillion 
of taxpayers’ money proved insufficient to guarantee 
stability and avoid recession. 
In short, the message from this chapter is that the 
‘age of irresponsibility’ is not about casual oversight 
or individual greed. The economic crisis is not a 
consequence of isolated malpractice in selected 
parts of the banking sector. If there has been 
irresponsibility, it has been much more systemic, 
sanctioned from the top, and with one clear aim in 
mind: the continuation and protection of economic 
growth. 
The realisation that the credit crisis and the ensuing 
recession were part of a systemic failure in the 
current economic paradigm is reinforced by an 
understanding of the resource and environmental 
implications of economic growth. 
The commodity price ‘bubble’ that developed over 
several years and peaked in mid-2008 had clearly 
burst by the end of the year (Figure 1). It now 
seems likely that the very high prices attributed to 
key commodities in mid-2008 were in part the result 
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of speculation and in part the result of identifiable 
supply-side problems such as limited refinery 
capacity in the face of high demand. 
But this short-term bubble sat on top of a rising 
trend in commodity prices that cannot entirely 
be explained away in these terms. Environmental 
factors, resource and land scarcities, also played a 
key part and will inevitably continue to do so as the 
economy recovers. Concerns around peak oil and gas 
are already gathering momentum. The natural rate 
of decline in established oil fields is now believed to 
be as high as 9% a year.22 
Economic expansion in China and the emerging 
economies has accelerated the demand for fossil 
fuels, metals, and non-metallic minerals (see 
Chapter 5) and will inevitably reduce the reserve 
life of finite resources. The competition for land 
between food and biofuels clearly played a part in 
rising food prices. And these demands in their turn 
are intimately linked to accelerating environmental 
impacts: rising carbon emissions, declining 
biodiversity, rampant deforestation, collapsing fish 
stocks, declining water supplies and degraded soils. 
The material and environmental impacts of growth 
were paramount in prompting this inquiry. The 
economic crisis may appear to be unrelated; but it is 
not. The age of irresponsibility demonstrates a long-
term blindness to the limitations of the material 
world. This blindness is as evident in our inability 
to regulate financial markets as it is in our inability 
to protect natural resources and curtail ecological 
damage. Our ecological debts are as unstable as our 
financial debts. Neither is properly accounted for in 
the relentless pursuit of consumption growth. 
To protect economic growth we have been prepared 
to countenance – and have even courted – unwieldy 
financial and ecological liabilities, believing that 
these are necessary to deliver security and keep us 
from collapse. But this was never sustainable in the 
long-term. The financial crisis has shown us that it 
isn’t even sustainable in the short-term. 
The truth is that we have failed to get our economies 
working sustainably even in financial terms. For 
this reason, responses to the crisis which aim to 
restore the status quo are deeply misguided and 
doomed to failure. Prosperity today means nothing 
if it undermines the conditions on which prosperity 
tomorrow depends. And the single biggest message 
from the financial meltdown of 2008 is that 
tomorrow is already here.
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Redefining Prosperity
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“ The good life of the good person 
can only be fully realised in the 
good society. Prosperity can 
only be conceived as a condition 
that includes obligations and 
responsibilities to others.”
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Climate change, ecological degradation and the 
spectre of resource scarcity compound the problems 
of failing financial markets and lengthening 
recession. Short-term fixes to prop up a bankrupt 
system aren’t good enough. Something more is 
needed. An essential starting point is to set out a 
coherent notion of prosperity that doesn’t rely on 
default assumptions about consumption growth. 
Accordingly, this chapter searches for a different kind 
of vision for prosperity: one in which it is possible 
for humans beings to flourish, to achieve greater 
social cohesion, to find higher levels of wellbeing 
and yet still to reduce their material impact on the 
environment. 
A part of the aim of the SDC’s Redefining Prosperity 
study was to explore this possibility. A key finding 
from the study was that, beyond the narrow 
economic framing of the question, there are some 
strong competing visions of prosperity. Some of 
these visions hail from psychology and sociology; 
others from economic history. Some draw on 
secular or philosophical viewpoints; others from the 
religious or ‘wisdom’ traditions.2 
There are differences between these approaches. 
But there are also some striking similarities. Many 
perspectives accept that prosperity has material 
dimensions. It is perverse to talk about things going 
well if you lack the basic material resources required 
to sustain yourself: food and water to be adequately 
nourished or materials for clothing and shelter. 
Security in achieving these aims is also important.
But from at least the time of Aristotle, it has been 
clear that something more than material security is 
needed for human beings to flourish. Prosperity has 
vital social and psychological dimensions. To do well 
is in part about the ability to give and receive love, to 
enjoy the respect of your peers, to contribute useful 
work, and to have a sense of belonging and trust in 
the community. In short, an important component 
of prosperity is the ability to participate freely in the 
life of society.3 
Some approaches suggest a ‘transcendental’ need in 
human beings. For the more religious perspectives 
this may entail belief in some higher power. But 
even secular understandings accept that the human 
psyche craves meaning and purpose in life. 
Some perspectives – particularly from the wisdom 
traditions – add in an important moral or ethical 
component to prosperity. Islamic commentator 
Zia Sardar makes this point very clearly in his 
contribution to Redefining Prosperity. ‘Prosperity 
can only be conceived,’ he writes, ‘as a condition 
that includes obligations and responsibilities to 
others’.4 The same principle is enshrined in the 
Quaker’s Moral Economy Project.5 My prosperity 
hangs on the prosperity of those around me, these 
traditions suggest, as their’s does on mine. 
There is an interesting overlap between components 
of prosperity and the factors that are known to 
influence subjective wellbeing or ‘happiness’ 
(Figure 5). Indeed, to the extent that we are happy 
when things go well and unhappy when they don’t, 
there is clearly some connection between prosperity 
and happiness. This doesn’t necessarily mean that 
prosperity is the same thing as happiness. But the 
connection between the two provides a useful link 
into recent policy debates about happiness and 
subjective wellbeing.6
In fact, there are at least three different candidates 
on offer here as concepts of prosperity. It’s useful 
to distinguish carefully between them. Perhaps the 
easiest way to do this is to borrow from Amartya 
Sen, who set out the distinctions very clearly in 
a landmark essay on ‘the living standard’ first 
published in 1984.8 One of Sen’s concepts was 
characterised by the term opulence; another, by 
the term utility; and a third through the idea of 
capabilities for flourishing. 
The prevailing vision of prosperity as a continually expanding economic paradise has come 
unravelled. Perhaps it worked better when economies were smaller and the world was less 
populated. But if it was ever fully fit for purpose, it certainly isn’t now. 
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Prosperity as opulence
Broadly speaking, Sen’s first concept – opulence – 
corresponds to a conventional understanding that 
prosperity is about material satisfactions. Opulence 
refers to the ready availability and steady throughput 
of material commodities. An increase in the volume 
flow of commodities represents an increase in 
prosperity. The more we have the better off we are, 
in this view. 
The logic of abundance as the basis for doing well 
dates back to Adam Smith. In those days providing 
material commodities to meet the necessities of life 
was a priority. But it is pretty straightforward to see 
that this simple equation of quantity with quality, of 
more with better, is false in general. Even economic 
theory recognises this limitation. The ‘diminishing 
marginal utility’ of goods (indeed of income itself) 
reflects the fact that having more of something 
usually provides less additional satisfaction. 
The sense that more can sometimes be less 
provides the beginnings of an understanding of the 
dissatisfactions of the consumer society (Chapter 9). 
It also offers a strong humanitarian argument for 
redistribution. 
When you’ve had no food for months and the harvest 
has failed again, any food at all is a blessing. When 
the American style fridge-freezer is already stuffed 
with overwhelming choice, even a little extra might 
be considered a burden, particularly if you’re tempted 
to eat it. Once my appetite for strawberries, say, is 
sated, more of them provide no further joy at all. 
On the contrary, they may even make me feel ill. 
And if I’m tempted to ignore these bodily feedback 
mechanisms against excess I will find myself on the 
road to obesity and ill-health: outcomes which it is 
nonsensical to describe as desirable or satisfying. 
Prosperity as utility 
Quantity is not the same thing as quality. Opulence 
is not the same thing as satisfaction. Sen’s 
second characterisation of prosperity – as utility – 
recognises this. Rather than focusing on the sheer 
volume of commodities available to us, this second 
version relates prosperity to the satisfactions which 
commodities provide.9 
Though it is easy enough to articulate this difference, 
it is more difficult to define exactly how commodities 
relate to satisfaction, as many people have noted.10 
The one thing that’s pretty easy to figure out is that 
the relationship is highly non-linear. Even something 
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as basic as food doesn’t follow a simple linear 
pattern in which more is always better. 
There’s a particularly important complexity here. 
Increasingly, the uses to which we put material 
commodities are social or psychological in nature 
rather than purely material.11 In the immediate 
post-war years, it was a challenge to provide for 
basic necessities, even in the most affluent nations. 
Today, consumer goods and services increasingly 
furnish us with identity, experience, a sense of 
belonging, perhaps even meaning and a sense of 
hope (Chapter 6). 
Measuring utility in these circumstances is even 
more difficult. What is the ‘psychic satisfaction’ 
from an i-Phone? A new bicycle? A holiday abroad? 
A birthday present for a lover? These questions 
are practically impossible to answer. Economics 
gets round the difficulty by assuming their value is 
equivalent to the price people are prepared to pay 
for them in freely functioning markets. It casts utility 
as the monetary value of market exchanges. 
The GDP sums up all these market exchanges. 
Broadly speaking, it measures the total spending 
across the nation on all the commodities that flow 
through the economy. In this way, total spending is 
taken as a proxy for utility. And this, in a nutshell, 
is the case for believing that the GDP is a useful 
measure of wellbeing. 
But the case is deeply problematic at best. There 
is a huge literature critiquing the value of GDP as 
a wellbeing measure.12 Obvious limitations include 
its failure to account for non-market services (like 
household or voluntary labour) or negative utilities 
(externalities) like pollution. Critics point to the 
fact that the GDP counts both ‘defensive’ and 
‘positional’ expenditures even though these don’t 
contribute additionally to wellbeing.13 And, perhaps 
most critically, the GDP fails to account properly for 
changes in the asset base which affect our future 
consumption possibilities. 
Some have argued that the underlying concept of 
utility as exchange value is itself fundamentally 
flawed. A key finding here is the so-called 
happiness or life-satisfaction paradox. If GDP really 
does measure utility, it’s a mystery to find that 
reported life satisfaction has remained more or 
less unchanged in most advanced economies over 
several decades in spite of significant economic 
growth. Real income per head has tripled in the US 
since 1950, but the percentage of people reporting 
themselves very happy has barely increased at all, 
and has declined since the mid-1970s. In Japan, 
there has been little change in life-satisfaction over 
several decades. In the UK the percentage reporting 
themselves ‘very happy’ declined from 52% in 1957 
to 36% today, even though real incomes have more 
than doubled.14 
Actually, as Figure 6 illustrates, the so-called life-
satisfaction paradox is largely a malaise of the 
advanced economies. It is only after an income 
level of about $15,000 per capita, that the life-
satisfaction score barely responds at all even to 
quite large increases in GDP. In fact the assumed 
relationship between income and life-satisfaction 
can be turned on its head here. Denmark, Sweden, 
Ireland and New Zealand all have higher levels of 
life-satisfaction than the USA, but significantly lower 
income levels. 
By contrast, at very low incomes there is a huge 
spread in terms of life satisfaction, but the general 
trend is a quite steeply rising curve. A small increase 
in GDP leads to a big rise in life satisfaction. 
These data underline one of the key messages of this 
report. There is no case to abandon growth universally. 
But there is a strong case for the developed nations 
to make room for growth in poorer countries. It is 
in these poorer countries that growth really does 
make a difference. In richer countries the returns on 
further growth appear much more limited. In the 
language of economics, marginal utility (measured 
here as subjective wellbeing) diminishes rapidly at 
higher income levels. 
More importantly, it becomes clear from this analysis 
that a happiness-based measure of utility and an 
expenditure-based measure of utility behave in 
very different ways. And since they both claim to 
measure utility we can conclude that there is a 
problem somewhere. One or other – perhaps both 
– of these measures appears not to be doing its job 
properly. 
The wellbeing protagonists claim it’s the GDP that’s 
failing. But the self-report measures also have their 
critics. In their contributions to Redefining Prosperity, 
both Paul Ormerod and John O’Neill pointed to the 
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fact that people are known to be inconsistent in 
assessments of their own happiness.16 
Nobel-prize winner Daniel Kahneman has shown 
that if you ‘add up’ people’s assessments of 
subjective wellbeing over time you don’t get the 
same answer as you would if you ‘take all things 
together’. This may partly be because people adapt 
quickly to any given level of satisfaction and this 
changes their future valuations. Even something 
simple like a change in the order of events can 
alter our assessment of how well things have 
gone overall.17 
One of the difficulties in comparing the self-report 
measure against the GDP is that they are simply 
different kinds of scales. The GDP is (in principle at 
least) unbounded. It can (politicians hope) go on 
growing indefinitely. The life-satisfaction measure 
on the other hand is a bounded scale. You can only 
score from 0 to 10, how ever often you go on making 
the assessment. It is implicit in the definition of the 
self-report scale that utility itself is bounded.18 
Here we come close to the crux of the matter. 
Obviously the two measures presume fundamentally 
different concepts of utility. In one interpretation 
there is no limit to the satisfaction that humans 
can achieve. The other is more circumspect in its 
view of the human psyche. Whatever else we may 
say about the relationship between GDP and life-
satisfaction, it’s clear they are not measuring the 
same kind of utility. 
When it comes to finding a reliable concept of 
prosperity, we appear to be no further forwards. 
Arguably, there are as many reasons for not 
equating prosperity with happiness as there are 
for not equating prosperity with exchange values. 
For one thing, the overriding pursuit of immediate 
pleasure is a very good recipe for things not going 
well in the future. This was a point highlighted 
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clearly by Avner Offer’s incisive contribution to the 
Redefining Prosperity project. ‘True prosperity is a 
good balance between short-term arousal and long-
term security,’ he writes.19 
Neither the GDP – which counts mainly present 
consumption – nor self-report measures which count 
mainly present happiness – provide an accurate 
reflection of this balance. Just because humans 
suffer from myopic choice and find it hard to make 
a sacrifice now even for the sake of something 
better later doesn’t justify taking a view of 
prosperity based on more or less instantaneous 
gratification.20 
More fundamentally, to equate prosperity with 
happiness goes against our experience of what 
it means to live well. People can be unhappy for 
all sorts of reasons, some of them genetic, even 
when things do go well. Equally, they may be 
undernourished, poorly housed, with no prospect 
of improvement and yet declare themselves 
(some might say foolishly) completely content with 
their lot.
Prosperity as capabilities for flourishing 
Sen uses these distinctions to argue (with a nod to 
Aristotle) for a third concept of the living standard 
based on the capabilities that people have to 
flourish. The key questions we should be asking, he 
insists, are to do with how well people are able to 
function in any given context. 
‘Are they well nourished? Are they free from 
avoidable morbidity? Do they live long?’ he asks. 
‘Can they take part in the life of the community? Can 
they appear in public without shame and without 
feeling disgraced? Can they find worthwhile jobs? 
Can they keep themselves warm? Can they use 
their school education? Can they visit friends and 
relations if they choose?’21 
There is a clear resonance between Sen’s questions 
and the dimensions of prosperity identified at the 
beginning of this chapter.22 In fact, the functionings 
he cites in this extract – nutritional health, life 
expectancy, participation in society – coincide closely 
with constituents of prosperity identified from time 
immemorial in a wide range of writings. 
In his later work, Sen stresses not so much the 
functionings themselves – whether people actually 
live long, have a worthwhile job or participate in 
the community – as the capabilities or freedoms 
they have to do so.23 His point is that in a liberal 
society, people should have the right to choose 
whether or not to participate in society, to work in 
paid employment, and perhaps even whether to 
live a healthy life. It is the capability to flourish that 
is important. 
Nonetheless, there are some clear reasons to retain 
the central importance of functionings themselves. 
In the first place, abstract capabilities are pretty 
uninformative. Any attempt to operationalise this 
idea of development ends up needing to specify 
what the important functionings are. This point is 
emphasised in a recent report to the Netherlands 
Environmental Assessment Agency on the feasibility 
of a capabilities approach within public policy. Even 
when it is the freedom to function that people value 
most, argues the report, this is largely because the 
functionings themselves are valued too.24 
There is another reason not to take the focus on 
freedom too far. In a world of limits, certain kinds 
of freedoms are either impossible or immoral. The 
freedom endlessly to accumulate material goods is 
one of them. Freedoms to achieve social recognition 
at the expense of child labour in the supply chain, to 
find meaningful work at the expense of a collapse 
in biodiversity, or to participate in the life of the 
community at the expense of future generations 
may be others. 
Bounded capabilities 
This is the most important lesson that sustainability 
brings to any attempt to conceptualise prosperity. 
Capabilities for flourishing are a good starting point 
from which to define what it means to prosper. But 
this vision needs to be interpreted carefully: not as 
a set of disembodied freedoms, but as a range of 
‘bounded capabilities’ to live well – within certain 
clearly defined limits. 
These limits are established in relation to two critical 
factors. The first is the finite nature of the ecological 
resources within which life on earth is possible. 
These resources include the obvious material ones: 
fossil fuels, minerals, timber, water, land – and so on. 
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They also include the regenerative capacity of 
ecosystems, the diversity of species and the integrity 
of the atmosphere, the soils and the oceans. 
None of these resources is infinite. Each stands 
in a complex relationship to the web of life on 
earth. We may not yet know exactly where all the 
limits lie. But we know enough to be absolutely 
sure that in most cases, even the current level of 
economic activity is destroying ecological integrity 
and threatening ecosystem functioning – perhaps 
irreversibly. To ignore these natural bounds to 
flourishing is to condemn our descendents – and 
our fellow creatures – to an impoverished planet. 
The second limiting factor on our capability to live 
well is the scale of the global population. This is 
simple arithmetic. With a finite pie and any given 
level of technology, there is only so much in the 
way of resources and environmental space to go 
around. The bigger the global population the faster 
we hit the ecological buffers. The smaller the 
population the lower the pressure on ecological 
resources. This basic tenet of systems ecology is the 
reality of life for every other species on the planet. 
And for those in the poorest nations. 
The point is that a fair and lasting prosperity 
cannot be isolated from these material conditions. 
Capabilities are bounded on the one hand by 
the scale of the global population and on the 
other by the finite ecology of the planet. In the 
presence of these ecological limits, flourishing 
itself becomes contingent on available resources, 
on the entitlements of those who share the 
planet with us, on the freedoms of future generations 
and other species. Prosperity in this sense has 
both intra-generational and inter-generational 
dimensions. As the wisdom traditions suggest, 
there is an irredeemably moral dimension to the 
good life. 
A prosperous society can only be conceived as one 
in which people everywhere have the capability to 
flourish in certain basic ways. 
Deciding on those basic ‘entitlements’ is not a trivial 
task. What does it mean for humans to flourish? 
What are the functionings that society should value 
and provide for? How much flourishing is sustainable 
in finite world? 
Sen has tended to stop short of clear prescriptions, 
even though some are implicit in his writing. 
The philosopher Martha Nussbaum has gone 
furthest in this direction. Her list of ‘central human 
capabilities’ bears a striking resemblance to the 
components of prosperity identified in this chapter 
and includes: 
•	 life (being able to live to the end of a human 
life of normal length); bodily health 
•	 bodily integrity (to be secure against  
violent assault)
•	 having opportunities for sexual satisfaction 
and choice in matters of reproduction
•	 practical reason (being able to form a 
conception of the good life) 
•	 affiliation (being able to live with and  
toward others) 
•	 play, and control over one’s environment.25
Ultimately, as the Dutch report cited above recognises, 
any such list needs to be negotiated in open dialogue 
before it can be taken as the basis of policy. But in 
practice, there is a surprisingly strong overlap between 
the components in such lists and the constituents of 
prosperity identified here. 
Physical and mental health matter. Educational and 
democratic entitlements count in many societies. 
Trust, security and a sense of community are vital 
to social wellbeing. Relationships, meaningful 
employment, and the ability to participate in 
the life of society appear to be important almost 
everywhere. People suffer physically and mentally 
when these things are absent. Society itself is 
threatened when they decline. 
The challenge for society is to create the conditions 
in which these basic entitlements are possible. 
This is likely to require a closer attention to the social, 
psychological and material conditions of living – for 
example, to people’s psychological wellbeing and 
to the resilience of communities – than is familiar in 
free market societies. 
Crucially though, this doesn’t mean settling for a 
vision of prosperity based on curtailment and sacrifice. 
Capabilities are inevitably bounded by material and 
social conditions. Some ways of functioning may 
even be forestalled completely, particularly where 
they rely heavily on material throughput. But social 
and psychological functionings are not in any case 
best served by materialism, as we shall see more 
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clearly in Chapter 9. As Tim Kasser highlighted in 
his contribution to Redefining Prosperity, this new 
vision of prosperity may serve us better than the 
narrow materialistic one that has ensnared us. 
The possibility that humans can flourish, achieve 
greater social cohesion, find higher levels of 
wellbeing and still reduce their material impact 
on the environment is an intriguing one. It would 
be foolish to think that it is easy to achieve – for 
reasons that will be discussed in more detail in the 
next chapter. But it should not be given up lightly. 
It may well offer the best prospect we have for a 
lasting prosperity.
William Baumol, Robert Litan and Carl Schramm
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The Dilemma of Growth
“ One of the ‘paradoxes of prosperity’ 
is that people in rich countries don’t 
realise how good things really are.”
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Evidence for this would certainly need to be taken 
seriously. Perhaps the growth model is, after all, 
as good as it gets in terms of delivering prosperity. 
Are we guilty, as Baumol and his colleagues claim in 
the quote on the previous page, of not realising how 
good things really are under free-market capitalism? 
This chapter explores that possibility. 
It examines three closely related propositions 
in defence of economic growth. The first is that 
opulence – though not synonymous with prosperity 
– is a necessary condition for flourishing. The second 
is that economic growth is closely correlated with 
certain basic entitlements – for health or education, 
perhaps – that are essential to prosperity. The third 
is that growth is functional in maintaining economic 
and social stability.  
Any of these propositions, if supported, could threaten 
our prospects for achieving prosperity without growth 
and would place us instead between the horns of a 
rather uncomfortable dilemma. On the one hand, 
continued growth looks ecologically unsustainable; on 
the other, it appears essential for lasting prosperity. 
Making progress against such an ‘impossibility 
theorem’ would be vital. 
Material opulence as a condition  
of flourishing 
At first sight it might seem odd to reopen the 
relationship between opulence and prosperity. 
Chapter 3 disposed of any simple linear relationship 
between material flow and flourishing. More 
isn’t always better, even in something as basic as 
nutrition. 
Admittedly, our ability to flourish declines rapidly 
if we don’t have enough food to eat or adequate 
shelter. And this motivates a strong call for increasing 
incomes in poorer nations. But in the advanced 
economies, aside from some pernicious inequalities, 
we are largely past this point. Material needs are 
broadly met and disposable incomes are increasingly 
dedicated to different ends: leisure, social interaction, 
experience. Clearly though, this hasn’t diminished 
our appetite for material consumption. 
Why is it that material commodities continue to be 
so important to us, long past the point at which 
material needs are met? Are we really natural-born 
shoppers? Have we been genetically programmed, 
as the psychologist William James believed, with an 
‘instinct for acquisition’? What is it about consumer 
goods that continues to entrance us even beyond the 
point of usefulness? 
The clue to the puzzle lies in our tendency to 
imbue material things with social and psychological 
meanings. A wealth of evidence from consumer 
research and anthropology now supports this 
point. And the insight is devastating. Consumer 
goods provide a symbolic language in which we 
communicate continually with each other, not just 
about raw stuff, but about what really matters to us: 
family, friendship, sense of belonging, community, 
identity, social status, meaning and purpose in life.2 
And crucially, these social conversations provide, 
in part, the means to participate in the life of 
society. Prosperity itself, in other words, depends 
on them. ‘The reality of the social world’, argues 
sociologist Peter Berger, ‘hangs on the thin thread of 
conversation.’3 And this conversation hangs in turn 
on the language of material goods. 
There’s a lovely illustration of the power of this 
seductive relationship in a study led by consumer 
researcher Russ Belk. He and his colleagues explored 
the role of desire in consumer behaviour across three 
different cultures. Commenting on what fashion 
meant to them, one of Belk’s respondents remarked: 
‘No one’s gonna spot you across a crowded room and 
say “Wow! Nice personality!”’4 
The goal of this respondent is immediately identifiable 
as a basic human desire to be noticed, to be included, 
Prosperity is not just about income. That much is clear. Rising prosperity is not the same 
thing as economic growth. But this doesn’t in itself ensure that prosperity without growth is 
possible. A distinct possibility remains that growth is functional for prosperity: that continued 
economic growth is a necessary condition for a lasting prosperity. And that without growth 
our ability to flourish diminishes substantially. 
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to be liked, to find friendship – possibly more (as the 
singles ads put it). All of these things are fundamental 
components of participating in the life of society, of 
flourishing. 
It’s tempting to think that this is a predominantly 
western (and relatively modern) phenomenon. 
Belk’s study and numerous others suggest otherwise. 
The objective of the consumer, quite generally, 
according to anthropologist Mary Douglas, is ‘to help 
create the social world and find a credible place in 
it.’5 The symbolic role of material commodities has 
been identified, by anthropologists, in every single 
society for which records exist. 
It is of course abundantly true in consumer society. 
Matter matters to us. And not just in material ways. 
But this is no longer unique to the West. ‘One of the 
defining features of India’s middle classes at the turn 
of the millennium,’ argues anthropologist Emma 
Mawdsley, ‘is their appetite for ‘global’ culture, and 
their pursuit of ‘western’ lifestyles, possessions and 
values.’6 Very similar values and views are clearly 
discernible in China, in Latin America and even in 
parts of Africa. 
The consumer society is now, to all intents and 
purposes, a global society. One in which, for sure, 
there are still ‘islands of prosperity, oceans of poverty’. 
But in which the ‘evocative power of things’7 
increasingly creates the social world and provides the 
dominant arbiter of personal and societal progress.
In short, the material and the non-material 
dimensions of prosperity are inextricably intertwined 
with each other through the language of goods. 
Though it is essentially a social rather than a material 
task, our ability to participate in the life of society 
depends on this language. Anyone who has ever felt 
– or watched their kids feel – the enormous pressure 
of the peer group to conform to the latest fashion 
will understand how access to the life of society is 
mediated by sheer stuff. 
Little wonder then that people regard income as one 
of the factors important to their wellbeing (Figure 5).8 
Incomes after all provide the material means for 
flourishing. 
Prosperity depends more on opulence, it would 
seem, than is obvious at first glance. But there is 
an important subtlety in this relationship. And this 
subtlety provides a vital clue as to how we might 
confront – and get beyond – our dependency on 
material things. 
The importance of income in wellbeing is largely 
played out (within nations) through relative effects. 
What matters – more than the absolute level of 
income – is having more or less than those around 
us.9 This is particularly true in highly unequal 
societies where income disparities signal significant 
differences in social status. Income levels speak 
directly of status; and sometimes of authority, 
power and class as well. But, in addition, as we now 
see, income provides access to the ‘positional’ or 
status goods that are so important in establishing 
our social standing. 
And there is little doubt that at the individual level, 
social position counts. ‘A positive social ranking 
produces an inner glow that is also matched with 
a clear advantage in life expectation and health,’ 
argues economic historian Avner Offer.10 And this 
claim is backed up by persuasive evidence on the 
pernicious health effects of income inequality. 
Healthy life expectancy for English females was 16 
years higher for those in the top decile in the late 
1990s than it was for those in the bottom decile.11 
The importance of social position is reinforced 
by Defra’s recent ground-breaking study of the 
distribution of subjective wellbeing in the UK. Figure 
7 shows reported satisfactions with different life 
‘domains’ across different ‘social grades’. Those in 
the higher social grades tend to report significantly 
higher levels of satisfaction than those in the lower 
social grades.12 
Being at or near the top of the pile matters, it seems, 
both in terms of health and in terms of happiness or 
subjective wellbeing.
At the societal level though, there is a clear danger 
that this positional race doesn’t contribute much to 
overall prosperity. ‘The stock of status, measured as 
positive advantages, showed a sustained increase 
in the post-war years,’ acknowledges Offer. ‘Much 
of the pay-off, however, was absorbed in positional 
competition.’13 
This reasoning suggests that, at the level of society 
as a whole, income growth – and the associated 
material throughput – may be a ‘zero-sum game’. 
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Notes: Social grade is a classification based on occupation developed from the National Readership Survey
Examples of occupation in each grade include:
 AB: doctor, solicitor, accountant, teacher, nurse, police oficer
 C: Junior manager, student, clerical worker, foreman, plumber, bricklayer
 D: Manual workers, shop workers, apprentices
 E: Casual labourers, state pensioners, unemployed
Separate grades A and B and C1 and C2 have been joined (as AB and C) due to very similar distributions.
The results presented here show the difference between each group and the overall average.
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The population as a whole gets richer. Some people 
are better off than others and positions in society 
may change. But overall this positional competition 
adds little or nothing to the levels of wellbeing in 
the nation. This is one of the arguments that has 
been used to explain the life satisfaction paradox 
(Chapter 3).15 
If it’s right it suggests the possibility that a different 
form of social organisation – perhaps a more equal 
society – in which social positioning is either less 
important or signalled differently – could change 
things. We would need to confront the social logic that 
conspires to lock people into positional competition 
(Chapter 6). We would also have to identify less 
materialistic ways for people to participate in the 
life of society (Chapter 9). But in principle, these 
strategies could allow us to distinguish prosperity 
from opulence and reduce our dependency on 
material growth. In other words, this particular 
aspect of the dilemma of growth may just turn out 
to be avoidable. 
But relative (or distributional) effects don’t exhaust 
the relationship between income and human 
flourishing. There remains a distinct possibility 
that rising levels of income are required in and 
of themselves to establish and maintain absolute 
levels of capability for functioning. 
Income and basic entitlements 
This is where the second proposition comes in. 
The possibility that certain basic entitlements – such as 
life expectancy, health and educational participation – 
rely inherently on rising income, would cast a serious 
doubt on our ability to flourish without growth. 
The following graphs test this proposition using 
cross-country correlations between income and 
certain key components of human flourishing. The 
analysis uses data collected over several decades by 
the United Nations Development Programme. These 
data in themselves can neither prove nor disprove a 
causal link between income and prosperity. But they 
provide a useful starting point in understanding how 
important GDP might be in human flourishing.
Figure 8, for example, maps life expectancy against 
average annual income levels in 177 different nations. 
The pattern is similar to the one in Figure 6 (Chapter 3), 
which looked at the relationship between life 
satisfaction and income. But now the ‘dependent 
variable’ is life expectancy rather than satisfaction. 
The difference between the poorest and the richest 
countries is striking, with life expectancies as low as 
40 years in parts of Africa and almost double that 
in many developed nations. But the advantage of 
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being richer as a nation shows diminishing returns. 
As income rises, the additional benefits in terms of 
increased life expectancy are reduced. 
Some low-income countries have life expectancies 
that are on a par with developed nations. Chile 
(with an average annual income of $12,000) has a 
life expectancy of 78.3 years, greater than that of 
Denmark (whose average income is almost three 
times higher at $34,000). But it is also possible to find 
countries with incomes in the same range as Chile 
(South Africa and Botswana, for instance) where life 
expectancy is 30 years lower. 
A similar story emerges from the data on infant mortality 
(Figure 9). In sub-Saharan Africa, 18% of children die 
before their fifth birthday, whereas in OECD countries, 
the proportion is 0.6%. But as incomes increase, the 
gains from growth again diminish quite rapidly. Infant 
mortality in Cuba is six deaths per 1000 live births, as 
low as it is in the US – even though Cubans, with an 
average per capita income of $6,000 enjoy less than 
15% of the income enjoyed by Americans. 
At the same time, it is possible to find countries 
with an average income somewhat higher than 
$6,000 per capita, whose infant mortality rates are 
much worse than those in Cuba. Equatorial Guinea 
is a striking example, with a per capita income of 
$8,000 and infant mortality of 123 deaths per 1000 
live births. 
The ambivalent relationship between income and 
health indicators is echoed in the relationship 
between income and education. The Human 
Development Report’s Education Index – based 
on a composite of educational participation rates 
– illustrates the same disparity between the very 
poor and the very rich. It also shows the familiar 
pattern of diminishing returns with respect to 
income growth (Figure 10). 
Once again, it is possible to find low income countries 
providing educational participation rates that are as 
high as the most developed nations. Kazakhstan, 
with in average income of less than $8,000, scores 
higher on the index than Japan, Switzerland or the 
US, countries with income levels four and five times 
higher. Equally though, it isn’t hard to find countries 
with income levels of $8,000 whose educational 
participation rates are only two-thirds of those in 
most developed nations. 
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Interestingly, there is no hard and fast rule here 
on the relationship between income growth and 
improved flourishing. The poorest countries certainly 
suffer extraordinary deprivations in life expectancy, 
infant mortality and educational participation. 
But as incomes grow beyond about $15,000 per 
capita the returns to growth diminish substantially. 
Some countries achieve remarkable levels of 
flourishing with only a fraction of the income 
available to richer nations.
More exploration of these relationships is warranted. 
Understanding the structural dependencies between 
income and human flourishing is a vital subject for 
study.19 One of the questions that needs answering 
is how things change over time, within countries. 
Figure 11 illustrates the importance of this question 
for changes in life expectancy. 
Again there is no single pattern. Three or four different 
modes of development emerge. One belongs to 
the developed nations – exemplified in Figure 11 
by the UK and Japan. In these countries, there is a 
very strong but quite ‘shallow’ correlation between 
income growth and increased life expectancy. In the 
UK, for example, life expectancy has increased quite 
gradually but very consistently over the last few 
decades in spite of short periods of recession.20
Japan offers an even more interesting example. 
The country was hit quite severely during the Asian 
crisis in the late 1990s and suffered a prolonged 
period of economic turbulence. And yet life 
expectancy subsequently increased faster than at 
any time in the preceding two decades. 
The ability to improve life expectancy despite a 
faltering economy is also in evidence in another 
group of countries, exemplified by Chile and 
Argentina in the graph. Here, rises in life expectancy 
appear much less dependent on income growth. In 
Argentina, in particular, economic output has been 
highly erratic over the last three decades, but the 
gains in life expectancy have been substantial and 
consistent. 
Finally though, there are some countries (exemplified 
in Figure 11 by Russia and South Africa) which show 
significant declines in life expectancy when the 
economy falters. In fact, almost all the former Soviet 
bloc countries experienced reduced life expectancy 
in the post-Soviet era. In Russia itself, life expectancy 
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remained more or less constant between 1970 and 
1989 but fell by 6% following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. Perhaps most strikingly, this decline 
continued, even after the economy started to 
recover. 
The same phenomenon – decline in spite of 
economic recovery – is visible in the case of South 
Africa. Here, the context and the contributing factors 
are rather different. A striking feature of human 
development across Africa since 1990 is the collapse 
in life expectancy irrespective of growth rates. This 
is largely down to the devastating impact of Aids. 
Clearly growth doesn’t guarantee improved prosperity, 
even in such basic components of flourishing as 
life expectancy. Incremental improvements have 
been possible in most developed nations, alongside 
more or less continuous economic growth. But 
there are also examples where life expectancy has 
increased much faster than income and one or two 
where it has increased even in the face of prolonged 
or severe recession. 
In Cuba (not shown in Figure 11), the formal 
economy (GDP) more or less collapsed after the 
breakup of the Soviet Union in 1989, partly because 
of the sudden removal of subsidised Soviet oil. 
But one recent study suggests that there were 
significant health improvements in the aftermath. 
Calorific intake was reduced by over a third. 
But obesity was halved and the percentage of 
physically active adults more than doubled. 
Between 1997 and 2002, ‘there were declines in 
deaths attributed to diabetes (51%), coronary heart 
disease (35%) [and] stroke (20%)’.22 
Income growth and economic stability 
This brings us on to the third proposition identified 
above: that growth is functional in maintaining 
economic and social stability. It is clear from the 
evidence here that collapsing economies do present 
a risk of humanitarian loss. Economic stability or, 
at the very least, some form of social resilience, is 
important for prosperity.  
Even so there are interesting differences between 
countries faced with economic hardship. Some 
countries – notably Cuba, Japan, Argentina – have been 
able to ride out quite severe economic turbulence 
and yet maintain or even enhance national health. 
Others have watched life expectancy tumble in the 
face of economic recession. 
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Some of the explanation for these differences must 
lie in social structure. The transition of ex-Soviet 
states to a market economy was characterised by 
very profound changes in social structure, not the 
least of which was a collapse in state provision 
of health and social care. Little surprise, in these 
circumstances, that life expectancy faltered. In Cuba 
by contrast, continuing state-led social provision was 
almost certainly a contributing factor in the health 
improvements that followed the economic collapse. 
Humanitarian loss in the face of economic turbulence, 
in other words, may be more dependent on social 
structure than on the degree of economic instability 
that is encountered. There are some interesting 
policy lessons here (Chapter 11) for the prospect of 
prosperity without growth. 
But the risk of humanitarian collapse is enough 
to place something of a question mark over the 
possibility that we can simply halt economic growth. 
If halting growth leads to economic and social 
collapse, then times look hard indeed. If it can be 
achieved without collapse, prospects for maintaining 
prosperity are considerably better. 
Critical here is the question of whether a growing 
economy is essential for economic stability. Is growth 
functional for stability? Do we need economic growth 
after all simply to keep the economy stable? 
The conventional answer is certainly that we do. 
To see why, we need to explore a little further how 
such economies work. A detailed discussion of this is 
deferred to Chapter 6. But the broad idea is simple 
enough to convey. 
Market economies place a high emphasis on 
technological efficiency. Continuous improvements in 
technology mean that more output can be produced 
for any given input of labour, capital and resources.23 
Efficiency improvement stimulates demand by 
driving down costs and contributes to a positive cycle 
of expansion. But crucially it also means that fewer 
people are needed to produce the same goods from 
one year to the next. 
As long as the economy grows fast enough to offset 
this increase in ‘labour productivity’, there isn’t 
a problem. But if it doesn’t, then increased labour 
productivity means that someone loses their job.24 
If the economy slows for any reason – whether 
through a decline in consumer confidence, through 
commodity price shocks, or through a managed 
attempt to reduce consumption – then the systemic 
trend towards improved labour productivity leads to 
unemployment. This in its turn, leads to diminished 
spending power, a loss of consumer confidence and 
further reduces demand for consumer goods. 
From an environmental point of view this may be 
desirable if it leads to lower resource use and fewer 
polluting emissions. But it also means that retail 
falters and business revenues suffer. Incomes fall. 
Investment is cut back. Unemployment rises further 
and the economy begins to fall into a spiral of 
recession. 
Recession has a critical impact on the public finances. 
Social costs rise with higher unemployment. But tax 
revenues decline as incomes fall and fewer goods 
are sold. Lowering spending risks real cuts to public 
services. Cutting spending affects people’s capabilities 
for flourishing – a direct hit on prosperity. 
Governments must borrow more not just to maintain 
public spending but to try and re-stimulate demand. 
But in doing so, they inevitably increase the national 
debt. Servicing this debt in a declining economy – 
as we noted in Chapter 2 – is problematic at best. 
Just maintaining interest payments takes up a larger 
proportion of the national income. 
The best that can be hoped for here is that demand 
does recover and it’s possible to begin paying off the 
debt. This could take decades. It took Britain almost 
half a century to pay off public debts accumulated 
through the Second World War. The Institute for 
Fiscal Studies has estimated that the ‘debt overhang’ 
from the current crisis could last into the 2030s.25 
On the other hand, if the debt accumulates and the 
economy fails to recover, the country is doomed to 
bankruptcy. 
Crucially, there is little resilience within this system. 
Once the economy starts to falter, feedback 
mechanisms that had once contributed to expansion 
begin to work in the opposite direction, pushing the 
economy further into recession. With a growing (and 
aging) population these dangers are exacerbated. 
Higher levels of growth are required to protect the same 
level of average income and to provide sufficient 
revenues for (increased) health and social costs.
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In short, modern economies are driven towards 
economic growth. For as long as the economy is 
growing, positive feedback mechanisms tend to 
push this system towards further growth. When 
consumption growth falters the system is driven 
towards a potentially damaging collapse with a 
knock-on impact on human flourishing. People’s jobs 
and livelihoods suffer. 
There is of course, something of an irony here. Because 
at the end of the day the answer to the question of 
whether growth is functional for stability is this: in 
a growth-based economy, growth is functional for 
stability. The capitalist model has no easy route to 
a steady-state position. Its natural dynamics push it 
towards one of two states: expansion or collapse. 
Later (Chapter 8) we explore the possibilities for 
amending this conclusion. In the meantime, we 
appear to have returned to the dilemma with 
which this chapter started. Or at least to a more 
precise incarnation of it. Put in its simplest form the 
‘dilemma of growth’ can now be stated in terms of 
two propositions:
•	 Growth is unsustainable – at least in its current 
form. Burgeoning resource consumption and 
rising environmental costs are compounding 
profound disparities in social wellbeing 
•	 ‘De-growth’ii is unstable – at least under 
present conditions. Declining consumer 
demand leads to rising unemployment, falling 
competitiveness and a spiral of recession. 
This dilemma looks at first like an impossibility 
theorem for a lasting prosperity. But it cannot be 
avoided and has to be taken seriously. The failure 
to do so is the single biggest threat to sustainability 
that we face.
ii De-growth (décroissance in the French) is an emerging term for (planned) reductions in economic output. 
“ From 1981 to 2005 the global economy 
more than doubled, but 60 percent of 
the world’s ecosystems were either 
degraded or over-used.”
5
The Myth of Decoupling
United Nations Environment Programme
October 20081
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It’s vital here to distinguish between ‘relative’ and 
‘absolute’ decoupling. Relative decoupling refers 
to a decline in the ecological intensity per unit of 
economic output. In this situation, resource impacts 
decline relative to the GDP. But they don’t necessarily 
decline in absolute terms. Impacts may still increase, 
but do so at a slower pace than growth in the GDP. 
The situation in which resource impacts decline 
in absolute terms is called ‘absolute decoupling’. 
Needless to say, this latter situation is essential if 
economic activity is to remain within ecological 
limits. In the case of climate change, for instance, 
absolute reductions in global carbon emissions of 
50-85% are required by 2050 in order to meet the 
IPCC’s 450 ppm stabilisation target.2 
The aim of this chapter is to explore the evidence for 
both relative and absolute decoupling. It concentrates 
in particular on trends in the consumption of finite 
resources and the emission of carbon. These 
examples don’t exhaust the concerns associated 
with a continually growing economy. But they are 
already of immediate concern and illustrate clearly 
the scale of the problem. 
How much decoupling has been achieved in these 
examples? How much needs to be achieved? 
Is it really possible for a strategy of ‘growth with 
decoupling’ to deliver ever-increasing incomes for a 
world of nine billion people and yet remain within 
ecological limits? These questions are central to this 
study. 
Relative decoupling 
Put very simply, relative decoupling is about doing 
more with less: more economic activity with less 
environmental damage; more goods and services 
with fewer resource inputs and fewer emissions. 
Decoupling is about doing things more efficiently. 
And since efficiency is one of the things that 
modern economies are good at, decoupling has a 
familiar logic and a clear appeal as a solution to the 
dilemma of growth. 
Resource inputs represent a cost to producers. So the 
profit motive should stimulate a continuing search for 
efficiency improvement in industry to reduce input 
costs. Some evidence supports this hypothesis. For 
example, the amount of primary energy needed to 
produce each unit of the world’s economic output 
has fallen more or less continuously over most of the 
last half century. The global ‘energy intensity’ is now 
33% lower than it was in 1970.3 
These gains have been most evident in the advanced 
economies. Energy intensities have declined three 
times faster in the OECD countries over the last 25 
years than they have in non-OECD countries.4 Energy 
intensity in both the US and the UK is some 40% 
lower today than it was in 1980.5 
Outside the most advanced nations, the pattern 
has been much less clear. Even in some southern 
European countries (Greece, Turkey, Portugal e.g.) 
energy intensity has increased in the last twenty five 
years. And in emerging economies and developing 
nations, achievements have been very mixed. 
Across the Middle East, energy intensity more 
than doubled between 1980 and 2006; in India it 
increased at first but has declined slowly since the 
peak in 1993. In China, energy intensity fell by over 
70% to the turn of the 21st Century but has now 
begun to climb again.6 
Overall, however, energy intensities declined 
significantly during the last three decades, across 
the OECD countries in particular. The same is true of 
material intensities more generally. Figure 12 shows 
a measure of material intensity for five advanced 
nations, including the UK, over the final quarter of 
the 20th Century. The Figure shows clear evidence of 
‘relative decoupling’. 
Not surprisingly, improved resource efficiency is also 
leading to declining emission intensities. Figure 13 
The conventional response to the dilemma of growth is to appeal to the concept of 
‘decoupling’. Production processes are reconfigured. Goods and services are redesigned. 
Economic output becomes progressively less dependent on material throughput. In this way, 
it is hoped, the economy can continue to grow without breaching ecological limits – or running 
out of resources. 
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shows the changing carbon dioxide intensity of GDP 
over the last 25 years. The global carbon intensity 
declined by almost a quarter from just over 1 
kilogram of carbon dioxide per US dollar (kgCO2/$) 
in 1980 to 770 grams of carbon dioxide per US dollar 
(gCO2/$) in 2006. 
Again, steady improvements across the OECD 
countries were accompanied by a slightly more 
uneven pattern across non-OECD countries. 
Significant growth in carbon intensity occurred 
across the Middle East and during the earlier stages 
of development in India. China witnessed some 
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striking improvements early on. But these have 
been partly offset by increasing carbon intensity in 
recent years. Worryingly, the declining global trend 
in carbon intensity has also faltered in recent years, 
even increasing slightly since its low point in 2000. 
Clearly, there is little room for complacency here. 
The efficiency with which the global economy 
uses fossil resources and generates carbon dioxide 
emissions is improving in some places. But overall 
we are making faltering progress at best. 
To make matters worse, relative decoupling is 
barely half the story. It measures only the resource 
use (or emissions) per unit of economic output. 
For decoupling to offer a way out of the dilemma 
of growth, resource efficiencies must increase at 
least as fast as economic output does. And they 
must continue to improve as the economy grows, 
if overall burdens aren’t to increase. To achieve 
this more difficult task, we need to demonstrate 
absolute decoupling. Evidence of this is much harder 
to find.
Absolute decoupling 
Despite declining energy and carbon intensities 
carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels have 
increased by 80% since 1970. Emissions today are 
almost 40% higher than they were in 1990 – the 
Kyoto base year – and since the year 2000 they have 
been growing at over 3% per year (see Figure 14). 
Figure 14 does illustrate some relative decoupling: 
the world GDP has risen faster than carbon dioxide 
emissions over the last eighteen years. But there 
is no absolute decoupling here. And a surge in 
world consumption of coal has increased the rate 
of growth in carbon dioxide emissions since the 
year 2000. 
What’s true for fossil resources and carbon emissions 
is true for material throughputs more generally. 
Figure 15 illustrates direct material consumption for 
the same five OECD countries shown in Figure 12. 
Despite very clear evidence of relative decoupling in 
the earlier figure, there is far less evidence here of 
an absolute decline in material consumption. 
The best that can be observed – in only a couple 
of countries – is something of a stabilisation in 
resource requirements, particularly since the late 
1980s. But even this finding is not entirely to be 
trusted. The problem is that it’s difficult to pick 
up all the resources embedded in traded goods. 
The measure shown here – direct material 
consumption – does its best to identify traded 
Figure 15: Direct Material Consumption in OECD Countries: 1975-2000
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flows of specific resources. But it misses out on the 
resources (and emissions) used to manufacture 
finished and semi-finished products abroad. 
This question is important precisely because of the 
structure of modern developed economies, which 
have typically tended to move progressively away 
from domestic manufacturing. Unless the demand 
for consumer goods also declines, more and more 
finished and semi-finished goods need to be 
imported from abroad. And since concepts like direct 
material consumption omit such accounts, Figure 
15 underestimates the resource requirements of 
developed economies. 
Correcting this failing calls for more sophisticated 
resource and economic models than are currently 
available. In the case of carbon dioxide, however, 
several recent studies for the UK have confirmed 
that national accounts systematically fail to account 
for the ‘carbon trade balance’. In other words, there 
are more (hidden) carbon emissions associated 
with UK consumption patterns than appear from the 
numbers we report to the United Nations under the 
Climate Change Convention. 
In fact, this difference is enough to undermine 
the progress made towards the UK’s Kyoto 
targets. An apparent reduction in emissions of 6% 
between 1990 and 2004, as reported under UN 
FCCC guidelines is turned into an 11% increase in 
emissions, once emissions embedded in trade are 
taken into account.11 
Without more detailed work, it’s difficult to know 
whether this pattern is true more generally for 
material resources. But given the trend away from 
manufacturing, it’s clearly wise to view Figure 15 
with some caution. There is an outside chance that 
some stabilisation of resource consumption has 
occurred. But Figure 15 doesn’t provide a lot of 
confidence in absolute decoupling, even within the 
advanced economies. 
Ultimately, in any case, what count most in terms 
of global limits are worldwide statistics. Both 
climate change and resource scarcity are essentially 
global issues. So the final arbiter on the feasibility 
of absolute decoupling – and the possibilities for 
escaping the dilemma of growth – are worldwide 
trends. Figure 14 confirmed a rising global trend in 
fossil fuels and carbon emissions. Figure 16 shows 
the global trend in the extraction of another vital set 
of finite resources – metal ores.
What’s striking from Figure 16 is not just the absence 
of absolute decoupling. There is little evidence of 
relative decoupling either. Some improved resource 
Figure 15: Direct Material Consumption in OECD Countries: 1975-2000
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efficiency is evident in the earlier years, but this 
appears to have been eroded more recently. 
Particularly notable is the increased consumption 
of structural metals. Extraction of iron ore, bauxite, 
copper and nickel is now rising faster than world 
GDP. 
Reasons for this are not particularly hard to find. 
China’s hunger for iron ore is well-documented.13 
As the emerging economies build up their 
infrastructures, the rising demand for structural 
materials is one of the factors that put an upward 
pressure on commodity prices during 2007 and 
the first half of 2008 (see Chapter 2, Figure 1). The 
impact on certain non-metallic minerals is just as 
striking. Worldwide cement production has more 
than doubled since 1990, surpassing growth in world 
GDP by some 70 percentage points. Global resource 
intensities (the ratios of resource use to GDP), far 
from declining, have increased significantly across 
a range of non-fuel minerals. Resource efficiency 
is going in the wrong direction. Even relative 
decoupling just isn’t happening. 
It’s clear from this that history provides little support 
for the plausibility of decoupling as a sufficient 
solution to the dilemma of growth. But neither 
does it rule out the possibility entirely. A massive 
technological shift; a significant policy effort; 
wholesale changes in patterns of consumer demand; 
a huge international drive for technology transfer 
to bring about substantial reductions in resource 
intensity right across the world: these changes are 
the least that will be needed to have a chance of 
remaining within environmental limits and avoiding 
an inevitable collapse in the resource base at some 
point in the (not too distant) future. 
The message here is not that decoupling is 
unnecessary. On the contrary, absolute reductions 
in throughput are essential. The question is, how 
much is achievable? How much decoupling is 
technologically and economically viable? With the 
right political will, could relative decoupling really 
proceed fast enough to achieve real reductions in 
emissions and throughput, and allow for continued 
economic growth? These critical questions remain 
unanswered by those who propose decoupling as 
the solution to the dilemma of growth. More often 
than not, the crucial distinction between relative 
and absolute decoupling isn’t even elucidated. 
It’s far too easy to get lost in general declarations 
of principle: growing economies tend to become 
more resource efficient; efficiency allows us to 
decouple emissions from growth; so the best way 
Figure 17: Carbon Intensities Now and Required to Meet 450 ppm Target 
Figure 16: Global Trends in Primary Metal Extraction: 1990-2007
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to achieve targets is to keep growing the economy. 
This argument is not at all uncommon in the tangled 
debates about environmental quality and economic 
growth. 
It contains some partial truths – for example, that 
some efficiency improvements occur in some 
advanced economies.14 It draws some support from 
some limited evidence on air pollutants such as 
sulphur dioxide and particulates. These emissions 
sometimes show an inverted-U shaped relationship 
with economic growth: emissions grow in the early 
stage of growth but then peak and decline.15 
But this relationship only holds, according to 
ecological economist Douglas Booth, for local, visible 
environmental effects like smoke, river water quality 
and acid pollutants. It isn’t uniformly true even for 
these pollutants. And it simply doesn’t exist at all 
for key indicators of environmental quality such as 
carbon emissions, resource extraction, municipal 
waste generation and species loss.16 
As an escape from the dilemma of growth it is 
fundamentally flawed. Ever greater consumption 
of resources is a driver of growth. As industrial 
ecologist Robert Ayres has pointed out: ‘consumption 
(leading to investment and technological progress) 
drives growth, just as growth and technological 
progress drives consumption.’17 Protagonists of 
growth seldom compute the consequences of this 
relationship. 
The Arithmetic of Growth 
Arithmetic is key here. A very simple mathematical 
identity governs the relationship between relative 
and absolute decoupling. It was put forward almost 
forty years ago by Paul Ehrlich and John Holdren. 
The Ehrlich equation tells us quite simply that the 
impact (I) of human activity is the product of three 
factors: the size of the population (P), its level of 
affluence (A) expressed as income per person, and 
a technology factor (T), which measures the impact 
associated with each dollar we spend (Box 3).  
For as long as the T factor is going down, then we 
are safe in the knowledge that we have relative 
decoupling. But for absolute decoupling we need I 
to go down as well. And that can only happen if T 
goes down fast enough to outrun the pace at which 
population (P) and income per capita (A) go up. 
Over the last five decades this has been a tough 
ask. Both affluence and population have gone up 
substantially, each being about equally responsible 
for the overall five-fold growth in the economy. 
In recent years, the affluence factor has exceeded 
the population factor in driving growth. But both 
are clearly important, as Ehrlich himself clearly 
recognised.18 And neither has proved particularly 
tractable to policy. Increasing affluence has been 
seen as synonymous with improved wellbeing. 
Advocating limits to population growth has been 
seen as contravening basic human liberties. 
Ironically, both these preconceptions are wrong. 
Increasing incomes don’t always guarantee 
wellbeing and sometimes detract from it. And 
the fastest population growth has occurred in 
the developing world – driven not by liberty but 
by a lack of education and inadequate access to 
contraception.19 
Nonetheless, the intractability of addressing both 
population and income has tended to reinforce the 
idea that only technology can save us. Knowing that 
efficiency is key to economic progress, it is tempting 
to place our faith in the possibility that we can push 
relative decoupling fast enough that it leads in the 
end to absolute decoupling. But just how feasible 
is this?
There is a convenient ‘rule of thumb’ to figure out 
when relative decoupling will lead to absolute 
decoupling. In a growing population with an 
increasing average income, absolute decoupling 
will occur when the rate of relative decoupling is 
greater than the rates of increase in population and 
income combined.20 
With this rule of thumb in mind, it’s instructive to 
explore what’s happened historically (and why) to 
global carbon dioxide emissions. 
Carbon intensities have declined on average by 
0.7% per year since 1990. That’s good; but not good 
enough. Population has increased at a rate of 1.3% 
and average per capita income has increased by 
1.4% each year (in real terms) over the same period. 
Efficiency hasn’t even compensated for the growth 
in population, let alone the growth in incomes. 
Instead, carbon emissions have grown on average 
by 1.3 + 1.4 – 0.7 = 2% per year, leading over 17 years 
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to an almost 40% increase in emissions (Box 3).21
The same rule of thumb allows us a quick check 
on the feasibility of decoupling carbon emissions 
from growth in the future. The IPCC’s Fourth 
Assessment report suggests that achieving a 450 
ppm stabilisation target means getting global 
carbon dioxide emissions down to below 4 billion 
tonnes per annum by 2050 or soon after. This would 
be equivalent to reducing annual emissions at an 
average rate of 4.9% per year between now and 
2050.22
But income and global population are going in the 
opposite direction. According to the UN’s mid-range 
estimate, the world’s population is expected to reach 
nine billion people by 2050 – an average growth of 
0.7% each year. Under business as usual conditions, 
the decline in carbon intensity just about balances 
the growth in population and carbon emissions 
will end up growing at about the same rate as the 
average income – 1.4% a year. It might not sound 
much, but by 2050, under these assumptions, carbon 
emissions are 80% higher than they are today. 
Not quite what the IPCC had in mind. 
To achieve an average year-on-year reduction in 
emissions of 4.9% with 0.7% population growth 
and 1.4% income growth T has to improve by 
approximately 4.9 + 0.7 + 1.4 = 7% each year – 
almost ten times faster than it is doing right now. 
By 2050 the average carbon content of economic 
output would need to be less than 40 gCO2/$, a 
21-fold improvement on the current global average 
(Figure 17, Scenario 1). 
In fact, things could get even worse than this. At the 
higher end of the UN’s population estimates – in a 
world of almost 11 billion people – business as usual 
would more than double global carbon emissions 
over today’s level. Achieving the 2050 target in 
these circumstances would put even more pressure 
on technological improvements, to drive the carbon 
intensity of output down to less than 30 gCO2/$ 
(Figure 17, Scenario 2).23 
Box 3: Unravelling the Arithmetic of Growth
The Ehrlich equation states that environmental (I) is a product of population (P) times affluence or income level 
(A) times the technological intensity (T) of economic output. 
I = P x A x T
For carbon dioxide emissions from fuel combustion, for example, the total emissions are given by the product of 
population (P) times income (measured as dollars of GDP/person) times the carbon intensity of economic activity 
(measured as gCO2/$): 
C = P x $/person x gCO2/$
Using this arithmetic for the year 2007, when the global population was about 6.6 billion, the average income 
level in constant 2000 dollars (at market prices) was $5,900, and the carbon intensity was 760 gCO2/$, we find 
that the total carbon dioxide emissions C were: 
6.6 x 5.9 x 0.77 = 30 billion tonnes of CO2.
In 1990, when the population was only 5.3 billion and the average income was $4,700 but carbon intensity was 
860 gCO2/$, total carbon dioxide emissions C were given by: 
5.3 x 4.7 x 0.87 = 21.7 billion tonnes of CO2.
These numbers are confirmed against those reported in the Energy Information Administration’s International 
Energy Annual. The cumulative growth in emissions between 1990 (the Kyoto base year) and 2007 was 39% 
(30/21.7 = 1.39) with an average growth rate in emissions (r
i
) of almost 2% (r
i
 = (1.39)1/17 – 1 = 1.96%).  
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Notably, this would still be a deeply unequal world. 
Business-as-usual income growth is usually taken to 
mean a steady 2 or 3% growth rate in the most 
developed countries while the rest of the world 
does its best to catch up – China and India leaping 
ahead at 5-10% per annum at least for a while, with 
Africa, South America and parts of Asia languishing 
in the doldrums for decades to come. In most of 
these scenarios, both the incomes and the carbon 
footprints of the developed nations would be more 
than an order of magnitude higher by 2050 than 
those in the poorest nations. 
If we were really serious about fairness and wanted 
the world’s nine billion people all to enjoy an income 
comparable with EU citizens today, the economy 
would need to grow 6 times between now and 
2050, with incomes growing at an average rate of 
3.6% a year. Achieving the IPCC’s emission target in 
this world means pushing down the carbon intensity 
of output by 9% every single year for the next forty 
or so years.24 By 2050, the average carbon intensity 
would need to be 55 times lower than it is today at 
only 14 gCO2/$ (Figure 17, Scenario 3). 
And this scenario still hasn’t factored in income 
growth in the developed nations. Imagine a scenario 
in which incomes everywhere are commensurate 
with a 2% increase per annum in the current EU 
average income. The global economy grows almost 
15 times in this scenario and carbon intensity must 
fall by over 11% every single year. By 2050 the 
carbon content of each dollar has to be no more 
than 6 gCO2/$. That’s almost 130 times lower than 
the average carbon intensity today (Figure 17, 
Scenario 4). 
Beyond 2050, of course, if growth is to continue, 
so must efficiency improvements. With growth at 
2% a year from 2050 to the end of the century, the 
economy in 2100 is 40 times the size of today’s 
economy. And to all intents and purposes, nothing 
Figure 17: Carbon Intensities Now and Required to Meet 450 ppm Target 
Figure 16: Global Trends in Primary Metal Extraction: 1990-2007
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less than a complete decarbonisation of every single 
dollar will do to achieve carbon targets. Needless to 
say, these numbers look even worse, if the higher 
UN population projections materialise. Although 
conversely, of course, more robust population 
policies would reduce the pressure on technology. 
Stark choices 
Playing with numbers may seem like dancing angels 
on the head of a pin. But simple arithmetic hides 
stark choices. Are we really committed to eradicating 
poverty? Are we serious about reducing carbon 
emissions? Do we genuinely care about resource 
scarcity, deforestation, biodiversity loss?26 Or are we so 
blinded by conventional wisdom that we daren’t do 
the sums for fear of revealing the truth? 
One thing is clear. Business as usual is grossly 
inadequate, as even the International Energy Agency 
– the world’s energy watchdog – now accepts. Their 
‘Reference’ scenario has the demand for primary 
energy growing by 45% by 2030, on-track for the 
80% hike in carbon emissions alluded to above. 
The IEA’s ‘Stabilisation’ scenario reveals the scale 
of the challenge. ‘Our analysis shows that OECD 
countries alone cannot put the world onto a 
450ppm trajectory, even if they were to reduce their 
emissions to zero’, the World Energy Outlook 2008 
admits.27 
The report also highlights the scale of investment 
that is likely to be needed over the coming decades. 
Stabilising carbon emissions (and addressing 
problems of energy security) requires a whole-scale 
transition in global energy systems. Technological 
change is essential, with or without growth. Even a 
smaller economy would face this challenge: declining 
fossil energy requirements and substantially reduced 
carbon emissions are vital. 
We can never entirely discount the possibility that 
some massive technological breakthrough is just 
round the corner. But it’s clear that early progress 
towards carbon reduction will have to rely on 
options that are already on the table: enhanced 
energy efficiency, renewable energy and perhaps 
carbon capture and storage.28 
Just how much decoupling could be achieved in this 
way is an open question. The truth is, we haven’t yet 
tried that hard to achieve it. As Paul Ekins pointed 
out in his contribution to Redefining Prosperity, 
current policies barely scratch the surface of what 
could be done to deliver decoupling.29 Substantial 
early investment in low carbon technologies is 
obviously essential. 
The need for this kind of investment could transform 
the economics of the 21st Century. Its impact on 
global growth is far from certain. The Stern Review 
famously argued that ‘the annual costs of achieving 
stabilisation...are around 1% of global GDP.’30 But 
the stabilisation target was a less punishing one 
(550 ppm) than is now believed to be necessary. 
Stern himself subsequently revised his cost estimate 
to 2% of GDP on the grounds that a stabilisation 
target of 500 ppm was now needed because climate 
change was proceeding faster than previously 
anticipated. The UK Climate Change Committee’s 
first report published in December 2008 came 
up with costs consistent with Stern. Accountancy 
firm PriceWaterhouseCoopers estimated the costs 
of achieving a 50% reduction in global carbon 
emissions at 3% of global GDP.31 
Though clearly substantial, even these numbers may 
underestimate the economic impact of addressing 
climate change. ‘The easy compatibility between 
economic growth and climate change, which lies at 
the heart of the Stern Report, is an illusion,’ claims 
energy economist Dieter Helm. Stern’s microeconomic 
appraisals of cost suffer from serious ‘appraisal 
optimism’, he suggests, assuming that wholesale 
transformation of energy systems can be achieved 
by scaling up marginal cost estimates.32 
Helm also attacks the macro-economics of current 
stabilisation scenarios. Not only could carbon 
abatement policies interfere more seriously with 
productivity than many macro-economic assessments 
suggest, but early climate change impacts could 
themselves reduce potential growth. Assuming that 
economic growth simply rolls onwards in the face of 
high mitigation and adaptation costs is untenable, 
claims Helm.33 
Besides all this, none of the existing stabilisation 
scenarios (including those in the Stern review) 
deliver global income parity. Income growth in the 
developed nations is taken as read. Parts of the 
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developing world are assumed to catch up a little 
with the richer nations. But no attempt is made to 
develop scenarios in which incomes are distributed 
equally across nations. Unless growth in the richer 
nations is curtailed or some kind of completely 
unforeseen technological breakthrough happens, 
the carbon implications of a truly shared prosperity 
are even more daunting to contemplate. 
The truth is that there is as yet no credible, socially-
just, ecologically-sustainable scenario of continually 
growing incomes for a world of nine billion people. 
In this context, simplistic assumptions that 
capitalism’s propensity for efficiency will allow us 
to stabilise the climate or protect against resource 
scarcity are nothing short of delusional. Those who 
promote decoupling as an escape route from the 
dilemma of growth need to take a closer look at 
the historical evidence – and at the basic arithmetic 
of growth. 
Resource efficiency, renewable energy and reductions 
in material throughput all have a vital role to play in 
ensuring the sustainability of economic activity. But 
the analysis in this chapter suggests that it is entirely 
fanciful to suppose that ‘deep’ emission and resource 
cuts can be achieved without confronting the structure 
of market economies. 
58 Prosperity without Growth? Sustainable Development Commission
The Economist
November 20081
6
Confronting Structure
“ As every hunted animal knows, it is not 
how fast you run that counts, but whether 
you are slower than everyone else.”
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Fear may not be all bad. The threat of imminent 
collapse may have been the only force strong enough 
to bring so many countries together in late 2008, 
with a pledge to ‘achieve needed reforms in the 
world’s financial systems’. Decisiveness in the face 
of fear won Gordon Brown his international plaudits 
during the early phase of financial recovery.
And yet the sense of a more fundamental, a more 
pervasive anxiety underlying the modern economy 
is an enduring one.2 Could it really be the case, as 
The Economist suggests, that we are still behaving 
like hunted animals, even in the 21st Century, driven 
by the fine distinction between predator and prey? 
If we are, it would be good to recognise it. And to 
understand why. For without that understanding, 
solutions to the dilemmas we face will inevitably 
prove elusive. 
Admittedly, the dilemma of growth isn’t helping 
much, looking as it does like an impossibility 
theorem for lasting prosperity. Perhaps at some 
instinctive level, we have always understood this. 
Maybe we’re haunted by subconscious fear that the 
‘good life’ we aspire to is already deeply unfair and 
can’t last forever. That realisation – even repressed 
– might easily be enough to taint casual joy with 
existential concern. 
And of course the analysis in Chapter 5 doesn’t 
allay those fears. It more or less closes down the 
most obvious escape from the dilemma of growth. 
Efficiency is a grand idea. And capitalism sometimes 
delivers it. But even as the engine of growth delivers 
productivity improvement, so it also drives forward 
the scale of throughput. Nowhere is there any 
evidence that efficiency can outrun – and continue 
to outrun – scale in the way it must do if growth is 
to be compatible with sustainability. 
There is still a possibility that we just haven’t tried 
hard enough. With a massive policy effort and huge 
technological advances, perhaps we could reduce 
resource intensities the two or three orders of 
magnitude necessary to allow growth to continue 
– at least for a while. And yet, the idea of running 
faster and faster to escape the damage we’re 
already causing is itself a strategy that smacks of 
panic. So before we settle for it, a little reflection 
may be in order. 
Accordingly, this chapter confronts the structure 
of modern economies head on. In particular, it 
explores two interrelated features of economic life 
that are central to the growth dynamic. On the one 
hand, the profit motive stimulates newer, better or 
cheaper products and services through a continual 
process of innovation and ‘creative destruction’. 
At the same time, the market for these goods relies 
on an expanding consumer demand, driven by a 
complex social logic. 
These two factors combine to drive ‘the engine of 
growth’ on which modern economies depend and 
lock us in to an ‘iron cage’ of consumerism.3 It’s 
essential to get a better handle on this twin dynamic, 
not least so that we can identify the potential to 
escape from it. The starting point is to unravel some 
of the workings of the modern economy. 
Economic structure
At its outer frontier, consumer capitalism is a 
complex beast, generating whole new species of 
financial derivatives just to keep itself afloat. At its 
heart, it is strikingly simple (Figure 18).  
In broad terms, firms employ labour (people) and 
capital (buildings and machinery) to produce the 
goods and services that households want and need. 
Households (people) offer up their labour and 
capitaliii (savings) to firms in exchange for incomes. 
Revenue from the sale of goods and services is what 
allows firms to provide people with incomes. People 
spend some of this income on more consumer 
goods. But some of it they save. These savings 
are invested (directly or indirectly) back into firms. 
A sense of anxiety pervades modern society. At times it tips over into visceral fear. 
The economic crisis of 2008 was such a time. Financial institutions became almost paralysed 
by fear. Banks refused to lend even to each other; consumers stopped spending because of it. 
Governments displayed signs of being totally bewildered, both by the speed of change and 
by the implications of failure. 
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This, in a nutshell, is the ‘circular flow’ of the 
economy.4 
Missing from this over-simplified picture of the 
economy (and from Figure 18) are what’s called 
the public sector (government), the foreign sector 
(overseas firms, households and governments) and 
the financial sector – which mediates the financial 
flows of the circular economy. 
All of these are crucial. Partly because they 
introduce a whole new set of actors and a whole 
new set of possibilities: different ways of spending 
and producing, saving and investing. These offer 
some potential (as we shall see in Chapter 8) for 
reconfiguring the economy. But they also complicate 
the basic simplicity of Figure 18 enormously. 
In one sense, the financial crisis emerged precisely 
out of the complexity generated by the evolution of 
a global financial sector. And as we saw in Chapter 
2, that complexity was in part the result of trying 
to keeping the system going. Global credit markets 
facilitate one of the most fundamental features of 
capitalism: the dual role of saving and investment. 
The basic functioning of this feature is pretty simple. 
Households give over part of their income to 
savings. These savings are invested – either directly 
or through an intermediary (a bank, building society 
or investment house, e.g.) in businesses to generate 
profits. 
Profit is key to this system. Why would households 
give their savings to firms rather than simply 
Figure 19: A Low-Growth Scenario for Canada: Collapse
Figure 18: The ‘Engine of Growth’ in Market Economies
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Figure 18   The ‘Engine of Growth’ in Market Economies
iii  Oddly for a system which borrows its name from it, the term ‘capital’ is confusing in the sheer variety of meanings given 
to it within that system. Buildings and machinery are ‘capital goods’ sometimes called physical capital. Financial capital 
is used to refer to reserves of money (savings for instance), which of course can be used to invest in capital goods. And 
confusingly the term capital is also used to refer to the accumulation of wealth or assets – which include both financial 
and physical capital. In simple terms, capital simply means a stock of something. This broader meaning has been taken 
(Porritt 2005, e.g.) as the basis for arguing that there are things called natural capital (stocks of resources, say), human 
capital (stocks of skills) and social capital (stocks of community). 
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hanging on to them or spending the money on 
consumer goods? Only because they expect to 
receive a healthy ‘return’ on their capital at some 
point in the future. This return is created out of the 
stream of profits from the firms they invest in. 
Firms themselves seek profit for several reasons. 
In the first place, it provides them with working 
capital (cash) to invest in maintenance and 
improvements themselves. Secondly, it’s needed to 
pay off the company’s creditors – people who’ve lent 
the firm money in expectation of a return. Thirdly, 
it’s used to pay dividends to shareholders – people 
who’ve bought a share in the company. 
A company that shows good returns attracts more 
investment. The value of the company will rise 
because people are prepared to pay more for shares 
in it. When share values are rising, more people will 
be keen to buy them. Creditors know they will get 
their money back with interest. Shareholders know 
that the value of their shares will rise. The company 
knows that it has sufficient resources to maintain 
its capital stock and invest in new processes and 
technologies. 
This ability to re-invest is vital. At a basic level, it’s 
needed to maintain quality. Without it, buildings 
and equipment inevitably get run down.5 Product 
quality is lost. Sales decline. The company loses 
its competitive position and risks going out of 
business.
Investment is also needed continually to improve 
efficiency – in particular labour productivity. The 
role of efficiency in capitalism has already been 
noted (Chapter 5). The driver for efficiency is 
essentially the profit motive: the need to increase 
the difference between revenues from sales and 
the costs associated with the so-called factor inputs: 
capital, labour and material resources. 
Cost minimisation becomes a core task for any firm. 
But it involves some inherent tradeoffs. Amongst 
these is that capital investment is needed, in addition 
to its role in maintenance, to achieve cost reduction 
in the other two factors: labour and materials.6 
Switching to more energy efficient appliances or 
less labour intensive processes requires capital. 
This continuing capital need both motivates the 
search for low-cost credit and highlights the 
dangers of credit drying up. It also explains why 
reducing capital costs indefinitely isn’t an option.7 
When it comes to choosing which of the other two 
factors to target, a lot depends on the relative price 
of labour and materials. In a growing economy, 
wages rise in real terms. Until very recently at least, 
material costs have been falling in real terms. So in 
practice, companies have invested preferentially in 
technologies that reduce labour costs even if this 
increases material costs: an obvious counter to the 
trend of resource productivity discussed in Chapter 5.8 
For a company, then, higher labour productivity 
lowers the cost of its products and services. Foregoing 
that possibility runs the risk of the company finding 
itself at a disadvantage compared with national and 
international competitors. In this case, it would sell 
fewer goods, report lower profits to its shareholders, 
and risk capital flight from the company. At the national 
level, this dynamic plays out as the ability to compete 
in international markets. 
In short, the general trend in capitalism is towards 
increasing labour productivity. Since this means 
producing the same quantity of goods and services 
with fewer people, the cycle creates a downward 
pressure on employment that’s only relieved if 
output increases. At the national level, this means 
growing the economy. Labour productivity more 
than doubled in the UK between 1976 and 2005. 
But the GDP grew even faster (by 133%) and this 
allowed for the unemployment rate to fall by half a 
percentage point over the period.9 
Efficiency drives growth forwards. By reducing 
labour (and resource) inputs, efficiency brings down 
the cost of goods over time. This has the effect of 
stimulating demand and promoting growth. Far 
from acting to reduce the throughput of goods, 
technological progress serves to increase production 
output by reducing factor costs.10 
The phenomenon of ‘rebound’ attests to this.11 
Money saved through energy efficiency, for 
example, gets spent on other goods and services. 
These goods themselves have energy costs that 
offset the savings made through efficiency, and 
sometimes wipe them out entirely (a situation 
described as ‘backfire’). Spending the savings from 
energy-efficient lighting (say) on a cheap short-haul 
flight is one sure-fire recipe for achieving this.
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This somewhat counter-intuitive dynamic helps 
explain why simplistic appeals to efficiency 
will never be sufficient to achieve the levels of 
decoupling required for sustainability. In short, 
relative decoupling sometimes has the perverse 
potential to decrease the chances of absolute 
decoupling. 
However, efficiency alone doesn’t guarantee success 
in business. Making the same thing more and more 
efficiently doesn’t work for a couple of reasons. The 
first is that there are physical limits to efficiency 
improvement in specific processes. At the basic 
level, these constraints are laid down by the laws 
of thermodynamics.12 The second is that failing to 
diversify and innovate risks losing out to competitors 
producing newer and more exciting products. 
The economist Joseph Schumpeter was the first 
to suggest that it is in fact novelty, the process 
of innovation, that is vital in driving economic 
growth.13 Capitalism proceeds, he said, through a 
process of ‘creative destruction’. New technologies 
and products continually emerge and overthrow 
existing technologies and products. Ultimately, 
this means that even successful companies cannot 
survive simply through cost-minimisation.14 
The ability to adapt and to innovate – to design, 
produce and market not just cheaper products 
but newer and more exciting ones – is vital. Firms 
who fail in this process risk their own survival. 
The economy as a whole doesn’t care if individual 
companies go to the wall. It does care if the process 
of creative destruction stops, because without it, 
economic activity eventually stops as well.15 
The role of the entrepreneur – as visionary – is 
critical here. But so is the role of the investor. It is 
only through the continuing cycle of investment 
that creative destruction is possible. When credit 
dries up, so does innovation. And when innovation 
stalls, according to Schumpeter, so does the long-
term potential for growth itself. 
At this point, it’s tempting to wonder what the 
connection is between this self-perpetuating but 
somewhat abstract vision of creative capitalism, and 
the needs and desires of ordinary human beings. 
The circular flow of production and consumption 
may once have been a useful way of organising 
human society to ensure that people’s material 
needs are catered for. But what does this continual 
cycle of creative destruction have to do with human 
flourishing? Does the self-perpetuating system really 
contribute to prosperity, in any meaningful sense? 
Isn’t there a point at which enough is enough and 
we should simply stop producing and consuming so 
much?
One of the things that prevents this happening, 
clearly, is the structural reliance of the system itself 
on continued growth. But proponents also point to 
the human benefits that this kind of entrepreneurship 
brings: advances in medical science, for example, 
which have contributed to increased longevity 
(Chapter 4); or the sheer variety of experience which 
now contributes to our modern quality of life.16 
In fact, there is something even more deep-rooted 
at play here, conspiring to lock us firmly into the 
cycle of growth. The continual production of novelty 
would be of little value to firms if there were no 
market for the consumption of novelty in households. 
Recognising the existence, and understanding the 
nature, of this demand is essential. 
Social logic 
It is perhaps not surprising to discover that the desire 
for novelty is linked intimately to the symbolic role 
that consumer goods play in our lives. It’s been 
noted already (Chapter 4) that material artefacts 
constitute a powerful ‘language of goods’ that we 
use to communicate with each other – not just about 
status, but also about identity, social affiliation, and 
even – through giving and receiving gifts for example 
– about our feelings for each other, our hopes for our 
family, and our dreams of the good life.17 
This is not to deny that material goods are essential 
for our basic needs: food, shelter, protection. On 
the contrary, this role is critical to our physiological 
flourishing: health, life expectancy, vitality.
But stuff is not just stuff. Consumer artefacts play a 
role in our lives that goes way beyond their material 
functionality. Material processes and social needs 
are intimately linked together through commodities. 
Material things offer the ability to facilitate our 
participation in the life of society. And in so far as 
they achieve this, they contribute to our prosperity 
(Chapter 3). 
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One of the vital psychological processes here 
is what consumer researcher Russ Belk called 
cathexis: a process of attachment that leads us to 
think of (and even feel) material possessions as 
part of the ‘extended self’.18 This process is evident 
everywhere. Our relationships to our homes, our 
cars, our bicycles, our favourite clothes, our books, 
our CD or DVD collection, our photographs all have 
this character. 
Our attachments to material things can sometimes be 
so strong that we even feel a sense of bereavement 
and loss when they are taken from us. ‘Hollow 
hands clasp ludicrous possessions because they are 
links in the chain of life. Without them, we are truly 
lost.’ claimed the marketing guru Ernest Dichter in 
The Science of Desire.19 
Some of these attachments are fleeting. They burn 
with novelty momentarily and are extinguished as 
suddenly when something else attracts our attention. 
Others last a lifetime. Possessions sometimes offer 
a sanctuary for our most treasured memories and 
feelings. They allow us to identify what is sacred in 
our lives and distinguish it from the mundane. 
This kind of materialism, flawed though it may be, 
even offers some kind of substitute for religious 
consolation. In a secular world, having something 
to hope for is particularly important when things are 
going badly. Retail therapy works for a reason.20  
Novelty plays an absolutely central role in all this. 
In the first place, of course, novelty has always 
carried information about social status. As Thorstein 
Veblen pointed out over a century ago, ‘conspicuous 
consumption’ proceeds through novelty. Many of 
the latest consumer appliances and fashions are 
accessible at first only to the rich. New products are 
inherently expensive, because they are produced 
on a small scale. They may even be launched at 
premium prices deliberately to attract those who 
can afford to pay for social distinction.21 
After distinction comes emulation. Social comparison 
– keeping up with the Joneses – rapidly expands the 
demand for successful products and facilitates mass 
production, making once luxury goods accessible 
to the many. And the sheer wealth and enormous 
variety of material goods has a democratising 
element to it. It allows more and more people to go 
about inventing and reinventing their social identities 
in the search for a credible place in society. 
Arguably it is precisely this cornucopia of material 
goods and its role in the continual re-invention of 
the self that distinguishes consumer society from 
its predecessors. Material artefacts were always 
capable of carrying symbolic meaning. They were 
often used to establish social position. Only in 
modernity has this wealth of material artefacts 
been so deeply implicated in so many social and 
psychological processes. 
According to some commentators, the symbolic role 
of goods is even appropriated in modern society 
to explore deep existential questions about who 
we are and what our lives are about. Novelty is 
seductive in its own right here. It offers variety and 
excitement; it allows us to dream and hope. It helps 
us explore our dreams and aspirations for the ideal 
life and escape the sometimes harsh reality of our 
lives.22 
And it is precisely because material goods are flawed 
but somehow plausible proxies for our dreams and 
aspirations, that consumer culture seems on the 
surface to work so well. Consumer goods, suggests 
anthropologist Grant McCracken, provide us with a 
tangible bridge to our highest ideals. They fail, of 
course, to provide a genuine access to those ideals, 
but in failing they leave open the need for future 
bridges, and so stimulate our appetite for more 
goods. Consumer culture perpetuates itself here 
precisely because it succeeds so well at failure!23 
Again, it is important to remember that this dynamic 
doesn’t by any means exhaust our relationship to 
material goods. Consumption is also vital to us in 
simple material ways. It is as much about ordinary 
everyday survival as it is about the continual 
processes of emulation, status competition and 
‘self-completion’. But it is this social dynamic, rather 
than physiological flourishing, which serves to 
explain why our desire for material goods appears 
so insatiable. And why novelty matters to us. 
Novelty and anxiety 
It’s tempting to dismiss such a system as pathological. 
And in some senses it clearly is. Psychologist Philip 
Cushman has argued that the extended self is 
ultimately an ‘empty self’ which stands in continual 
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need of ‘being “filled up” with food, consumer 
products, and celebrities’.24
But it is also vital to recognise that this pathology is 
not simply the result of some terminal quality in the 
human psyche. We are not by nature helpless dupes, 
too lazy or weak to resist the power of manipulative 
advertisers. On the contrary, human creativity, 
emotional intelligence and resilience in the face of 
adversity are visible everywhere, even in the face of 
an apparently pathological consumerism. 
Rather, what emerges from this analysis is that 
the empty self is itself a product of powerful social 
forces and the specific institutions of modern 
society. Individuals are at the mercy of social 
comparison. Institutions are given over to the 
pursuit of consumerism. The economy is dependent 
on consumption for its very survival. 
Perhaps the most telling point of all is the rather 
too perfect fit between the continual consumption 
of novelty by households and the continuous 
production of novelty in firms. The restless desire 
of the ‘empty self’ is the perfect complement for 
the restless innovation of the entrepreneur. The 
production of novelty through creative destruction 
drives (and is driven by) the appetite for novelty in 
consumers. 
Taken together these two self-reinforcing processes 
are exactly what is needed to drive growth forwards. 
As the ecological economist Douglas Booth remarks: 
‘The novelty and status seeking consumer and the 
monopoly-seeking entrepreneur blend together 
to form the underpinning of long-run economic 
growth.’25 
It’s perhaps not surprising that this restlessness 
doesn’t necessarily deliver genuine social progress. 
Sometimes (Chapter 4) it even undermines wellbeing 
and contributes to social recession. And there are 
some pretty clear reasons for that. Amongst them is 
that this is a system driven by anxiety. 
The extended self is motivated by the angst of 
the empty self. Social comparison is driven by the 
anxiety to be situated favourably in society. Creative 
destruction is haunted by the fear of being left 
behind in the competition for consumer markets. 
Thrive or die is the maxim of the jungle. It’s equally 
true in the consumer society. Nature and structure 
combine together here to lock us firmly into the iron 
cage of consumerism.
It’s an anxious, and ultimately a pathological system. 
But at one level it works. The relentless pursuit of 
novelty may undermine wellbeing. But the system 
remains economically viable as long as liquidity is 
preserved and consumption rises. It collapses when 
either of these stalls. 
These understandings provide us with our clearest 
insight yet into the enormity of the challenge implied 
in delivering a truly sustainable form of prosperity. 
Perhaps first and foremost, that challenge compels 
us to develop a different kind of economic structure 
(Chapters 7 and 8). 
But it’s clear that this task isn’t sufficient. We also 
have to find a way through the institutional and 
social constraints that lock us into a failing system. 
In particular, we need to identify opportunities for 
change within society – changes in values, changes 
in lifestyles, changes in social structure – that will free 
us from the damaging social logic of consumerism 
(Chapter 9 and 10). 
Only through such changes will it be possible 
to get ourselves ‘unhooked’ from growth, free 
ourselves from the relentless flow of novelty that 
drives material throughput and find instead a 
lasting prosperity – the potential to flourish, within 
ecological and social limits.
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Keynesianism and the 
‘Green New Deal’
“ The new, green economy would 
provide a new engine of growth, 
putting the world on the road to 
prosperity again. This is about 
growing the world economy in a 
more intelligent, sustainable way.”
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The reason for this consensus is obvious enough. 
It flows immediately from the structural reliance of 
the economy on growth to maintain full employment. 
When spending slows down, unemployment looms 
large. Firms find themselves out of business. People 
find themselves out of a job. And a government that 
fails to respond appropriately will soon find itself 
out of office. In the short-term, the moral imperative 
to protect jobs and prevent any further collapse is 
incontrovertible.
But what about the long-term vision? When the 
economy falters, the clarion call from every side 
is to get the economy ‘back on the growth path’. 
And this call is not just to increase the GDP. It is, 
for the most part, to stimulate consumption growth: 
to restore consumer confidence and stimulate 
high street spending. It is, in effect, a more or less 
united call to re-inspire the dynamics described in 
Chapter 6. The dynamics that will continue to drive 
unsustainable throughput. 
Those inclined to question the consensus wisdom 
are swiftly denounced as cynical revolutionaries 
or modern day luddites. ‘We do not agree with 
the anti-capitalists who see the economic crisis 
as a chance to impose their utopia, whether of a 
socialist or eco-fundamentalist kind,’ roared the 
Independent on Sunday late in 2008. ‘Most of us in 
this country enjoy long and fulfilling lives thanks to 
liberal capitalism: we have no desire to live in a yurt 
under a workers’ soviet.’2
With that confusingly-attired bogey-man looming 
over us, kick-starting consumer confidence to boost 
high street spending looks like a no-brainer. And 
internecine warfare is all saved for arguing over 
how this is to be achieved.
Kick-starting the economy 
The whole point about a circular economy (Figure 18) 
is that there’s no simple answer to this question. 
There are multiple points of intervention. But none 
of them is risk free. The three main contenders are: 
to stimulate credit to businesses and consumers 
(for example by cutting interest rates), to increase 
people’s spending power (for example by cutting 
taxes) or to increase public spending on jobs and 
infrastructure. 
The first option more or less characterises the way in 
which the consumer boom was built and protected 
for so long throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. 
There is a logic to it. Stimulating credit increases the 
availability of investment capital to firms and at the 
same time reduces the cost of debt to consumers. 
We’ve seen already how crucial both of these things 
are in keeping consumption going. 
But making credit easier and cheaper also played 
a critical role (Chapter 2) in creating the global 
financial crisis of 2008. The danger for the UK – and 
for many other developed economies – is that we 
are already at the limits of consumer indebtedness 
and face a sharply rising public sector debt as well. 
Pushing these any further stretches the boundaries 
of financial prudence. 
Reducing the interest rate also reduces the 
incentive to save, at a point when the savings rate 
has collapsed to virtually nothing (Figure 2). This 
route appears to be an encouragement away from 
economic prudence by firms and households. 
Perversely, this may work in favour of recovery – at 
least in the short term. One of the dangers of the 
second option – putting more money in people’s 
pockets – is that government doesn’t have control 
over where it gets spent. People are more inclined 
to save during a recession. If your financial security 
looks threatened, it’s not a bad idea to have 
something put away for the future. Ironically, more 
saving is the last thing that governments want in 
these circumstances, in spite of widespread concern 
over levels of consumer indebtedness. 
One of the most striking features of the global financial crisis that emerged during 2008 was the 
degree of consensus that the overriding priority was to re-invigorate economic growth. From 
the International Monetary Fund to the United Nations Environment Programme, from political 
parties across the political spectrum, and from within both liberal and coordinated market 
economies, the call was for mechanisms that would ‘kick-start’ economic growth again.
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This is what economist John Maynard Keynes called 
the ‘paradox of thrift’. The normal rules of prudence 
are turned on their head. It’s entirely rational for 
each individual (or firm) to save a bit more in a crisis. 
But it turns out to be bad for the economy – at least 
with the system designed the way it is right now. 
Increased saving reduces high street spending still 
further, deepening and lengthening the recession.3 
This leaves option three, a classic Keynesian public 
spending programme. The most well-known 
example of this was Franklin D Roosevelt’s New Deal 
in the 1930s, implemented as the world struggled to 
escape the great Depression. The New Deal entailed 
a massive investment in public sector works. It may 
not have had the short-term effect some claim for 
it. It didn’t in fact achieve a full economic recovery 
within Roosevelt’s first two terms in office. But its 
long-term impact was enormous.4 
As Paul Krugman, winner of the 2008 Nobel Prize in 
economics, has pointed out: ‘The New Deal famously 
placed millions of Americans on the public payroll 
via the Works Progress Administration [WPA]… To 
this day we drive on WPA-built roads and send our 
children to WPA-built schools.’ 5 Not surprisingly, 
there was a lot of talk about the New Deal during 
the financial crisis. Krugman called for a Keynesian-
type stimulus equivalent to 4% of the US GDP.6
Green New Deal
The most interesting variation on this theme was 
the call for a (global) Green New Deal. If the public 
sector is going to spend money to re-invigorate the 
economy, argued its advocates, wouldn’t it be as 
well to spend it investing in the new technologies 
that we know we are going to need to address the 
environmental and resource challenges of the 21st 
Century? 
‘Investments will soon be pouring back into the 
economy,’ suggested Pavan Sukdhev, the Deutsche 
Bank economist leading research on UNEP’s Green 
Economy Initiative. ‘The question is whether they 
go into the old extractive short-term economy of 
yesterday, or a new green economy that will deal 
with multiple challenges while generating multiple 
economic opportunities for the poor and the well-
off alike.’7 
By early 2009, a strong international consensus had 
emerged in support of a very simple idea. Economic 
recovery demands investment. Targeting that 
investment carefully towards energy security, low-
carbon infrastructures and ecological protection offers 
multiple benefits. These benefits include: 
•	 freeing up resources for household spending 
and productive investment by reducing 
energy and material costs
•	 reducing our reliance on imports and our 
exposure to the fragile geopolitics of  
energy supply
•	 providing a much-needed boost to jobs in the 
expanding ‘environmental industries’ sector8
•	 making progress towards the demanding 
carbon emission reduction targets needed to 
stabilise the global atmosphere
•	 protecting valuable ecological assets 
and improving the quality of our living 
environment for generations to come.
Consensus had also formed around the appropriate 
targets for a green stimulus package. As the UK 
Prime Minister pointed out in a speech to the 
World Economic Forum in Davos early in 2009, the 
‘contours of a resilient low-carbon recovery are 
becoming clear’, not just from the proposals from 
a wide variety of observers but from plans being 
made on the ground in numerous countries. 
During 2008, the UK-based Green New Deal group 
(which includes representatives from business, 
the media and NGOs) had suggested that stimulus 
spending should be focused on the twin challenges 
of climate change and energy security. The group put 
forward proposals for a low-carbon energy system 
that would make ‘every building a power station’ 
and the creation and training of ‘a “carbon army” of 
workers to provide the human resources for a vast 
environmental reconstruction programme.’9
UNEP’s global Green New Deal widened the remit 
of spending to include investment in natural 
infrastructure: sustainable agriculture and ecosystem 
protection. Ecosystems already provide tens of 
trillions of dollars worth of services to the world 
economy.10 So protecting and enhancing ecosystems 
is vital to economic productivity in the future, 
UNEP pointed out. They also called for substantial 
investments in clean technologies, sustainable 
agriculture and sustainable cities.  
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The case for a stimulus focused on energy and 
carbon is very strong. Re-capitalising the world’s 
energy systems for a low carbon world will be a 
major investment challenge over the next fifty years. 
The IEA has estimated that energy investment needs 
between 2010 and 2030 will be in excess of $35 
trillion.11 Bringing forward some of this investment 
and targeting it specifically at renewable energy, 
low-carbon technologies and energy efficiency 
could pay massive dividends later.12
In a report published towards the end of 2008, 
the Deutsche Bank identified a ‘green sweet spot’ 
for stimulus spending, consisting of investment 
in energy efficient buildings, the electricity grid, 
renewable energy and public transportation. ‘One 
of the reasons that the “green sweet spot” is an 
attractive focus for an economic stimulus is the labor- 
intensity of many of its sectors,’ claimed the Bank.13
A study by the University of Massachusetts Political 
Economy Research Institute supports that view. 
It identified six priority areas for investment: 
retrofitting buildings, mass transit/freight rail, smart 
grid, wind power, solar power and next generation 
biofuels. The authors calculated that spending $100 
billion on these interventions over a two year period 
would create 2 million new jobs. By contrast, the 
same money directed at household spending would 
generate only 1.7 million jobs and directed at the oil 
industry fewer than 600,000 jobs.14
Strategies for job creation 
If replicable elsewhere, these findings provide 
vital insights into the appropriate way to approach 
economic recovery. Job creation is one of the key 
aims of an economic stimulus programme. Not only 
are jobs essential for economic recovery. Meaningful 
employment is itself a key constituent in prosperity 
(Chapter 3). 
Understanding how best to protect employment is 
vital. Several strategies are possible, including the 
direct creation of public sector jobs, financial support 
to boost employment in specific sectors, or indirect 
support for jobs through measures to stimulate 
demand. 
Public sector employment was the route favoured 
in the Roosevelt’s New Deal. Apart from the 
obvious social benefit in providing jobs, public 
sector employment seeks its return in several 
ways. Firstly, there are the benefits to the economy 
from investment in productive infrastructure (road-
building, for example, in the New Deal). In addition, 
public sector jobs generate a part of what has been 
called the ‘social wage’ – a return to households 
from government spending in the form of wages, 
health and education benefits and social services.15 
The stimulus packages to emerge from the 2008 
crisis favoured a mixture of the other two strategies. 
Specific sectors received (or sought) direct support 
from government in a number of different countries. 
Most obviously of course, enormous sums of money 
were committed to the direct support of the 
financial sector. By the end of 2008, an estimated 
$7 trillion had been spent globally in underwriting 
toxic assets, recapitalising banks and attempting 
to restore confidence in the financial sector and 
stimulate lending (Chapter 2). 
Direct recovery packages were also sought (and 
sometimes offered) in other sectors. Most notably, 
the car industry received direct support in both 
the UK and the US. The US government committed 
over $23 billion to bail out the ailing giants GM and 
Chrysler at the end of 2008.16 Early in 2009, the UK 
Government promised to underwrite loans to the 
car industry totalling £2.3 billion.
Perhaps most bizarrely, representatives from the 
US porn industry approached US Congress for 
support, early in 2009, following the car industry 
bailout. ‘Americans can do without cars and such, 
but they cannot do without sex,’ argued Larry Flynt, 
the founder of Hustler magazine.17 Surely more 
of a publicity stunt than a serious claim, the call 
nonetheless highlights the profound mess created 
by the financial crisis, with the vulnerable and not-
so-vulnerable alike lobbying for direct support in 
the matter of their livelihoods.
Beyond direct support to specific sectors, broader 
fiscal recovery packages have also been established 
in many countries and at EU level. The employment 
aims of these packages are achieved by attempting 
to ‘kick-start’ growth through a mixture of tax cuts, 
social spending and public investment. 
For example, the UK Pre-Budget Report (PBR) 
2008 establoished a fiscal stimulus worth £20 
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billion, including an estimated £12.5 billion cut in 
the VAT and £3 billion of capital spending ‘brought 
forward’.18
In the US, the Obama administration brought in a 
fiscal stimulus package equivalent to 5% of US GDP 
through the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act 2009 (ARRA). The $787 billion package comprised 
around $290 billion in tax cuts and almost $500 
billion in ‘thoughtful and carefully targeted priority 
investments’; its aim ‘to create and save 3 to 4 
million jobs, jumpstart our economy, and begin the 
process of transforming it for the 21st century’.19
The potential for ‘green’ recovery
In principle, each of these different approaches to 
economic recovery could contain a ‘green stimulus’ 
component. Public sector employment could be 
directed explicitly at ‘green jobs’. Direct support for 
the financial sector could be allied with conditions 
or investment vehicles to ensure that lending is 
preferentially targeted at sustainable investments.20 
Sectoral bailouts like those afforded to the car 
industry could be made conditional on shifting 
towards greener manufacturing and low-carbon 
vehicles.21 
In practice little of this happened in the early stages 
of the crisis. But by early 2009, the concept of a 
green stimulus was evident in recovery packages 
across the world in countries as varied as China, South 
Korea, Australia and Denmark, the UK and the US.
In the UK, for instance, a ‘green stimulus’ element 
was included in the 2008 Pre-Budget Report. 
In total, this only amounted to £535 million, less 
than 3% of the whole package, which was in its 
turn only a little over 1% of the GDP. £300 million of 
this was for accelerated replacement of new railway 
carriages. A small component (£25 million) was for 
flood defence and water infrastructure. Only about 
£200 million (just over 1% of the total package) 
was for energy efficiency (mostly brought forward 
investment) in people’s homes. 
By comparison the US ARRA explicitly identified 
about $130 billion of spending (16% of the total 
stimulus) in environmental investment. This figure 
included $32 billion investment in the electricity 
grid, $22 billion on energy and carbon saving in 
homes and a further $31 billion in the public estate, 
$19 billion in ecosystem maintenance and flood 
protection and $10 billion on public transport. 
There are good grounds to question the scope and 
scale even of this relatively ambitious US plan. As 
we noted in Chapter 5, the likely annual investment 
needed to achieve a low carbon society could be 
as high as 3% of GDP per annum. For the US, this 
would be equivalent to a green stimulus worth 
around $400 billion, over three times the size of the 
environmental investment outlined in the ARRA.
In the case of the UK, the equivalent investment 
would be in the region of £45 billion a year, 
massively higher than anything proposed so far 
by the UK government.22 The SDC has argued that 
there is considerable scope for a much higher level 
of green stimulus than is currently being considered 
and has identified a range of possible investment 
targets.23 These include:
• an ambitious 20 year plan to retrofit the 
existing housing stock to high energy 
performance standards
• substantial investment in renewable energy 
to put the UK on track to meeting its target of 
15% renewables by 2020.
• the reinforcement of the electricity grid to 
facilitate decentralised energy technologies, 
support renewable energy companies and 
improve control
• to reduce car use through a combination of 
better public transport, investment in walk-
ability, cyclability and the roll-out of personal 
travel planning to encourage a modal shift
• massive investment in the energy efficiency 
of the public estate with the aim of delivering 
low carbon public services across the country. 
Any recovery package raises the question of how it 
is to be paid for. One of the interesting features of 
green investment packages is that they offer the 
potential for direct financial returns to the economy. 
These returns take a variety of forms. Most obviously 
they arise in the form of fuel and resource savings. 
For instance, some simple measures to improve the 
energy efficiency of the domestic housing stock 
have payback times of less than two years. 
Some are in the form of lower social costs and more 
efficient services. For instance, the UK Department 
for Transport has estimated that each £1 spent in 
reducing car use saves up to £10 in the economy 
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through a combination of fuel savings, reduced 
congestion costs, and lower pollution levels.
Beyond such easy wins, there are still challenges 
in raising the funds to invest in such measures, 
particularly in a harsh economic climate. The 
Deutsche Bank report argues that the best way to 
fund a green investment programme is through 
auctioning carbon permits under a cap and trade 
scheme. In other words by raising a new form of 
environmental taxation. At the same time the report 
accepts that the more likely option in the short term 
is deficit spending. 
This was certainly the working assumption in 
most of the recovery packages put forward in the 
immediate response to the 2008 crisis. They were 
based on deficit spending over the short term in the 
hope of stimulating sufficiently robust growth that 
national debt can be reduced again in the longer 
term. It was estimated that the cost of the UK’s PBR 
package could push the national debt to around 
60% of GDP within a couple of years.24 Paying this 
off would in itself be a long-term commitment.25 
A further option would be to fund future spending 
through ‘green bonds’. There is in any case more 
likelihood that people will save during a recession. 
Targetting that saving in funds which can achieve 
positive returns from investment in green recovery 
has a dual logic to it. On the one hand it provides a 
differentiated savings product when the propensity 
to save is high. On the other, it places investment 
funds directly into green recovery.
Finally, the possibility of innovative service 
structures which share the rewards from energy 
savings between households and investors have a 
clear rationale here. This ‘energy services model’ 
is usually assumed to proceed through private 
sector energy service companies. But the case for 
the public sector to reclaim some ownership in 
energy-related assets is also worth considering. 
There is a legitimate public claim on the return from 
public investment funds whereever those funds are 
directed. The energy sector case is at least as strong 
as the financial sector case.
In summary however, the broad assumption behind 
all these recovery packages is that they will be 
successful in stimulating consumption growth again. 
Credit will flow, consumers will spend, business will 
invest and innovate, productivity will return and the 
wheels of the machine will start turning. This is the 
logic of Keynesianism.26 
Recovery here is taken to mean business as usual. 
Kick start the circular flow of the economy and watch 
it grow. The outcome (assuming it works) will be 
thoroughly predictable. Business innovation (creative 
destruction) and consumer demand (positional 
spending) will drive consumption forwards. And with 
employment depending on it, there’s no means of 
anyone getting off the treadmill. We are right back 
at the structural impasse identified in Chapter 6. 
Beyond recovery 
Clearly, the Green New Deal advocates aren’t 
proposing a return to the status quo. The UK group 
talks of ‘a huge transformational programme’. UNEP 
also calls for ‘transformational thinking’. But all 
recovery initiatives proposed so far assume that the 
ultimate goal of intervention is to restore economic 
growth. It’s a different kind of growth, for sure; 
what Achim Steiner, Executive Director of UNEP, calls 
a ‘green engine of growth’. But growth nonetheless. 
‘Any public spending should be targeted so that 
domestic companies benefit, and then the wages 
generated create further spending on consumer 
goods and services,’ argues the UK group.27
Some kind of green stimulus makes perfect sense, 
both in protecting people’s jobs and in making the 
transition to a low carbon economy. In circumstances 
where we know that public sector spending is 
needed to prevent the economy from collapsing, 
it is absolutely vital to target that spending 
properly. Massive investment is required to achieve 
sustainability. The current crisis is exactly the right 
time to commit to that investment. And the evidence 
suggests that the employment and resource saving 
benefits might be considerably better than for other 
kinds of spending.
Stimulus measures which support the least well-off 
are particularly to be welcomed. The poorest will 
inevitably be hardest hit through the recession and 
are already struggling with rising costs for food and 
fuel. Income inequality is higher in the UK today than 
it was in the mid-1980s.28 Some modest progress has 
been made in recent years, but we do not yet live 
in the ‘strong, healthy and just society’ promised 
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in the UK’s much-lauded Sustainable Development 
principles. 
An unequal society is an anxious society, one given 
too readily to ‘positional consumption’ that adds little 
to overall happiness but contributes significantly to 
unsustainable resource throughput. A Green New 
Deal worthy of the name would signal clearly to the 
post-crisis world that we are serious about fighting 
climate change, preventing resource scarcity, and 
creating a fairer society. 
And yet, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that 
in the longer term, we’re going to need something 
more than this. Returning the economy to a 
condition of continual consumption growth is the 
default assumption of Keynesianism. But, for all 
the reasons highlighted in preceding chapters, this 
condition remains as unsustainable as ever. 
There is no consistent vision of an economy founded 
on consumption growth that delivers absolute 
decoupling. And the systemic drivers of growth push 
us relentlessly towards ever more unsustainable 
resource throughput. A different way of ensuring 
stability and maintaining employment is essential. 
A different kind of economic structure is needed 
for an ecologically-constrained world. It is to this 
possibility that we now turn. 
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Macro-economics 
for Sustainability
“ Under existing macro-economic 
arrangements, growth is the only 
real answer to unemployment – 
society is hooked on growth.”
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Of course, other things aren’t equal. And the 
dominant attempt to escape the dilemma relies 
precisely on this fact. Things change as economies 
grow. One of these things is technological efficiency. 
It is now widely accepted that technological efficiency 
is both an outcome from, and a fundamental driver 
of, economic growth. 
Proponents use this feature of capitalism to 
suggest that growth is not only compatible with 
environmental limits but necessary for it. Growth 
induces technological efficiency as well as increases 
in scale. All that’s needed to achieve environmental 
goals is for efficiency to outrun (and continue to 
outrun) scale. 
But historical evidence for the success of this strategy 
is unconvincing (Chapter 5). Global emissions and 
resource use are still rising. Apparent declines in 
carbon emissions in countries like the UK turn out 
on closer inspection to be due to accounting errors 
and cross-boundary trades. Much of the growth that 
is desperately needed in developing countries is 
inherently material in nature. And rebound effects 
from technological change push consumption even 
higher. In short, efficiency hasn’t outrun scale and 
shows no signs of doing so. 
That doesn’t mean such a transition is impossible. 
On the contrary, we’ve already seen how little effort 
has truly been dedicated towards achieving it. And 
how the current economic crisis presents a unique 
window of opportunity to reconfigure our economies 
and invest in a sustainable future. 
But it’s abundantly clear that a different kind of 
macroeconomics is going to be needed. One in 
which stability no longer relies on ever-increasing 
consumption growth. One in which economic 
activity remains within ecological scale. Though 
these are unfamiliar goals for macro-economists, 
the aim of this chapter is to show that they are not 
only meaningful, but achievable. 
Changing the ‘Engine of Growth’
First, it’s worth exploring whether a different ‘engine 
of growth’ would help us here, as Achim Steiner 
suggests. Similar proposals have been voiced for 
some years by ecological economists. Pointing out 
that ‘ever greater consumption of resources is [in 
itself] a driver of growth’ in the current paradigm, 
American academic Robert Ayres argues that ‘in 
effect, a new growth engine is needed, based 
on non-polluting energy sources and selling non-
material services, not polluting products’.2  
Similar visions for business models based on 
product-service systems have been put forward 
elsewhere. The UK Business Taskforce on Sustainable 
Consumption and Production highlighted the 
potential for such models to reduce the requirement 
for personal ownership, improve the utilisation of 
capital resources and lower the material intensity of 
the economy.3 
This is still essentially an appeal to decoupling. 
Growth continues, while resource throughput 
declines. But here at least is something in the way 
of a blueprint for what such an economy might 
look like. It gives us more idea what people are 
buying and what businesses are selling in this new 
economy. Its founding concept is the production 
and sale of de-materialised ‘services’, rather than 
material products. 
It’s vital to note that this cannot simply be the 
‘service-based economies’ that have characterised 
development in advanced economies. For the most 
part, that has been achieved (as we saw in Chapter 
5) by reducing manufacturing, continuing to import 
consumption goods from abroad and expanding the 
financial sector to pay for it. 
Nor can it look much like anything that passes for 
service sector activity in modern economies at the 
present. When the impacts attributable to these 
are computed properly, most of them turn out to 
Put bluntly, the dilemma of growth has us caught between the desire to maintain economic 
stability and the need to reduce resource use and emissions. This dilemma arises because 
environmental impacts ‘scale with’ economic output: the more economic output there is, the 
greater the environmental impact – all other things being equal. 
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be at least as resource hungry as the manufacturing 
sectors. The recreation and leisure sector ought 
to be a prime candidate for de-materialisation in 
principle. In practice, it’s responsible for around 
25% of all energy and carbon emissions attributable 
to UK consumers.4 
So what exactly constitutes productive economic 
activity in this economy? It isn’t immediately clear. 
Selling ‘energy services’, certainly, rather than 
energy supplies.5 Selling mobility rather than cars. 
Recycling, re-using, leasing, maybe. Yoga lessons, 
perhaps, hairdressing, gardening: so long as these 
aren’t carried out using buildings, don’t involve the 
latest fashion and you don’t need a car to get to 
them. The humble broom would need to be preferred 
to the diabolical ‘leaf-blower’, for instance. 
The fundamental question is this: can you really 
make enough money from these activities to keep 
an economy growing?6 And the truth is we just 
don’t know. We have never at any point in history 
lived in such an economy. That doesn’t mean we 
couldn’t. But it sounds at the moment suspiciously 
like something the Independent on Sunday would 
instantly dismiss as a yurt-based economy – with 
increasingly expensive yurts. 
The dynamics described in Chapter 6 just don’t seem 
amenable to moderation of the kind envisaged. 
Social logic, questions of scale, and the laws of 
thermodynamics are still significant stumbling 
blocks to the changes hoped for by those with 
well-meaning intentions for continued growth with 
drastic reductions in material intensity. 
‘The idea of economic growth overcoming physical 
limits by angelizing GDP is equivalent to overcoming 
physical limits to population growth by reducing the 
throughput intensity or metabolism of human beings,’ 
wrote ecological economist, Herman Daly, over thirty 
years ago. ‘First pygmies, then Tom Thumbs, then 
big molecules, then pure spirits. Indeed, it would be 
necessary for us to become angels in order to subsist 
on angelized GDP.’7 
On the other hand, doing without growth doesn’t 
look attractive either. Modern economies are built 
explicitly around consumption growth. Politicians 
and economists may differ in their prescriptions for 
kick-starting growth in the event of a recession. But 
all of them assume a return to high street spending 
is what we’re after. Apart from anything else, in the 
conventional view, structural stability relies on it. 
And yet there’s still something odd about our 
persistent refusal to countenance anything but 
growth at all costs. After all, John Stuart Mill, one 
of the founding fathers of economics, recognised 
both the necessity and the desirability of moving 
eventually towards a ‘stationary state of capital and 
wealth’, suggesting that it ‘implies no stationary 
state of human improvement’. And though Keynes’ 
macro-economics was largely concerned with the 
conditions of prudent growth, he also foresaw a 
time when the ‘economic problem’ would be solved 
and ‘we prefer to devote our further energies to 
non-economic purposes’.8
All the more strange then, that virtually no attempt 
has been made to develop an economic model that 
doesn’t rely on long-term growth. Herman Daly’s 
pioneering work at least defined the ecological 
conditions of a steady state economy. For Daly, 
these can be expressed in terms of a constant stock 
of physical capital, capable of being maintained by 
a low rate of material throughput that lies within 
the regenerative and assimilative capacities of the 
ecosystem.9
What we still miss from this is the ability to establish 
economic stability under these conditions. We 
have no model for how common macro-economic 
‘aggregates’ (production, consumption, investment, 
trade, capital stock, public spending, labour, money 
supply and so on) behave when capital doesn’t 
accumulate. Nor do our models properly account for 
the dependency of macro-economic aggregates on 
ecological variables such as resource use, reserves, 
emissions and ecological integrity. 
In short, there is no macro-economics for 
sustainability and there is an urgent need for one. 
In fact, this call – for a robust macro-economics 
of sustainability – is one of the most important 
messages from the analysis in this study. The 
following paragraphs explore the dimensions of this 
call in more detail. 
Macro-economic basics 
The main parameters can be set out easily enough. 
The principal macro-economic aggregate – the one 
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all the fuss is about, so to speak – is the GDP. Whether 
it deserves pride of place in a new macroeconomics 
for sustainability is an open question to which we 
return below. In the meantime, it’s useful to set out 
briefly some of its economic characteristics. 
There are three distinct ways of thinking about (and 
calculating) the GDP. In one view, it is the sum of 
all final expenditures on goods and services in the 
economy.10 In another it measures the total output 
(or value added) of goods and services from all the 
productive enterprises within the nation. In a third 
view, it is the sum of all the incomes earned by 
people living in the country.11 
The different calculations all come up with more 
or less the same total. In fact, they can be thought 
of, broadly speaking, as measuring the volume of 
the economic flow (at different points) around the 
circular economy.12 
The expenditure-based GDP, also called ‘aggregate 
demand’ is made up from private consumer 
expenditure, public (government) expenditure, 
gross investment in fixed capital and net exports.13 
The economy is said to be in equilibrium when the 
aggregate demand matches the aggregate supply 
(sometimes called the national income). 
In conventional macro-economics, the national 
income is estimated through a ‘production function’, 
which tells us how much (in monetary terms) an 
economy is capable of producing with any given 
input of the factors of production. Most often (as 
we saw in Chapter 6) the factors considered to 
drive the national income are capital, labour and 
technological efficiency.14 
Ecological economists argue that this form of 
production function is unsatisfactory because it 
takes no explicit account of material resources and 
carries an implicit assumption that it’s possible to 
substitute different factors of production indefinitely. 
One way of rectifying this would be to include 
energy (or other material resources) explicitly 
within the production function and also to constrain 
substitution possibilities.15
But the conventional macro-economic formulation 
contains no explicit reference to the material or 
ecological basis for the economy at all. Clearly both 
consumer goods and capital goods do embody 
material resources. So to some extent this is inherent 
in both the demand side and the supply side (in 
the production function). But these are measured 
only in monetary terms and don’t usually carry any 
explicit reference to the material flows needed to 
create them. 
A more general criticism of the GDP is its failure to 
account properly for changes in the asset base, even 
when it comes to financial assets. Gross fixed capital 
investment is measured. But depreciation of capital 
stocks goes unaccounted for and the GDP is almost 
completely blind to the levels of indebtedness 
identified in Chapter 2.16 
No attention is paid in the GDP to the costs 
associated with the degradation of natural capital 
from economic activity, either through the impacts 
of environmental emissions or through the depletion 
of natural resources. And, by contrast, there are all 
kinds of things which are included in the GDP – the 
costs of congestion, oil spills, and clearing up after 
car accidents, for example – that should not really 
be counted as additional to human wellbeing. 
These kinds of perversities have been the focus 
for long-standing critiques of conventional macro-
economics by ecological economists and others. 
Numerous suggestions have been made for 
supplementing or adjusting the natural accounts 
to rectify the situation. For instance, there is a 
strong argument in favour of including some 
account of the flow of services provided by the 
natural environment and for subtracting so-called 
‘defensive’ expenditures.17 
We return to these policy suggestions in Chapter 
11. The main aim here is to explore the principal 
macroeconomic variables and understand their 
relationships to each other. A key element in those 
relationships is the balance between supply and 
demand, and the importance of this balance for 
labour employment. 
As we’ve already seen (Chapter 6), when demand 
falls, revenues to firms are reduced and this leads 
to job losses and reduced investment. Reduced 
investment leads to a lower capital stock which, 
together with a lower labour input, in turn reduces 
the productive capability of the economy. Output 
falls and with less money in the economy, public 
revenues also fall, debt is more difficult to service and 
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the system has a tendency to become unstable.  
But does it have to work like this? Is it possible 
to configure the conventional macro-economic 
variables in such a way as to reduce the imperative 
for growth and yet maintain economic stability? 
One potential avenue of exploration is to attempt 
a stabilisation of economic output by altering the 
role or relative importance of key variables (such as 
consumption, investment, public spending and so 
on) within the basic macro-economic model. 
In search of the low-growth economy 
Astonishingly, there is almost no attempt at this task 
in the literature at all. The most notable exception 
is a study carried out by Canadian economist, Peter 
Victor, which was presented and discussed in detail 
at two workshops held by the SDC during the course 
of the Redefining Prosperity project.18
The study used an interactive systems model to 
explore the potential for achieving a stable, but 
non-growing economy. The model is calibrated 
against statistical data relating to the key macro-
economic variables in the Canadian economy: 
output, consumption, public spending, investment, 
employment, trade and so on. On the basis of these, 
and specific assumptions about the future, Victor’s 
model estimates the national income, computes 
the fiscal balance and tracks the national debt over 
a 30 year period to 2035. The model also keeps 
an account of unemployment, greenhouse gas 
emissions, and poverty levels.19 
By changing key input variables – particularly those 
which are known to be drivers of growth, such as 
labour participation and investment rates – the model 
can be used to develop different scenarios for the 
future of the Canadian economy. It can also illustrate 
the environmental and social implications of those 
scenarios. Figure 19 shows one such attempt.
 
This scenario certainly achieves a stabilisation in the 
GDP. Under business as usual, income levels might 
be expected to grow by up to 80% over 30 years. 
In Figure 19, income per person is barely 10% 
higher in 2035 than it was in 2005. Greenhouse 
gas emissions come down slightly, mainly because 
output falls. But this reduction falls considerably 
short of what might be needed for a 450 ppm 
stabilisation scenario. 
What’s more worrying is that income stabilisation 
has only been achieved at the cost of spiralling 
unemployment, rising poverty and escalating public 
sector debt. In short, this scenario represents the 
unpalatable form of social (and economic) collapse 
that politicians fear the most. 
Figure 19   A Low-Growth Scenario for Canada: Collapse
Figure 19: A Low-Growth Scenario for Canada: Collapse
Figure 18: The ‘Engine of Growth’ in Market Economies
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Figure 20 illustrates a more successful attempt to 
stabilise the economy. This time income is stabilised 
at a higher level. GDP per capita is around 70% 
higher in 2035 than it was in 2005. But most of the 
growth occurs in the first 20 years of the scenario. 
As economic stabilisation comes into effect, income 
growth is gradually reduced from 1.8% a year to less 
than 0.1% a year. During the final years, the national 
income is effectively stabilised. 
Notably though, this has been achieved without 
compromising wider economic and social resilience. 
Unemployment and poverty have both been halved. 
The debt to GDP ratio has been slashed by 75%. 
Though it falls some way short of achieving a 450 
ppm stabilisation target, Canada has achieved (25 
years too late!) its ‘Toronto target’ of a 20% cut in 
greenhouse gas emissions.20 
The difference in outcome in the two scenarios is 
striking. But what kinds of assumptions and policy 
interventions distinguish the ‘Collapse’ scenario in 
Figure 19 from the ‘Resilience’ scenario in Figure 
20? How is the collapse shown in Figure 19 averted 
in Figure 20? 
The most influential factors are changes to investment 
and the structure of the labour market. Net business 
investment is reduced in the Resilience scenario, and 
there has been a shift in investment from private 
to public goods, implemented through changes in 
taxation and public spending. The labour force has 
been stabilised, partly through demographic change 
and partly through policies aimed at stabilising the 
overall population. 
Perhaps most importantly, unemployment is 
avoided in the Resilience scenario by reducing both 
the total and the average number of working hours. 
Labour productivity is assumed to increase. And this 
normally leads, through the logic discussed already 
(Chapter 6), to a reduction in the available work. 
But here unemployment is averted by sharing the 
work more equally across the available workforce. 
This is an important outcome. It is possible to avoid 
the damaging unemployment that follows from 
recession by sharing work more equally amongst 
the population. 
Reducing the working week is the simplest and 
most often cited structural solution to the challenge 
of maintaining full employment with non-increasing 
output. And there is some precedent for it, for 
example, from labour policies in certain European 
nations.21 But it’s worth noting that there are some 
other more radical suggestions for reorganising 
work to ensure equity and to encourage creative 
participation in society. These include the introduction 
of a basic (or citizen’s) income.22 
Figure 20   A Low Growth Scenario for Canada: Resilience 
Figure 20: A Low Growth Scenario for Canada: Resilience 
Figure 21: Trust and Belonging in 22 European Nations
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One of the strengths of Peter Victor’s model is that 
it looks and behaves remarkably like a conventional 
macro-economy. In fact, aggregate demand is still 
dominated by consumption (although not driven 
by consumption growth). Consumer expenditure is 
close to 60% of GDP in both the base year (2004) 
and the final year (2035). However, the balance 
between other demand side variables is changed. 
Specifically, business investment falls from just 
under 20% of GDP in 2004 to only 12% in 2035. 
Public spending and net exports both rise.23 
In other words, what Victor demonstrates is that 
there may be more room than commonly supposed, 
even within the conventional framework, to 
stabilise economic output. This is not to suggest that 
such changes are easy to implement.24 Achieving 
reduced working hours, for example, requires careful 
policy and only tends to succeed under certain 
conditions. ‘One of the fundamental preconditions 
for the working time policy pursued in Germany and 
Denmark’ writes sociologist Gerhard Bosch, ‘was a 
stable and relatively equal earning distribution.’25 
The same may be said for policies which restructure 
investment or shift taxation. 
But the point here is that – even within a relatively 
conventional macro-economic framework – different 
configurations of the key variables are possible. 
And these configurations deliver different outcomes. 
When our goal is both to achieve economic stability 
and remain within ecological and resource limits, this 
is an absolutely critical finding. 
Another of the contributions to Redefining Prosperity 
illustrates the same point. Using a hypothetical 
simulation model, Italian economists Simone 
d’Alessandro and Tommaso Luzzati explored the 
challenge associated with the transition from fossil 
fuels to renewable energy. 26 
As already noted (Chapter 7) this transition will 
require substantial new investment.27 But there’s 
a balance to be struck. If we invest too slowly, 
we run out of resources before alternatives are in 
place. Fuel prices soar and economies crash. If we 
invest too fast, there’s a risk of slowing down the 
economy to the extent that the resources required 
for further investment aren’t available. The upshot, 
according to d’Alessandro and his colleagues, is 
that there is a narrow ‘sustainability window’ 
through which the economy must pass if it is 
successfully to make the transition to a non-fossil 
world.
Crucially though, this ‘sustainability window’ is 
widened if the balance between consumption and 
investment in the economy is changed. Specifically, 
if the savings ratio is increased and more of the 
national income is allocated to investment, the 
flexibility to achieve the transition is higher, 
according to this analysis.28 
Beyond the consumption-driven economy 
Again, this is a really important insight. The default 
assumption is that consumption is not just the 
primary purpose but the principal driver of growth. 
Investment is crucial too. But its role is largely seen 
as being to stimulate the innovation necessary to 
increase consumption flows in the future. Public 
sector spending is often regarded as a ‘necessary 
evil’ – there to correct for failures in the market and 
provide a basic safety net for the least well-off. 
It’s easy to see how we’ve ended up with this 
very specific and rather narrow vision of the 
macro-economy: at first because of the close 
correspondence between consumption growth 
and the living standard; and then later because of 
structural and social lock-in (Chapter 6). 
But the vision has failed. Consumption growth 
is damaging the basis for future wellbeing and 
isn’t even well-aligned with current wellbeing. 
Investment is needed now more than ever. Not to 
stimulate ever higher levels of consumption in the 
future, but to build new infrastructures, to effect 
the transition to renewable energy and to deliver 
key environmental and social goals. And the public 
sector, far from being a ‘distortion’ of the free 
market, has an absolutely crucial role to play in the 
transition. 
The state has clearly emerged as a vital ‘first resort’ 
when markets fail, as they did spectacularly during 
2008. But, as the analysis in this chapter shows, 
the public sector also has an active role to play 
in protecting macro-economic stability, delivering 
public goods, investing in and managing long-term 
infrastructure assets, and co-creating the climate for 
sustainable consumption (Chapter 10).29 
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In short, the assumptions embedded in the 
conventional macro-economics stand in urgent 
need of revision. And the potential to explore this 
possibility clearly exists. Promisingly, we can already 
make a decent guess at some of the characteristics 
of a new macro-economics for sustainability. 
The fundamental macro-economic variables will 
still pertain. People will still spend and they will 
still save. Enterprise will still produce goods and 
services. Government will still raise revenues and 
spend them in the public interest. Both private 
and public sector will both still invest in stocks of 
physical, human and social capital. 
But new macro-economic variables will need to 
be brought explicitly into play. These will almost 
certainly include variables to reflect the energy and 
resource dependency of the economy. They may also 
include variables to reflect the value of environmental 
services or stocks of natural capital. 30 
And there are likely to be key differences even in 
the way that conventional variables play out. The 
balance between consumption and investment, 
the balance between public and private sector, the 
role of different sectors, the nature of productivity 
improvement, the conditions of profitability. All of 
these are likely to be up for renegotiation. 
Investment is certainly going to play an absolutely 
vital role. If debt is to be kept under control this 
suggests that a different savings ratio will be 
needed. And that a different balance between 
consumption and investment in the aggregate 
demand function is likely. In addition, the level and 
nature of this investment almost certainly calls for a 
different balance between public and private sector 
investment. 
It’s worth exploring this last point further. The 
traditional function of investment (Chapter 6) is 
framed around labour productivity. This role is 
likely to diminish in importance. Innovation will 
still be vital, but it will need to be targeted more 
carefully towards sustainability goals. Specifically, 
investments will need to focus on resource 
productivity, renewable energy, clean technology, 
green business, climate adaptation and ecosystem 
maintenance and protection. These are some of 
the things to emerge from the consensus around a 
global Green New Deal (Chapter 7). 
What we don’t yet know is how to make the nature 
and scale of this investment work. Keynesianism 
assumes that investment has a ‘multiplier’ effect 
because it stimulates further consumption.31 This is 
true of conventionally-focused business investment. 
But the nature and scale of investment for 
sustainability is very different. 
Investment in resource productivity won’t always 
bring preferential returns unless the relative price 
of labour and materials changes substantially. 
Some investments in renewable energy will only 
bring returns over much longer time frames than 
traditional financial markets expect. And investments 
in ecosystem protection and maintenance might 
not bring conventional financial returns at all, even 
though they are protecting vital ecosystem services 
for the future and may also be contributing to 
employment. 
Simplistic prescriptions in which investment 
contributes to future productivity won’t work 
here. The nature and conditions of investment will 
themselves have to change. Investment in long-
term infrastructures and public goods will have 
to be judged against different criteria. Appendix 
2 sketches the outline for a new macro-economic 
investment framework that builds on these points. 
Particular attention is drawn in Appendix 2 to the 
challenge of matching supply with demand under 
these new conditions. Investments in ecosystem 
maintenance (for example) contribute to aggregate 
demand, but make no direct contribution to 
aggregate supply – at least under the assumptions 
of a conventional production function. They may be 
vital in protecting environmental integrity. And this 
is in its turn vital for sustaining production at all over 
the long-term. But in the short-term, they appear 
to ‘soak up’ income without increasing economic 
output.32 
In a conventional growth-based economy this is 
problematic. In a sustainable economy this kind 
of investment needs to be seen as an essential 
component of macro-economic structure. And yet, 
at the moment, the tools to analyse this dynamic 
properly don’t exist, even if the political will to 
implement such a strategy were in place. We return 
to the policy implications of this in Chapter 11. 
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In the meantime, the aim of this chapter has been to 
show that a new macro-economics for sustainability 
is not only essential, but possible. The starting point 
must be to relax our presumption of perpetual 
consumption growth as the only possible basis for 
stability and to identify clearly the conditions that 
define a sustainable economy. 
These conditions will still include a strong 
requirement for economic stability. Or perhaps 
‘resilience’ would be a better word for what is 
required here. A sustainable economy must be 
capable of resisting the exogenous shocks and avoid 
the internal contradictions which have caused chaos 
in the last year. 
But the requirement for resilience will need to be 
augmented by conditions that address distributional 
equity, impose sustainable levels of resource 
throughput, and provide for the protection of critical 
natural capital. 
In operational terms, this new macro-economy will 
require enhanced investment in public infrastructures, 
in sustainable technologies and in ecosystem 
maintenance. It is likely to demand a different 
balance between public and private goods. It will 
require us to reframe our concepts of productivity 
and profitability. Above all, a new macro-economics 
for sustainability will be ecologically and socially 
literate, ending the folly of separating economy 
from society and environment.
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Flourishing –  
within limits
“ We must bring back into society a deeper sense of 
the purpose of living. The unhappiness in so many 
lives ought to tell us that success alone is not 
enough. Material success has brought us to  
a strange spiritual and moral bankruptcy.”
9
Ben Okri
October 20081
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Prosperity is not synonymous with material wealth. 
And the requirements of prosperity go beyond 
material sustenance. Rather, prosperity has to do 
with our ability to flourish: physically, psychologically 
and socially. Beyond sheer subsistence or survival, 
prosperity hangs on our ability to participate 
meaningfully in the life of society. 
This task is as much social and psychological as it 
is material. But the appealing idea that (once our 
material needs are satisfied) we could do away with 
material things flounders on a simple but powerful 
fact: material goods provide a vital language through 
which we communicate with each other about the 
things that really matter: family, identity, friendship, 
community, purpose in life.
There is clearly a puzzle here. If participation is really 
what matters, and material goods provide a language 
to facilitate that, then richer societies ought to show 
more evidence of it. In fact, the opposite appears to 
be the case. Robert Putnam’s groundbreaking book 
Bowling Alone provided extensive evidence of the 
collapse of community across the USA.2 
Social Recession 
Modern western society appears to be in the grip of 
a ‘social recession’. There is a surprising agreement 
on this from across the political spectrum. Jonathan 
Rutherford (from the political left) and Jesse Norman 
(from the political right) both presented evidence 
on it to Redefining Prosperity. Rutherford pointed 
to rising rates of anxiety and clinical depression, 
increased alcoholism and binge drinking, and a 
decline in morale at work. Norman highlighted 
the breakdown of community, a loss of trust across 
society and rising political apathy.3
The two authors disagree on the causes of social 
recession. For Rutherford, the main culprit is the 
increasing commoditisation of public goods and 
the rising social inequalities that are engendered 
by capitalism itself. For Norman it is the over-
bearing influence of ‘big’ government in people’s 
lives. Their prescriptions for solving the problem 
differ accordingly. But on the existence of a social 
recession there is much less disagreement. 
The extent of this phenomenon clearly differs across 
different nations. Data from a recent module in the 
European Social Survey designed to measure social 
wellbeing illustrate this point. Figure 21 shows the 
different levels of trust and belonging experienced 
by respondents across 22 European nations. Those 
with the highest scores (e.g. Norway) experience 
far greater levels of trust and belonging than those 
with lower scores (e.g. the UK). 
It’s commonly agreed that some at least of the 
reasons for the breakdown in trust lie in the erosion 
of geographical community. A study by Sheffield 
University for the BBC confirms this trend in the UK. 
Using an index to measure geographical community 
in different BBC regions, the study revealed a 
remarkable change in British society since the early 
1970s. Incomes doubled on average over the 30 
year period. But the Sheffield ‘loneliness index’4 
increased in every single region measured. In fact, 
according to one of the report’s authors ‘even the 
weakest communities in 1971 were stronger than 
any community now’.5
The increasing number of people living on their 
own has a number of different causes, including a 
substantial hike in the divorce rate between 1971 
and 2001.6 The study’s authors link the changes 
over time largely to mobility. ‘Increased wealth and 
improved access to transport has made it easier 
for people to move for work, for retirement, for 
schools, for a new life’, reports the BBC. They might 
also have mentioned that the mobility of labour is 
one of the requirements for higher productivity in 
the growth economy.7 
In other words, some degree of responsibility for the 
change appears to be attributable to growth itself. 
As evidence for flourishing it doesn’t look good. 
And it becomes even more puzzling why rich 
societies continue to pursue material growth. 
Fixing the economy is only part of the problem. Addressing the social logic of consumerism 
is also vital. This task is far from simple – mainly because of the way in which material goods 
are so deeply implicated in the fabric of our lives.
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A Life without Shame 
Interestingly, Sen came close to addressing this 
puzzle in his early work on the ‘living standard’. 
There he argued that the material requirements for 
physiological flourishing tend to be fairly similar in 
all societies. After all, the basic human metabolism 
doesn’t change so much across the species. Crucially, 
however, Sen claimed that the material requirements 
associated with social and psychological capabilities 
can vary widely between different societies. 
His argument harks back to Adam Smith’s insight on 
the importance of shame in social life. ‘A linen shirt, 
for example, is, strictly speaking, not a necessary 
of life,’ wrote Smith in The Wealth of Nations. ‘But 
in the present times, through the greater part of 
Europe, a creditable day labourer would be ashamed 
to appear in public without a linen shirt, the want of 
which would be supposed to denote that disgraceful 
degree of poverty which, it is presumed, no body 
can well fall into without extreme bad conduct.’ 9  
Sen broadens this argument to a wider range of 
goods, and a deeper sense of flourishing. To lead 
a ‘life without shame,’ he claimed in The Living 
Standard, ‘to be able to visit and entertain one’s 
friends, to keep track of what is going on and what 
others are talking about, and so on, requires a more 
expensive bundle of goods and services in a society 
that is generally richer and in which most people 
already have, say, means of transport, affluent 
clothing, radios or television sets, and so on.’ In 
short, he suggested, ‘the same absolute level of 
capabilities may thus have a greater relative need 
for incomes (and commodities)’.10 
Putting aside for a moment the fact that higher 
incomes have – in the same token – been partly 
responsible for diminished flourishing, there is an 
Figure 21   Trust and Belonging in 22 European Nations8
Figure 20: A Low Growth Scenario for Canada: Resilience 
Figure 21: Trust and Belonging in 22 European Nations
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even more striking point to be noted here. If we take 
for granted the importance of material commodities 
for social functioning, there is never any point at 
which we will be able to claim that enough is 
enough. This is the logic of Sen’s argument. The 
baseline for social functioning is always the current 
level of commodities. And the avoidance of shame 
– a key feature of social flourishing – will drive 
material demand forward relentlessly. 
This is in effect a different framing of the social 
logic explored in Chapter 6. But the social trap is 
now even clearer. At the individual level it makes 
perfect sense to avoid shame. It is essential to 
social (and psychological) flourishing. But the 
mechanism for doing so in the consumer society is 
inherently flawed. At the societal level it can only 
lead to fragmentation and anomie. And in doing so 
it undermines the best intentions of the individual 
as well. It looks suspiciously like the language of 
goods just isn’t doing its job properly. All that’s left 
is an undignified scrap to try and ensure that we’re 
somewhere near the top of the pile. 
Most worrying of all is that there is no escape from 
this social trap within the existing paradigm. While 
social progress depends on the self-reinforcing cycle 
of novelty and anxiety, the problem can only get 
worse. Material throughput will inevitably grow. And 
the prospects for flourishing within ecological limits 
evaporate. Prosperity itself – in any meaningful 
sense of the word – is under threat. Not from the 
current economic recession, but from the continuing 
surge of materialism, and from the economic model 
that perpetuates it. 
Alternative hedonism 
Change is essential. And some mandate for this 
change already exists. There is cross-party concern 
over the social recession. And alarm at evidence like 
the Sheffield study. Politicians struggle for solutions. 
Small scale initiatives aimed at addressing the 
pernicious impacts of social recession are springing 
up across the country, led by local authorities or 
community groups.11 
The philosopher Kate Soper points to a growing 
appetite for ‘alternative hedonism’ – sources 
of satisfaction that lie outside the conventional 
market. In her contribution to Redefining Prosperity 
she describes a widespread disenchantment with 
modern life – what she refers to as a ‘structure of 
feeling’ – that consumer society has passed some 
kind of critical point, where materialism is now 
actively detracting from human wellbeing. 12  
Anxious to escape the work and spend cycle, we 
are suffering from a ‘fatigue with the clutter and 
waste of modern life’ and yearn for certain forms 
of human interaction that have been eroded. We 
would welcome interventions to correct the balance, 
according to Soper. A shift towards alternative 
hedonism would lead to a more ecologically 
sustainable life that is also more satisfying and 
would leave us happier.13
Some statistical evidence supports this view. 
Psychologist Tim Kasser has highlighted what he calls 
the high price of materialism. In his contribution to 
Redefining Prosperity, he shows how materialistic 
values such as popularity, image and financial 
success are psychologically opposed to ‘intrinsic’ 
values like self-acceptance, affiliation, a sense of 
belonging in the community.14 
Even more striking is Kasser’s evidence that people 
with higher intrinsic values are both happier and 
have higher levels of environmental responsibility 
than those with materialistic values. This finding is 
extraordinary because it suggests there really is a kind 
of double or triple dividend in a less materialistic life: 
people are both happier and live more sustainably 
when they favour intrinsic goals that embed them 
in family and community. Flourishing within limits is 
a real possibility, according to this evidence. 
It’s a possibility that has already been explored to 
some extent from within modern society. Against the 
surge of consumerism, there are already those who 
have resisted the exhortation to ‘go out shopping’, 
preferring instead to devote time to less materialistic 
pursuits (gardening, walking, enjoying music or 
reading, for example) or to the care of others. Some 
people (up to a quarter of the sample in a recent 
study) have even accepted a lower income so that 
they could achieve these goals.15 
Beyond this ‘quiet revolution’, there have also been 
a series of more radical initiatives aimed at living 
a simpler and more sustainable life.16 ‘Voluntary 
simplicity’ is at one level an entire philosophy 
for life. It draws extensively on the teachings of 
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the Indian cultural leader Mahatma Gandhi who 
encouraged people to ‘live simply, that others might 
simply live’. In 1936, a student of Gandhi’s described 
voluntary simplicity in terms of an ‘avoidance of 
exterior clutter’ and the ‘deliberate organisation of 
life for a purpose’.17 
Former Stanford scientist Duane Elgin picked up this 
theme of a way of life that is ‘outwardly simple, 
yet inwardly rich’ as the basis for revisioning human 
progress.18 More recently, psychologist Mihalyi 
Csikszentmihalyi has offered a scientific basis for 
the hypothesis that our lives can be more satisfying 
when engaged in activities which are both purposive 
and materially light.19 
Some of these so-called ‘intentional’ initiatives, 
such as the Findhorn community in northern 
Scotland, emerged initially as spiritual communities, 
attempting to create space in which it was possible 
to reclaim the contemplative dimension of our lives 
that used to be captured by religious institutions. 
Findhorn’s character as an eco-village developed 
more recently, building on principles of justice and 
respect for nature.20 
Another modern example is Plum Village, the 
‘mindfulness’ community established by the exiled 
Vietnamese monk Thich Nhat Hahn in the Dordogne 
area of France, which now provides a retreat for 
over 2,000 people. These initiatives are modern 
equivalents of more traditional religious communities 
like those of the Amish in North America or the 
network of Buddhist monasteries in Thailand – in 
which every young male is expected to spend some 
time before going out into professional life.21
Not all networks have this explicit spiritual character. 
The Simplicity Forum, for example, launched in 
North America in 2001, is a loose secular network 
of ‘simplicity leaders’ who are committed to 
‘achieving and honoring simple, just and sustainable 
ways of life.’ Downshifting Downunder is an even 
more recent initiative, launched off the back of an 
international conference on downshifting held in 
Sydney during 2005; its aim is to ‘catalyze and co-
ordinate a downshifting movement in Australia that 
will significantly impact sustainability and social 
capital’.22
The downshifting movement now has a surprising 
degree of allegiance across a number of developed 
economies. A recent survey on downshifting in 
Australia found that 23% of respondents had 
engaged in some form of downshifting in the five 
years prior to the study. A staggering 83% felt that 
Australians are too materialistic. An earlier study in 
the US found that 28% had taken some steps to 
simplify and 62% expressed a willingness to do so. 
Very similar results have been found in Europe.23 
Research on the success of these initiatives is quite 
limited. But the findings from studies that do exist 
are interesting. In the first place, the evidence 
confirms that ‘simplifiers’ appear to be happier. 
Consuming less, voluntarily, can improve subjective 
wellbeing – completely contrary to the conventional 
model.24 
At the same time, intentional communities remain 
marginal. The spiritual basis for them doesn’t appeal 
to everyone, and the secular versions seem less 
resistant to the incursions of consumerism. Some of 
these initiatives depend heavily on having sufficient 
personal assets to provide the economic security 
needed to pursue a simpler lifestyle. 
More importantly, even those in the vanguard of 
social change turn out to be haunted by conflict 
– internal and external.25 External conflicts arise 
because people are trying to live quite literally 
in opposition to the structures and values that 
dominate society. In the normal course of events, 
these structures and values shape and constrain how 
people behave. They have a profound influence on 
how easy or hard it is to behave sustainably.26 
The role of structural change 
Examples of the perverse effect of dominant 
structures are legion: private transport is incentivised 
over public transport; motorists are prioritised 
over pedestrians; energy supply is subsidised and 
protected, while demand management is often 
chaotic and expensive; waste disposal is cheap, 
economically and behaviourally; recycling demands 
time and effort: ‘bring centres’ are few and far 
between and often overflowing with waste. 
Equally important are the subtle but damaging 
signals sent by government, regulatory frameworks, 
financial institutions, the media, and our education 
systems: business salaries are higher than those 
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in the public sector, particularly at the top; nurses 
and those in the caring professions are consistently 
lower paid; private investment is written down 
at high discount rates making long-term costs 
invisible; success is counted in terms of material 
status (salary, house size etc); children are brought 
up as a ‘shopping generation’ – hooked on brand, 
celebrity and status.27
Policy and media messages about the recession 
underline this point. Opening the huge new Westfield 
Shopping Centre in White City in October 2008, 
London Mayor Boris Johnson spoke of persuading 
people to come out and spend their money, despite 
the credit crunch. Londoners had made a ‘prudent 
decision to give Thursday morning a miss and come 
shopping’, he said of the huge crowds who attended 
the opening.28
Little wonder that people trying to live more 
sustainably find themselves in conflict. These kinds 
of asymmetry represent a culture of consumption 
that sends all the wrong signals, penalising pro-
environmental behaviour, and making it all but 
impossible even for highly-motivated people to act 
sustainably without personal sacrifice. 
It’s really important to take this evidence seriously. 
As laboratories for social change, intentional 
households and communities are vital in pointing 
to the possibilities for flourishing within ecological 
limits. But they are also critical in highlighting the 
limits of voluntarism. 
Simplistic exhortations for people to resist 
consumerism are destined to failure. Particularly 
when the messages flowing from government are 
so painfully inconsistent. People readily identify 
this inconsistency and perceive it as hypocrisy. 
Or something worse. Under current conditions, 
it’s tantamount to asking people to give up key 
capabilities and freedoms as social beings. Far from 
being irrational to resist these demands, it would be 
irrational not to, in our society. 
Several lessons flow from this. The first is the obvious 
need for government to get its message straight. 
Urging people to Act on CO
2
, to insulate their homes, 
turn down their thermostat, put on a jumper, drive 
a little less, walk a little more, holiday at home, buy 
locally produced goods (and so on) will either go 
unheard or be rejected as manipulation for as long 
as all the messages about high street consumption 
point in the opposite direction.29 
Equally, it’s clear that changing the social logic of 
consumption cannot simply be relegated to the 
realm of individual choice. In spite of a growing 
desire for change, it’s almost impossible for people 
to simply choose sustainable lifestyles, however 
much they’d like to. Even highly-motivated 
individuals experience conflict as they attempt to 
escape consumerism. And the chances of extending 
this behaviour across society are negligible without 
changes in the social structure. 
Conversely, of course, social structures can and do 
shift people’s values and behaviours. Structural 
changes of two kinds must lie at the heart of any 
strategy to address the social logic of consumerism. 
The first will be to dismantle or correct the perverse 
incentives for unsustainable (and unproductive) 
status competition. The second must be to establish 
new structures that provide capabilities for people 
to flourish, and particularly to participate fully in the 
life of society, in less materialistic ways. 
What this second avenue means in practice is 
something that requires a more detailed exploration 
than is possible here. It will certainly require 
a keener policy attention to what flourishing 
means, particularly when it comes to questions of 
community, social participation and psychological 
flourishing. But these outcomes cannot be delivered 
in instrumental, ad hoc ways. Policy must pay closer 
attention to the structural causes of social alienation 
and anomie. It must have the goal of providing 
capabilities for flourishing at its heart.
This idea has some resonances with the concept of 
a service-based economy (Chapter 8). Specifically, 
the strategy suggested here replaces the centrality 
of material commodities as the basis for profitability 
with the idea of an economy designed explicitly 
around delivering the capabilities for human 
flourishing. 
More than this, of course, these capabilities will 
have to be delivered with considerably less material 
input. We will need to call on the creativity of the 
entrepreneur in a different way than in the past. 
Social innovation is going to be vital in achieving 
change. But so too is a closer attention to the 
question of limits. Creating continuity and cohesion 
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must be balanced against stimulating change. 
A core element in this strategy must be the reduction 
of social inequality. Unproductive status competition 
increases material throughput and creates distress. 
In his book Affluenza, clinical psychologist Oliver 
James presents evidence that more unequal societies 
systematically report higher levels of distress than 
more equal societies.30
A key point of influence here will lie in the structure 
of wages. This balance has consistently rewarded 
competitive and materialistic outcomes even when 
these are socially detrimental – as the lessons from 
the financial crisis made clear. Reducing the huge 
income disparities that result from this would send 
a powerful signal about what is valued in society. 
Better recognition for those engaged in child-care, 
care for the elderly or disabled and volunteer work 
would shift the balance of incentives away from 
status competition and towards a more cooperative, 
and potentially more altruistic society. 
Increased investment in public goods and social 
infrastructure is another vital point of influence. 
This has already been identified as an essential 
component in the macro-economics of sustainability 
(Chapter 8). In addition to its role in ensuring 
economic resilience, it sends a powerful signal 
about the balance between private interests and 
the public good. 
In summary, we are faced with an unavoidable 
challenge. A limited form of flourishing through 
material success has kept our economies going 
for half a century or more. But it is completely 
unsustainable and is now undermining the 
conditions for a shared prosperity. This materialistic 
vision of prosperity has to be dismantled. 
The idea of an economy whose task is to provide 
capabilities for flourishing within ecological limits 
offers the most credible vision to put in its place. 
But this can only happen through changes that 
support social behaviours and reduce the structural 
incentives to unproductive status competition.  
The rewards from these changes are likely to be 
significant. A less materialistic society will be a 
happier one. A more equal society will be a less 
anxious one. Greater attention to community and 
to participation in the life of society will reduce 
the loneliness and anomie that has undermined 
wellbeing in the modern economy. Enhanced 
investment in public goods will provide lasting 
returns to the nation’s prosperity. 
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Governance  
for Prosperity
“Thecurrentfinancialcrisishasalsobecomeapoliticalcrisis
thatisreconfiguringtheroleofgovernmentintheeconomy
andconventionalwisdomabouttheappropriaterelationship
betweenthepublicandtheprivatesector.”
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Two specific components of change have been 
identified. The first (Chapter 8) is the need to 
develop a new macro-economics for sustainability. 
This new macro-economics will have to become 
more ecologically literate. It will also need to reduce 
the structural reliance on consumption growth and 
find a different mechanism to achieve underlying 
stability. 
The existing mechanism, in any case, has failed us. 
A resilient economy – capable of resisting external 
shocks, maintaining people’s livelihoods, and living 
within our ecological means – is the goal we should 
be aiming for here. 
The second component of change lies in shifting the 
social logic of consumerism (Chapter 9). This change 
has to proceed through the provision of real, credible 
alternatives through which people can flourish. 
And these alternatives must go beyond making basic 
systems of provision (in food, housing and transport, 
for example) more sustainable. They must also 
provide capabilities for people to participate fully in 
the life of society, without recourse to unsustainable 
material accumulation and unproductive status 
competition. 
Making these changes may well be the biggest 
challenge ever faced by human society. Inevitably it 
raises the question of governance – in the broadest 
sense of the word. How is a shared prosperity to be 
achieved in a pluralistic society? How is the interest 
of the individual to be balanced against the common 
good? What are the mechanisms for achieving this 
balance? These are some of the questions raised 
by this challenge. Specifically, of course, such 
changes raise questions about the nature and role 
of government itself. 
The role of government 
Debates over whether we need more state or less 
state have been fiercely fought at times and have 
complex roots in history.2 But some striking shifts 
in this debate occurred as a result of the economic 
recession. The financial crisis of 2008 rewrote the 
boundary between the public and the private sector 
and changed profoundly the landscape of 21st 
Century politics. 
Part-nationalisation of financial sector institutions was 
an almost shocking turn of events, particularly from 
a free market perspective in which government is 
broadly seen as a distortion of the market. And yet 
there was little disagreement anywhere about the role 
of the state in times of crisis. On the contrary, the only 
possible response when the economy failed was for 
governments to intervene. Even the die-hards agreed 
on this. ‘Finance is inherently unstable,’ acknowledged 
The Economist in the early days of the crisis. ‘So the 
state has to play a big role in making it safer by lending 
in a crisis in return for regulation and oversight.’3 
Extending this responsibility to the task of 
building a credible and robust macroeconomics 
for sustainability seems entirely reasonable. It is 
admittedly a more complex task than anything 
faced in conventional macro-economics; in part 
because it has to depart from the well-worn formula 
of laissez-faire consumption growth as the basis for 
stability; and in part because it requires a closer 
attention to key ecological variables. For these 
reasons, progress will depend on engaging a wider 
community of advice than conventional approaches 
do. But the responsibility for taking it forwards lies 
unequivocally with government.
Beyond this quite specific responsibility, there are 
vital questions about the role of government – and 
the mechanisms for governance – in a much broader 
sense. Where, for example, does responsibility lie 
for the other key task identified here: redressing 
the social logic of consumerism? Policy-makers 
are (perhaps rightly) uncomfortable with the idea 
that they have a role in influencing people’s values 
and aspirations. But the truth is that governments 
intervene constantly in the social context, whether 
they like it or not. 
Achieving a lasting prosperity relies on providing capabilities for people to flourish - within 
certain limits. Those limits are established not by us, but by the ecology and resources of a 
finite planet. Unbounded freedom to expand our material appetites just isn’t sustainable. 
Change is essential. 
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A myriad different signals are sent out, for example, 
by the way in which education is structured, by the 
importance accorded to economic indicators, by 
public sector performance indicators, by procurement 
policies, by the impact of planning guidelines on 
public and social spaces, by the influence of wage 
policy on the work-life balance, by the impact of 
employment policy on economic mobility (and 
hence on family structure and stability), by the 
effect of trading standards on consumer behaviour, 
by the degree of regulation of advertising and the 
media, and by the support offered to community 
initiatives and faith groups. 
In all these arenas, policy shapes and co-creates the 
social world. So the idea that it is not only legitimate 
but possible for the state to intervene in changing 
the social logic of consumerism is far less problematic 
than is often portrayed. A critical task is to identify 
(and correct) those aspects of this complex social 
structure which provide perverse incentives in favour 
of a materialistic individualism and undermine the 
potential for a shared prosperity. 
At one level, this task is as old as the hills. It is, 
in part at least, the task of balancing individual 
freedoms against the social good. It relies crucially 
on being able to make prudent choices – both at 
the individual and at the social level – between the 
present and the future. In fact, rampant individualism 
which seeks short-term material gratification ends 
up undermining prosperity – not just for society as a 
whole, but at the individual level as well. 
Oxford economic historian Avner Offer addresses 
exactly this problem in The Challenge of Affluence.4 
Left to our own devices, argues Offer, individual 
choices tend to be irredeemably myopic. We favour 
today too much over tomorrow, in ways which, to an 
economist, appear entirely inexplicable under any 
rational rate of discounting of the future. Economists 
call this the problem of ‘hyperbolic’ discounting. It’s 
not unfamiliar in itself. Offer’s unique contribution is 
to suggest that this fallibility has (or has in the past 
had) a social solution. 
To prevent ourselves from trading away our long-
term wellbeing for the sake of short-term pleasures, 
society has evolved a whole set of ‘commitment 
devices’: social and institutional mechanisms which 
moderate the balance of choice away from the 
present and in favour of the future. 
Savings accounts, marriage, norms for social 
behaviour, government itself in some sense: all 
these can be regarded as commitment devices. 
Mechanisms which make it a little easier for us to 
curtail our appetite for immediate arousal and protect 
our own future interests. And indeed – although this 
is less obvious in Offer’s exposition – the interests of 
affected others, including future generations. 
The trouble is, as Offer demonstrates, affluence itself 
is eroding and undermining these commitment 
devices. The increase in family breakdown and the 
decline in trust have already been noted (Chapter 9). 
Parenthood has come under attack in developed 
countries. The financial crisis is in part a product 
of the erosion of economic commitment. And the 
hollowing out of government has left us ill-prepared 
to deal with the ‘crisis of commitment’.5 
Strikingly, Offer places a key responsibility for this 
erosion on the relentless pursuit of novelty in 
modern society. This dynamic has been addressed 
already in structural terms (Chapter 6). Novelty 
keeps us buying more stuff. Buying more stuff 
keeps the economy going. The end result is a society 
‘locked in’ to consumption growth by forces outside 
the control of individuals. 
Physical infrastructure and social architecture 
conspire against us. Lured by our evolutionary 
roots, bombarded with persuasion, and seduced 
by novelty: we are like children in the sweet shop, 
knowing that sugar is bad for us; unable to resist 
the temptation. 
These insights are damning for the prospects 
of laissez-faire individualism being a sufficient 
governance mechanism for a lasting prosperity. 
Left to our own individual devices, it seems, there 
is not much hope that people will spontaneously 
behave sustainably. As evolutionary biologist Richard 
Dawkins has concluded, sustainability just ‘doesn’t 
come naturally’ to us. 
Selfishness and altruism 
At the same time it is mistaken to assume that 
human motivations are all selfish. Evolution doesn’t 
preclude moral, social and altruistic behaviours. 
On the contrary, social behaviours evolved in humans 
precisely because they offer selective advantages 
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to the species. All of us are torn to some extent 
between selfishness and altruism. 
The psychologist Shalom Schwartz and his 
colleagues have formalised this insight in terms of 
underlying human values. Using a scale that has 
now been tested in over 50 countries, Schwartz 
suggests that our values are structured around two 
distinct tensions within the psychological make-
up of human beings. One is the tension between 
selfishness (self-enhancement, in Schwartz’s 
scheme) and altruism (self-transcendence) noted 
above. The other is between openness to change 
and conservation – or in other words between 
novelty and the maintenance of tradition.6  
Schwartz provided an evolutionary explanation for 
these tensions. As society evolved in groups, people 
were caught between the needs of the individual 
and the needs of the group. And as they struggled 
for survival in sometimes hostile environments, 
people were caught between the need to adapt and 
to innovate and the need for stability. In other words, 
both individualism and the pursuit of novelty have 
played an adaptive role in our common survival. But 
so have altruism and conservation or tradition. 
The important point here is that each society strikes 
the balance between altruism and selfishness (and 
also between novelty and tradition) in different 
places.7 And where this balance is struck depends 
crucially on social structure. When technologies, 
infrastructures, institutions, social norms reward self-
enhancement and novelty, then selfish sensation-
seeking behaviours prevail over more considered, 
altruistic ones. Where social structures favour 
altruism and tradition, self-transcending behaviours 
are rewarded and selfish behaviour may even be 
penalised.8
This finding suggests that we must ask searching 
questions about the balance of the institutions 
that characterise modern society. Do they promote 
competition or cooperation? Do they reward self-
serving behaviour or people who sacrifice their own 
gain to serve others? What signals do government, 
schools, the media, religious and community 
institutions send out to people? Which behaviours are 
supported by public investments and infrastructures 
and which are discouraged? 
Increasingly, it seems, the institutions of consumer 
society are designed to favour a particularly 
materialistic individualism and to encourage the 
relentless pursuit of consumer novelty. 
Government plays a crucial role in this, partly 
because it bears a responsibility for the stability of 
the macro-economy. The individualistic pursuit of 
novelty is a key requirement in consumption growth 
and economic stability depends on consumption 
growth. Little surprise then that the drift of policy is 
in these directions. The erosion of commitment, in 
Offer’s terms, is a structural requirement for growth 
as well as a structural consequence of affluence. 
Varieties of capitalism
This drift has not been uniform across all nations. 
Harvard historian Peter Hall and Oxford economist 
David Soskice have made an extensive study of the 
different ‘varieties of capitalism’. They distinguish 
two main types of capitalism across the advanced 
nations. Liberal market economies (specifically the 
UK, the USA, Canada and Australia) led the march 
towards competition and deregulation, particularly 
during the 1980s and 1990s. Coordinated market 
economies (such as Japan, Germany, Austria and 
the Scandinavian countries) depend more heavily 
on strategic interactions between firms – rather than 
competition – to coordinate economic behaviour.9 
There are some clear differences between the 
different kinds of economy. For example, inequality 
tends to be higher in liberalised market economies 
than in coordinated market economies. And it is 
mainly in the liberalised market economies that 
savings rates have fallen so dramatically in recent 
years and consumer debt has soared. In Germany, 
the government has had the opposite problem 
over the last decade, finding it hard to persuade its 
citizens to save less and consume more. 
Some other interesting differences emerge. Figure 
22 shows the indexed unemployment rates during 
the run-up to the economic crisis in two liberalised 
market economies (the UK and the US) and two 
coordinated market economies (Germany and 
Denmark). Though starting from a much higher 
base, unemployment in Germany fell by almost 
20% over the period from mid-2007 to the end of 
2008.10 In Denmark, where unemployment was 
already low, the fall was even greater (35%) over 
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the period. In the UK, by contrast, unemployment 
rose by 11% in the last half of 2008, while the US 
saw unemployment increase by over a third since 
July 2007. 
Recent work suggests that the different varieties 
of capitalism also perform differently in relation to 
ecological impacts, opportunities for skills training 
and various aspects of social capital.12 Tim Kasser 
and his colleagues show that people in liberalised 
market economies tend to have higher per capita 
carbon emissions, higher infant mortality, higher 
teenage pregnancies and a greater percentage of 
people reporting that they ‘feel like an outsider’.13 
Not all these findings are replicated consistently across 
all liberalised market economies and all coordinated 
market economies.14 Indeed there is some suggestion 
that the distinctions between liberalised and coordinated 
market economies are not as profound as they were 
through the 1980s and 1990s when Hall and Soskice 
carried out their analysis. 
Ironically, as we saw in Chapter 2, Germany suffered 
more during the early months of the financial crisis 
from building its economy on exports, than the 
UK did from building its economy on domestic 
consumption. Both economies, ultimately, were 
predicated on a materialistic consumerism fuelled 
by debt. And it’s too early to tell which one will 
emerge stronger in the end. In a recent article for the 
Huffington Post, Peter Hall argues that Germany’s 
domestic prudence and strong manufacturing base 
will make it more resilient in long run.15  
But the truth is that none of the varieties of capitalism 
is immune from the increasingly global recession. 
All of them are to a greater or lesser extent bound 
up in the pursuit of economic growth. Differences 
in social and economic organisation are differences 
in degree rather than fundamental differences in 
kind. And a key element in the political economy 
of all capitalist nations appears to be the role of 
government in protecting and stimulating economic 
growth. 
The conflicted state
Governance mechanisms emerged in human society 
to protect social behaviours.16 The principal role of 
government is to ensure that long-term public goods 
are not undermined by short-term private interests. 
It seems ironic then, that governments across 
the world – and in particular in the liberal market 
economies – have been so active in championing 
the pursuit of individual freedoms, often elevating 
consumer sovereignty above social goals and 
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actively encouraging the expansion of the market 
into different areas of people’s lives. 
It is particularly odd to see this tendency going hand 
in hand with the desire to protect social and ecological 
goals. It’s notable for example that the UK, one of 
the most fiercely liberal market economies, has also 
been a vociferous champion of sustainability, social 
justice and climate change policy. The UK’s 2005 
Sustainable Development Strategy received wide 
spread international praise. Its 2008 Climate Change 
Act is a world-leading piece of legislation.
There is a real sense here of policy-makers struggling 
with competing goals. On the one hand government 
is bound to the pursuit of economic growth. On the 
other, it finds itself having to intervene to protect the 
common good from the incursions of the market. 
The state itself appears deeply conflicted, striving 
on the one hand to encourage consumer freedoms 
that lead to growth and on the other to protect 
social goods and defend ecological limits.17
The reason for this conflict is clear once we recognise 
the critical role that growth plays in macro-economic 
stability. With a vital responsibility to protect jobs 
and to ensure stability, the state is bound (under 
current conditions) to prioritise economic growth. 
And it is locked into this task, even as it seeks to 
promote sustainability and the common good. 
Government itself, in other words, is caught in the 
dilemma of growth. 
Overcoming this dilemma is absolutely vital. The 
lessons from this study make it clear that without 
strong leadership, change will be impossible. 
Individuals are too exposed to social signals and 
status competition. Businesses operate under market 
conditions. A transition from narrow self-interest 
to social behaviours, or from relentless novelty to 
a considered conservation of things that matter, 
can only proceed through changes in underlying 
structure. Changes that strengthen commitment 
and encourage social behaviour. And these changes 
require governments to act. 
The trouble is that the thrust of policy over the 
last half century – particularly in the liberalised 
market economies – has been going in almost 
exactly the opposite direction. Governments have 
systematically promoted materialistic individualism 
and encouraged the pursuit of consumer novelty. 
This trend has been perpetrated, mostly deliberately, 
under the assumption that this form of consumerism 
serves economic growth, protects jobs and maintains 
stability. And as a result, the state has become 
caught up in a belief that growth should trump all 
other policy goals. 
But this narrow pursuit of growth represents a 
horrible distortion of the common good and of our 
underlying human values. It also undermines the 
legitimate role of government itself. At the end of 
the day, the state is society’s commitment device, 
par excellence, and the principal agent in protecting 
our shared prosperity. A new vision of governance 
that embraces this role is critical. 
Of course, such a vision requires a democratic 
mandate. ‘Political change comes from leadership 
and popular mobilisation. And you need both of 
them,’ argued UK Climate Change Secretary Ed 
Miliband in December 2008.18 Authoritarianism is 
damaging to human wellbeing in its own right.19 
And in any case it is unlikely to succeed in modern 
pluralistic societies. Governance for prosperity must 
engage actively with citizens both in establishing 
the mandate and delivering the change. 
But this doesn’t absolve government from its own 
vital responsibility in ensuring a lasting prosperity. 
The role of government is to provide the capabilities 
for its citizens to flourish – within ecological limits. 
The analysis here suggests that, at this point in 
time, that responsibility entails shifting the balance 
of existing institutions and structures away from 
materialistic individualism and providing instead 
real opportunities for people to pursue intrinsic 
goals of family, friendship and community. 
Unfortunately, for as long as macro-economic 
stability depends on economic growth, there will 
be a tendency for governments to support social 
structures that reinforce materialistic, novelty-
seeking individualism. 
But it doesn’t have to be like this. Freeing the 
macro-economy from the structural requirement 
for consumption growth will simultaneously free 
government to play its proper role in delivering 
social and environmental goods and protecting 
long-term interests. The same goal that was 
identified as essential for a macro-economics 
of sustainability is essential to a governance for 
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prosperity. The conflicted state is itself a casualty of 
an unsustainable macroeconomics. And in rescuing 
the macro-economy it has a chance of rescuing 
itself. 
In summary, it emerges that governments must 
now engage urgently in several interrelated tasks: 
1) develop and apply a robust macro-economics 
for sustainability 
2) redress the damaging and unsustainable 
social logic of consumerism 
3) establish and impose meaningful resource 
and environmental limits on economic 
activity. 
The precise policy directions implied by these goals 
must ultimately be a matter for public discourse and 
it lies beyond the scope of this study to address them 
in detail. But in the final chapter, some potential 
policy directions are suggested under each of these 
themes.
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Steps towards a 
Sustainable Economy
“ In the end, this economic agenda won’t just require new money. 
It will require a new spirit of cooperation… We will be called 
upon to take part in a shared sacrifice and shared prosperity.”
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This extraordinary ramping up of global economic 
activity is without historical precedent. It appears 
to be totally at odds with our scientific knowledge 
of the finite resource base and the fragile ecology 
on which we depend for survival. And it has 
already been accompanied by the degradation of 
an estimated 60% of the world’s ecosystems. 
For the most part, we tend to avoid the stark 
reality of these numbers. The default assumption is 
that – financial crises aside – growth will continue 
indefinitely. Not just for the poorest countries, 
where a better quality of life is essential, but even 
for the richest nations where material wealth adds 
little further to people’s quality of life and may even 
threaten the foundations of our wellbeing. 
The reasons for this collective blindness are easy 
enough to find. The modern economy is structurally 
reliant on economic growth for its stability. 
When growth falters, as it has done recently, 
politicians panic. Businesses struggle to survive. 
People lose their jobs and sometimes their homes. 
A spiral of recession looms. Questioning growth 
is deemed to be the act of lunatics, idealists and 
revolutionaries. 
In short, society is faced with a profound dilemma. 
To resist growth is to risk economic and social collapse. 
To pursue it is to endanger the ecosystems on which 
we depend for long-term survival. 
For the most part, this dilemma goes unrecognised in 
mainstream policy or in public debate. When reality 
begins to impinge on the collective consciousness, 
the best suggestion to hand is that we can somehow 
‘decouple’ growth from its material impacts. 
Never mind that decoupling isn’t happening. Never 
mind that no such economy has ever existed. 
Never mind that all our institutions and incentive 
structures continually point in the opposite 
direction. The dilemma, once recognised, looms so 
dangerously over our future that we are desperate 
to believe in miracles. Technology will save us. 
Capitalism is good at technology. So let’s just keep 
the show on the road and hope for the best. 
We can’t entirely dismiss the potential for 
technological breakthroughs. In fact we already 
have at our disposal a range of technologies that 
could begin to deliver effective change. But the idea 
that these will emerge spontaneously by giving free 
reign to the competitive market is patently false. 
This delusional strategy has reached its limits. We 
stand in urgent need of a clearer vision, more honest 
policy-making, something more robust in the way 
of a strategy with which to confront the dilemma 
of growth. 
The starting place must be to confront the structures 
that keep us in damaging denial. The analysis in this 
study suggests that nature and structure conspire 
together here. The endless creativity of capitalism 
and our own relentless striving for social status have 
locked us into an iron cage of consumerism. Affluence 
itself has betrayed us. 
Affluence breeds – and indeed relies on – the 
continual production and consumption of consumer 
novelty. But relentless novelty seeds social anxiety 
and weakens our ability to protect long-term social 
goals. In doing so it ends up undermining our own 
wellbeing and that of others. And somewhere along 
the way, we lose the sense of shared prosperity that 
we sought in the first place. 
For at the end of the day, prosperity goes beyond 
fleeting material pleasures. It transcends material 
concerns. It resides in the quality of our lives and in 
the health and happiness of our families. It is present 
in the strength of our relationships and our trust in 
the community. It is evidenced by our satisfaction at 
work and our sense of shared meaning and purpose. 
It hangs on our potential to participate fully in the 
life of society. Prosperity consists in our ability to 
flourish as human beings – within the ecological 
limits of a finite planet. 
For the last five decades the pursuit of growth has been the single most important policy 
goal across the world. The global economy is almost five times the size it was half a century 
ago. If it continues to grow at the same rate the economy will be 80 times that size by the 
year 2100. 
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Delivering these goals is not an entirely unfamiliar 
task to policy-makers. Governments care about 
health provision. And the recent focus on wellbeing 
has extended that concern to psychological health. 
At the same time these goals too often take second 
place to economic growth. The role of the state 
is too narrowly framed by a misguided vision of 
unbounded consumer freedoms. Governance itself 
stands in urgent need of renewal.
But the current economic crisis presents a unique 
opportunity to invest in change. To sweep away 
the short-term thinking that has plagued society for 
decades. To replace it with considered policy-making 
capable of addressing the enormous challenge of 
delivering a lasting prosperity. 
The policy demands of this task are considerable. 
Specifying them with any degree of precision 
is beyond the scope of this or any other single 
document. First and foremost, they call for a 
concerted and committed effort on the part of 
government to establish a detailed set of viable and 
effective policies for a sustainable economy. This is 
a challenge that governments can no longer afford 
to ignore. Beyond that need, it is possible to identify 
a range of broad policy recommendations on which 
the transition to a sustainable economy could be 
built. 
In the following paragraphs, these recommendations 
are grouped into three main themes that flow 
directly from the analysis in this report. Specifically 
these themes are: 
•	 Building a macro-economics for sustainability
•	 Protecting capabilities for social flourishing; 
and 
•	 Respecting ecological limits
Inevitably, there is some overlap between these 
groupings. Undoubtedly there are things missing 
from the range of policies suggested here. Not all of 
them can be achieved immediately. Not all of them 
can be achieved unilaterally. But taken together they 
offer the foundation from which to build meaningful 
and lasting change. 
Building a Sustainable Macro-Economy
A macro-economy predicated on continual expansion of debt-driven materialistic consumption 
is unsustainable ecologically, problematic socially, and unstable economically (Chapters 2, 5, 6). 
The time is now ripe to develop a new macro-economics for sustainability (Chapters 7 & 8) that 
does not rely for its stability on relentless growth and expanding material throughput. This theme 
includes four specific policy areas to help achieve this goal. 
resource or emission caps; and 3) evaluating the 
impact of changes in natural assets and ecosystem 
functioning on economic stability. 
Examples/precedents: Canadian LowGrow model; 
climate-economy models (cf. IPCC, Stern Review); 
Cambridge Econometrics’ MDM-E3 model; the EU’s 
TEEB study, the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment.2
1 
Developing macro-economic capability 
There is an urgent need to develop the capabilities 
required to build a new macro-economics for 
sustainability. This will include developing tools to 
explore different configurations of the key macro-
economic variables and to map the interactions 
between these and ecological variables. Particular 
challenges include 1) exploring the investment 
demands associated with a sustainable economy; 
2) investigating the economic implications of strict 
12 STEPS TO A SUSTAINABLE ECONOMY
A
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2 
Investing in jobs, assets and infrastructures 
Investment in jobs, assets and infrastructures 
emerges as a key component – not just of economic 
recovery – but of a new macroeconomics for 
sustainability. Targets for this include: public sector 
jobs in building and maintaining public assets; 
investments in renewable energy, public transport 
infrastructure, and public spaces; retrofitting 
the existing building stock with energy- and 
carbon-saving measures; investing in ecosystem 
maintenance and protection; and providing fiscal 
support and training for green businesses, clean 
technologies and resource efficiency. 
Examples/precedents: the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA); UK Pre-Budget Report 
‘green stimulus’; UNEP’s global Green New Deal; 
Deutsche Bank ‘Green Investment’; SDC Sustainable 
New Deal. 
3 
Increasing financial and fiscal prudence 
Debt-driven materialistic consumption has propped 
up economic growth for over a decade. But 
maintaining it has destabilised the macro-economy 
and contributed to the global economic crisis. 
A new era of financial and fiscal prudence needs to 
be ushered in to: reform the regulation of national 
and international financial markets; increase public 
control of the money supply; incentivise domestic 
savings, for example through secure (green) national 
or community-based bonds; outlaw unscrupulous 
and destabilising market practices (such as short-
selling); and provide greater protection against 
consumer debt. 
Examples/precedents: G20 statement on regulation 
of finance and currency markets (Nov 2008); 
Tobin tax; Obama Administration plan to protect 
borrowers. 
4 
Improving macro-economic accounting 
The shortfalls of conventional output or 
consumption-based measures of the GDP are now 
well-established. There is an urgent need to develop 
more robust measures of economic wellbeing that 
correct for the most obvious drawbacks in using 
the GDP. These new measures will need: to account 
more systematically for changes in the asset base; 
to incorporate welfare losses from inequality in the 
distribution of incomes; to adjust for the depletion 
of material resources and other forms of natural 
capital, to account for the social costs of carbon 
emissions and other external environmental and 
social costs; and to correct for positional consumption 
and defensive expenditures. 
Examples/precedents: longstanding critiques in the 
economic literature; the World Bank’s Adjusted Net 
Savings measure; RDA policies on Regional-ISEW; 
Sen/Stiglitz recommendations from the French 
Commission on the Measurement of Economic 
Performance and Social Progress.  
B 
Protecting Capabilities for Flourishing 
The social logic that locks people into materialistic consumerism as the basis for participating in 
the life of society is extremely powerful, but detrimental ecologically and psychologically (Chapters 
4-6). An essential prerequisite for a lasting prosperity is to free people from this damaging dynamic 
and provide opportunities for sustainable and fulfilling lives (Chapter 9). We offer five policy areas 
to help achieve this task.
Sustainable Development Commission Prosperity without Growth? 105
5 
Sharing the work and improving the  
work-life balance3
In a declining or non-increasing economy, working 
time policies are essential for two main reasons: 1) 
to achieve macro-economic stability; 2) to protect 
people’s jobs and livelihoods. But in addition, 
reduced working hours can increase flourishing by 
improving the work-life balance. Specific policies 
need to include: reductions in working hours; 
greater choice for employees on working time; 
measures to combat discrimination against part-
time work as regards grading, promotion, training, 
security of employment, rate of pay and so on; 
better incentives to employees (and flexibility for 
employers) for family time, parental leave, and 
sabbatical breaks. 
Examples/precedents: French, German and Danish 
work-time policies; TUC Green and Decent Work 
seminar.4 
 
6 
Tackling systemic inequality 
Systemic income inequalities drive positional 
consumption, increase anxiety, undermine social 
capital and expose lower income households to 
higher morbidity and lower life satisfaction. Too 
little has been done to reverse the long-term 
trend towards income inequality. But redistributive 
mechanisms and policies are well-established 
and could include: revised income tax structures; 
minimum and maximum income levels; improved 
access to good quality education; anti-discrimination 
legislation; implementing anti-crime measures and 
improving the local environment in deprived areas; 
addressing the impact of immigration on urban and 
rural poverty.
Examples/precedents: proposals for higher income 
tax on higher rate earners in PBR 08; restrictions 
on bonuses in the financial sector; Obama ‘shared 
prosperity’ plan; history of redistributive taxation, in 
many countries.  
7 
Measuring prosperity 
The suggestion that prosperity is not adequately 
captured by conventional measures of economic 
output or consumption leaves open the need to 
define an appropriate measurement framework for 
a lasting prosperity. Specifically this would entail the 
assessment of people’s capabilities for flourishing in 
different sections of the population and across the 
nation as a whole. Developing national accounts of 
wellbeing (or of flourishing) could proceed through 
the measurement of outcome variables such as 
healthy life expectancy, educational participation, 
social wellbeing, trust in the community, social 
capital and so on. A further requirement here is to 
adjust existing economic measurement frameworks 
to account systematically for ecological and social 
factors. 
Examples/precedents: Defra SD indicator No 68; 
Dutch capabilities index; nef’s national wellbeing 
accounts; the Government Economic Service project 
on sustainability and Green Book. 
8 
Strengthening human and social capital 
Understanding that prosperity consists in part in 
our capabilities to participate in the life of society 
demands that attention is paid to the underlying 
human and social resources required for this task. 
Creating resilient social communities is particularly 
important in the face of economic shocks. Specific 
policies are needed to: create and protect shared 
public spaces; strengthen community-based 
sustainability initiatives; reduce geographical 
labour mobility; provide training for green jobs; 
offer better access to lifelong learning and skills; 
place more responsibility for planning in the hands 
of local communities; and protect public service 
broadcasting, museum funding, public libraries, 
parks and green spaces. 
Examples/precedents: Cabinet Office study on social 
capital; Foresight study on wellbeing and intellectual 
capital; Transition Town movement; Environmental 
Action Fund; Young Foundation’s Local Wellbeing 
Project; the ‘Capital Growth’ project. 
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9 
Reversing the culture of consumerism
The culture of consumerism has developed in part 
at least as a means of protecting consumption-
driven economic growth. But it has had damaging 
psychological and social impacts on people’s 
wellbeing. There is a need systematically to 
dismantle incentives towards materialistic 
consumption and unproductive status competition. 
This recommendation will require: stronger 
regulation in relation to the commercial media; 
enhanced support for public sector broadcasting; 
more effective trading standards and stronger 
consumer protection – particularly on questions 
of product durability, sustainability and fair trade. 
Other measures might include: banning advertising 
to children, the establishment of commercial-free 
zones and times, and a funded right of reply to 
advertisers’ claims. 
Examples/precedents: Scandinavian advertising 
policies; public transport ‘quiet zones’; Brazil’s Lei 
Cuidade Limpa. 
C 
Respecting Ecological Limits
The material profligacy of consumer society is depleting key natural resources and placing 
unsustainable burdens on the planet’s ecosystems (Chapter 5). Establishing clear resource and 
environmental limits and integrating these limits into both economic functioning (Chapter 8 and 
Appendix 2) and social functioning (Chapter 9) is essential. The following three policy suggestions 
contribute to that task. 
10 
Imposing clearly defined resource/emissions caps 
A lasting prosperity requires a much closer attention to 
the ecological limits of economic activity. Identifying 
and imposing strict resource and emission caps is 
vital for a sustainable economy. The contraction 
and convergence model developed for climate-
related emissions should be applied more generally. 
Declining caps on throughput should be established 
for all non-renewable resources. Sustainable yields 
should be identified for renewable resources. Limits 
should be established for per capita emissions and 
wastes. Effective mechanisms for imposing caps on 
these material flows should be set in place. Once 
established, these limits need to be built into the 
macro-economic frameworks developed in 1 above. 
Example/precedent: UK climate change budgets; the 
Supplier Obligation; rationing – post-war and Cuba; 
contraction & convergence proposals; Kyoto and post-
Kyoto negotiations; concept of ecological space. 
11 
Fiscal Reform for Sustainability 
The argument for an ecological tax reform – a shift 
in the burden of taxation from economic goods (e.g. 
incomes) to ecological bads (e.g. pollution) – has 
been broadly accepted for at least a decade and 
has been implemented in varying degrees across 
Europe. But progress towards this goal has been 
painfully slow. In the UK the proportion of taxation 
from green taxes is now lower than it was in 1997. 
There’s an urgent need to achieve an order of 
magnitude step-change in the structure of taxation. 
A sustained effort by government is now required 
to design appropriate mechanisms for shifting the 
burden of taxation from incomes onto resources and 
emissions. 
Example/precedent: UK Government 1997 Statement 
of Intent on Environmental Taxation; Danish, German 
experience in Ecological Tax Reforms; the UK Green 
Fiscal Commission (reporting 2009).
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12 
Promoting Technology Transfer and Ecosystem 
Protection 
A key motivation for redefining the basis of 
prosperity in advanced economies is to make room 
for much-needed growth in poorer nations. But as 
these economies expand there will also be an urgent 
need to ensure that development is sustainable and 
remains within ecological limits. International policy 
will be required to establish a global technology fund 
to invest in renewable energy, energy efficiency, 
carbon reduction, and the protection of ‘carbon 
sinks’ (e.g. forests) and biodiversity in developing 
countries. This could be funded through a carbon/
resource levy (payable by importers) on imports 
from developing countries, or through a Tobin tax 
on international currency transfers. 
Example/precedent: Global Environmental Facility, 
Clean Development Mechanism; Development Aid 
targets; funding provisions of the UN Biodiversity 
Convention. 
In summary, these 12 steps offer the foundations 
for a comprehensive policy programme to make the 
transition to a sustainable economy. There is a unique 
opportunity here for government to demonstrate 
economic leadership and champion international 
action on sustainability. But it’s also essential to 
develop financial and ecological prudence at home. 
And we must also begin to redress the perverse 
incentives and damaging social logic that lock us into 
unproductive status competition and materialistic 
consumerism. 
Above all, there is an urgent need to develop a 
new ecologically-literate macro-economics capable 
of offering meaningful guidance for a lasting 
prosperity: a prosperity that for now at least will 
have to do without growth; and may eventually be 
able to replace it altogether. 
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Prosperity without Growth? represents the 
culmination of an extensive inquiry by the UK 
Sustainable Development Commission into the 
relationship between sustainability and economic 
growth. That inquiry was launched in 2003, 
when the Commission published its landmark 
report – Redefining Prosperity – which challenged 
Government ‘fundamentally to rethink the 
dominance of economic growth as the driving force 
in the modern political economy, and to be far 
more rigorous in distinguishing between the kind 
of economic growth that is compatible with the 
transition to a genuinely sustainable society and the 
kind that absolutely isn’t’.1 
That earlier report summarised evidence of a 
‘mismatch’ between economic growth, environ-
mental sustainability and human wellbeing, and 
called on politicians, policy experts, commentators, 
business people, religious leaders and NGOs to ‘put 
these issues on their must-get-to-grips-with agenda, 
rather than defer them endlessly as tomorrow’s 
issues’. The Commission itself kick-started that 
process with a series of stakeholder workshops 
(held during the latter part of 2003) to discuss the 
report’s findings. 
During 2004 and early 2005, SDC worked closely 
with government to renew the UK Sustainable 
Development Strategy. In particular, the Commission 
itself led the engagement process that resulted in 
the five Sustainable Development ‘principles’. A key 
element in these principles is the recognition that 
– rather than being an end in itself – a ‘sustainable 
economy’ should be regarded as the means to 
reaching the more fundamental goal of a ‘strong, 
healthy and just society’ that is ‘living within 
environmental limits’.2 
Following the launch of the new Strategy, 
the Commission helped Government meet its 
commitment in Securing the Future to explore the 
concept of wellbeing and develop new wellbeing 
indicators for the UK. In particular, SDC convened a 
web-based consultation involving several hundred 
respondents to explore people’s perceptions of 
the relationship between wellbeing and economic 
progress.3 
A key finding from the consultation was that the 
conventional measure of economic output – the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) – is widely regarded 
as an inadequate measure of sustainable wellbeing, 
and that there is a need to ‘open out political 
space’ within which to address the shortcomings of 
conventional approaches to prosperity. 
In the spirit of ‘opening out space’, SDC launched a 
new programme of work on prosperity during 2007. 
The programme involved a series of workshops – 
held between November 2007 and April 2008. The 
workshops entailed intensive discussions based 
around invited ‘think-pieces’ on different aspects 
of prosperity from senior academics, policy-makers, 
business and NGOs. The essays and the workshops 
were organised around four related themes. 
•	 Visions of Prosperity: identified a variety of 
different perspectives (historical, economic, 
psychological, religious) on the meaning and 
interpretation of prosperity
•	 Economy ‘Lite’: examined international 
evidence concerning the feasibility of 
‘decoupling’ economic progress from material 
throughput and environmental impact 
•	 Confronting Structure: addressed the 
structural drivers associated with continued 
economic growth and explored the 
impediments to a ‘stationary state economy’
•	 Living Well: explored the links between 
prosperity, economic progress and the 
recent surge of policy and media interest in 
happiness and wellbeing.  
It is intended to publish the seminar contributions as 
an edited collection.4 In the meantime, draft versions 
of these papers can be found on the SDC website 
at: www.sd-commission.org.uk/pages/redefining-
prosperity.html. Together with ‘background’ reports 
prepared by SDC staff (and interns) and the extensive 
literature on growth and sustainability, these essays 
provide a part of the ‘evidence base’ from which 
this study has drawn. 
Appendix 1
The SDC Redefining Prosperity Project
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However, this report is not intended to be a 
commentary on the Redefining Prosperity workshops. 
Nor can it really do justice to the wealth of input and 
advice that we received from those who attended 
the workshops and contributed thinkpieces to them. 
Rather, Prosperity without Growth? aims to convey 
a coherent position on questions of sustainability 
and economic growth; and to offer some clear 
recommendations to policy-makers struggling to take 
concrete steps towards a sustainable economy.
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This annex addresses the broad goal of developing 
a macro-economics for sustainability (Chapter 
8). Explicitly, it sets out some of the features of a 
potential macro-economic simulation model for the 
UK that would be capable of testing the relationship 
between the economy and the demands of 
sustainability. Specific aims of such a model would 
be: 
•	 to test the stability of different macro-
economies under exogenously defined carbon 
emission and energy resource constraints
•	 to explore the potential for macro-economies 
with high investment to consumption ratios 
•	 to explore the potential for macro-economies 
with high public sector expenditure and 
investment
•	 to explore the stability of macro-economies 
with low or no consumption growth 
•	 to explore the stability of macro-economies 
with low or no aggregate demand growth. 
The rationale for exploring different investment-to-
consumption ratios and different public-to-private 
ratios follows from the discussion in Chapter 8. In the 
first case, it is assumed that changes in investment 
structure are a prerequisite for sustainability. In 
particular, there will be a need to shift investment 
substantially towards resource productivity, energy 
efficiency, and low carbon (e.g. renewable) 
technologies. Secondly, some of this investment 
may need to be led by the public sector – because of 
the nature of the required projects. This requirement 
is discussed in more detail below.  
Model Development 
A simple approach to developing a macro-economic 
simulation for the UK economy would be to take 
a broadly Keynesian model in which an aggregate 
demand (AD) function of the form: 
1)  AD ≡ C + G + I + X¯ 
(where C = private consumption, G = government 
expenditure, I = investment and X¯  = net exports) is 
coupled with some form of production function. The 
simplest (and commonest) such production function 
is a two-factor Cobb-Douglas function of the form:
2) Y ≡ Y (K,L) = a.Kα  .L(1-α)   
where K is capital, L is labour, a is an efficiency factor 
and 0 < α < 1 . The fundamental macro-economic 
identity is then given by the equation:1 
3) Y (K,L) = C + G + I + X¯  
This form of production function has been subject to 
two main criticisms by ecological economists: first, 
that it includes no explicit reference to material 
resources; and second, that it assumes perfect 
substitutability between factors. For these reasons, 
we may want to adopt a production function that has 
explicit reference to (say) energy resources (E): 
4) Y ≡ Y (K,E,L)
   
where the energy variable E ≡ E (F,R) accounts 
separately for fossil resources F and renewable 
resources R, and the level of renewable resources 
R in any given year is a function of investment IR in 
renewables capacity. 
5) R
t
 ≡ R
t
 (R
t–1 
,IR
t–1 
)   
We may also want to use a production function 
where the elasticity of substitution is constant 
but less than 1. The general form of three factor 
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production 
function is given by: 
6) Y ≡ a.(αKP +
 
βLρ +
 
γEρ)1/ρ
 
where a is an efficiency factor, α +
 
β + γ = 1 
and ρ = (s – 1)/s where s is the elasticity 
of substitution. 
Finally, we might want the production function 
to be able to ‘pick out’ improvements in resource 
productivity, separately from total factor productivity. 
Our initial requirements for a suitable production 
function are therefore as follows: 
•	 includes explicit account of energy resources 
•	 allows for incomplete substitutability 
between factors
Appendix 2  
Towards a Sustainable Macro-Economy 
Sustainable Development Commission Prosperity without Growth? 111
•	 accounts for resource productivity 
improvements. 
Additionally, we are likely to want our model to 
reflect the more detailed account of investment 
structure that lies at the heart of our exploration 
of alternative macroeconomic structures. In fact, 
this feature of our model could be regarded as the 
single most important innovation over conventional 
macro-economic models and is worth setting out in 
more detail here. 
Specifically, we want to distinguish between different 
forms of investment in two distinct ‘dimensions’: 1) 
the target for investment and 2) the conditions of 
investment. 
Firstly, we are likely to want to identify different 
technological targets for investment. For instance, 
we might want to separate investment dedicated 
to reducing the demand for resources from 
conventional business investments aimed at the 
recapitalisation of productive capacity. Energy 
demand-reducing investments themselves could be 
of two main types, some devoted to improvements 
in energy efficiency; some devoted to substitution of 
renewables (say) for fossil-fuelled technologies. We 
may also want to consider investments dedicated 
to improving ecosystem functioning; or investments 
targeted at climate adaptation. 
Our second ‘dimension’ of investment structure 
follows on from this consideration of investment 
demands in different categories. Specifically, we 
need to identify different conditions of investment. 
For example, investment focused on technological 
efficiency might well be viewed straightforwardly 
as a conventional business sector investment. 
However, investment in ecosystem function or 
adaptation might more realistically be envisaged as 
requiring significant public investment. Somewhere 
between these extremes we might want to consider 
categories of infrastructure investment which 
typically require some public sector involvement. 
The Severn Tidal Barrage may be one potential 
investment in this category. 
Perhaps the most significant difference between 
different investment conditions is the required rate 
(and period) of financial return. Whereas typically, 
models of this kind would assume a single rate of 
return consistent with current commercial conditions, 
a part of the hypothetical exercise set out here 
would be to explore the potential for different kinds 
of investment conditions, which might be more 
suited to the long-term public sector investments 
needed to mitigate or adapt to climate change or to 
restore ecosystem integrity. Taken together, these 
two dimensions suggest a ‘matrix’ of investment 
types, something like the following:2 
Business 
sector – 
commercial 
rate of 
return
Public 
sector 
– quasi 
commercial
Public 
sector – 
social rate 
of return
Energy 
efficiency I 
E
B
  I E
P
   I E
S
      
Renewable 
supply I 
R
B
   I R
P
   I R
S
   
Other 
capacity I 
O
B
   I O
P
   I O
S
   
Climate 
adaptation I 
A
B
   I A
P
   I A
S
   
Ecosystem 
maintenance I 
M
B
   I M
P
   I M
S
   
Table 1: Potential Investment Dimensions in the Model
The next consideration in developing a model 
along the lines outlined here would be to connect 
these different investment types to the production 
function. In principle, investments should add to 
capital stocks, and the augmented capital stocks 
will then lead – via the production function – to 
increased output. In practice, however, connections 
between our different types of investment and the 
production function might be of different kinds. For 
example, energy efficiency investments might lead 
specifically to changes in the efficiency factor in the 
production function. 
Investments in ecosystem maintenance may have 
no direct impact on the production function at all. 
They are ‘non-productive’ in conventional economic 
terms – whatever their importance for sustainability. 
On the other hand, they ‘soak up’ income and have 
to be included in the model. 
Investments in renewable energy (as indicated 
above) might contribute directly to the E factor 
in the production function. Some may be less 
productive (in conventional terms) than others. The 
Tidal Barrage is an example of such an investment 
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– its value is difficult to capture at commercial rates 
of return, in part because of the longevity of the 
investment. 
This is not to denigrate these relatively ‘unproductive’ 
investments. They may be essential to reduce carbon 
emissions, to protect ecosystems or to guarantee 
long-term energy security. The point is that we 
need to be able to distinguish different categories 
of investment in terms of three key parameters: 
1) their contribution to emission limits or resource 
caps; 2) their contribution to aggregate demand; 
and 3) their impact on the productive capacity 
of the economy. While 1) and 2) are relatively 
straightforward to handle exogenously, 3) requires 
us to establish (within the model) a relationship 
between the schedule of investments determined 
by Table 1 and the production function. 
At the moment, it isn’t entirely clear how this is to be 
achieved. Several possibilities exist. One would be to 
assume that different forms of investment augment 
different categories of capital, each of which has 
a different productivity factor. Another would be 
to separate out (energy) resources specifically in 
the production function and relate investment 
to changes in the availability of those resources. 
A further avenue would be to aggregate capital into 
(say) two categories in the production function, 
with different productivity assumptions associated 
with each. 
Broadly speaking, the development of an 
appropriate production function emerges as one of 
the key tasks inherent in taking this work forward. 
One of the difficulties in achieving this lies in the 
calibration of the model. It isn’t clear that we have 
enough econometric data, for example, to estimate 
productivities separately for each of the capital 
stocks implied by Table 1. This may not necessarily 
matter for a simulation model, but at some level we 
will want to ensure that business as usual can be 
calibrated consistently with current trends.  
A further aspect that would need to be developed 
in the model is the ability to map the carbon 
emission and/or resource implications of different 
levels and compositions of aggregate demand. The 
most immediate way to take this forward would 
be to expand or disaggregate the subcategories 
of the aggregate demand function (C, G, I, X) 
and to use an Environmental Input-Output (EIO) 
model3 to attribute the carbon emissions and/or 
energy resource requirements associated with the 
different demand categories using known carbon 
intensities. In principle, this attribution exercise 
could also be used to develop different scenarios 
with different carbon/resource implications, subject 
to some obvious caveats about the limitations of 
the underlying EIO data.4 
In summary, this brief overview serves to establish 
the outlines for a macro-economic model that could 
be used to explore further some of the arguments 
made in this study. In particular, the enhanced 
capability to explore different targets of, and 
conditions for, investment is key. It will be essential 
in understanding how to build a different kind of 
macro-economics, one in which stability is no longer 
predicated on increasing consumption growth, but 
emerges through strategic investment in jobs, social 
infrastructures, sustainable technologies and the 
maintenance and protection of ecosystems.
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Appendix 2
Towards a Sustainable Macro-Economy 
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economic model in Peter Victor’s (2008a) 
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does not constrain the production function 
indices to sum to 1. 
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